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Conditions of Modern Return Migrants – 
Editorial Introduction
JEAN-PIERRE CASSARINO 
European University Institute 
There exists a basic, and too often overlooked, condition in current 
migration management policies, which intimately connects any person 
who returns home from abroad, regardless of the place of origin, 
social background, motivations, prospects, skills and occupational 
status. Beyond the plurality of return migrants’ experiences there is a 
primary element that needs to be taken into consideration: return 
preparedness. Return preparedness refers to a process which, by 
definition, takes place in real life, through time, and is shaped by 
changing circumstances (i.e. personal experiences, contextual factors 
in sending and receiving countries) in their broadest sense. It is not 
only about preparing for return. It is about having the ability, 
although not always the opportunity, to gather the tangible and 
intangible resources needed to secure one’s own return home. This 
thematic issue of the IJMS on the conditions of modern return 
migrants asks two main questions. Why do some migrants have a 
stronger degree of preparedness than others? How is the issue of 
return preparedness dealt with or taken into consideration in the 
framework of contemporary migration management policies? The 
contributors address these questions across various disciplines. 
he rationale for the management of international migration lies in the capacity 
to “influence migration flows” (Salt 2000: 11). Additionally, it is also 
conducive to the reinforced (or more visible) centrality of the state and its 
administration in destination countries (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001: 15) and 
sending countries (Abella 1992: 266). Beyond their conflicting sovereign interests, 
countries of origin and destination share a common objective in the migration 
management agenda: introducing regulatory mechanisms buttressing their position 
as legitimate managers of the mobility of their nationals and foreigners. It is 
precisely the emergence and consolidation of regional trading blocs, at global level, 
that has heightened the political importance of the migration management agenda. 
 T
Never before has the need of state administrations to control count and predict 
migration flows been so strong. Never before has the role of the state in protecting 
its citizens and in defending their rights and privileges been so intertwined with its 
capacity to secure its borders or buffer zones and to regulate migration flows. 
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Today, this cause-and-effect relationship is presented as a fait accompli. However, 
it originates in the recurrence of numerous regional consultative processes (RCPs) 
which, from the early 1990s onwards, have mobilised government officials from 
countries of origin, transit and destination.1
Since then, a plethora of consultative initiatives, conferences and informal 
meetings have taken place, in the context of regional cooperation, gathering 
government officials from sending and receiving countries as well as international 
experts and scholars. From a general point of view, it is possible to identify four 
basic reasons for which these consultative informal meetings succeeded in 
mobilising officials from receiving, sending and transit countries. 
First, they are primarily aimed at fostering inter-state cooperation on migration 
management; hence at developing an inter-state approach that puts national 
governments at the centre of discussions. State sovereignty remains untouched, not 
questioned.  
Second, the participation in RCPs occurs on a voluntary basis. Deliberations are 
kept confidential with a view to favouring open debates on all issues pertaining to 
migration and asylum. State officials choose to participate in such events to gauge 
the views and attitudes of their counterparts, but also because they expect their 
views and interests to be taken seriously. Additionally, the free participation 
implies that if a state decides not to be involved in such consultative forums, then 
its refusal may be interpreted as a form of defection or unwillingness to take part in 
the discussion.  
Third, by promoting exchange of viewpoints and experiences among government 
officials and migration stakeholders, RCPs are also conducive to “informal policy 
networks” (Lavenex 2008: 940) and to a kind of intellectual ambience, or a process 
of socialisation among participants (Thouez and Channac 2006: 384).  
Fourth, and importantly, through the process of repetition,2 these recurrent regional 
consultative processes have contributed to instilling guiding principles, which in 
turn have been erected as normative values paving the way for how international 
migration should best be administered, regulated and understood for the good of 
all.  
This normative construct does not only stem from the recurrence of the above-
mentioned consultations. In addition, the introduction of a lexicon including such 
 
1 The analysis and evolution of RCPs in various regions of the world go beyond the scope of this 
editorial. For a comprehensive analysis see Thouez and Channac (2006) and Martin et al. (2006). 
2 I draw on Hannah Arendt’s reflection regarding the acquired plausibility of political discourses 
through their recurrence, which she mentioned in 1975 on the occasion of a Düsseldorf 
Bildungsforum entitled “The legitimacy of lying in politics?” Briefly stated, something is plausible 
not because it is believed to be true or founded, but because it is (repeatedly) given or shown as 
being so (Arendt 2007: 78–79). In the process of repetition, the most worrying aspect, for Arendt, 
lies in the fact that those who give and receive the plausible “truth” may play interchangeable roles.  
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words and notions as predictability, sustainability, orderliness, interoperability, 
quotas, root causes, comprehensiveness, unwanted migration, prevention, shared 
responsibility, joint ownership, balanced approach, temporariness, has also been 
critical in manufacturing a top-down framework of understanding while 
reinforcing, at the same time, the managerial centrality of the state.  
There is no question that this lexicon, endorsed and used by governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies, has achieved a terminological hegemony in today’s 
official discourse and rhetoric as applied to international migration. Moreover, it 
has promoted a form of hegemonic knowledge through a concomitant process of 
seduction3 shaping the overall interpretation of facts, identifying some key issues 
while hiding others. 
This has had various implications. Perhaps the most important lies in having built a 
hierarchy of priorities and values aimed at best achieving the objectives set out in 
the migration management agenda. The above lexicon is of course a prerequisite to 
making sense of this hierarchy of priorities, for its main function is to delineate the 
contours of the issues that should be tackled first and foremost.  
1. “Return” in the hierarchy of state priorities 
“Return” stands high in the hierarchy of priorities that have been identified in the 
current top-down management of international migration. However, this is not 
because return is viewed as a stage in the migration cycle. It is because return has 
been narrowly defined in the current lexicon of governmental and 
intergovernmental agencies as the fact of leaving the territory of a destination 
country. 
In the European Union (EU), this vision of return has been presented as an 
“integral part” (European Commission 2005: 2) of the instruments aimed at dealing 
with unauthorised or “illegal” migration and at protecting the integrity of the 
immigration and asylum systems in most destination countries. Since the early 
2000s, the return policies of the EU and its Member States have been 
predominantly, if not exclusively, viewed as instruments aimed at fighting against 
unauthorised migration while defining return as “the process of going back to one’s 
country of origin, transit or another third country” (European Council 2002: 29). 
Return has been euphemistically used as a synonym of readmission or expulsion.  
This understanding of return is of course reflective of the normative construct that 
the migration management agenda has consolidated, for it not only reinforces the 
centrality of the state, as mentioned before, but also rationalises its security-
oriented methods and means of implementation. Return merely refers to the act of 
removing unauthorised migrants and rejected asylum-seekers from the European 
 
3 In its Latin usage seducere, i.e. to lead astray. For an analysis of “seduction” in political and public 
discourse, see Jankélévitch (1980).  
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territory. It does not take into account migrants’ post-return conditions, let alone 
their human and financial potential as participants in development. This narrow 
approach to return is enshrined in the draft Directive on common standards and 
procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals adopted by the 
European Parliament in June 2008. 
It is astonishing to observe the hegemony that this approach to return has achieved 
over the last decade and how it is now weaving into various policy areas at national 
and international levels. At a national level, an array of measures, laws and 
infrastructures have been established to serve this design. Detention centres, 
fingerprint identification systems, yearly expulsion quotas, laws on preventative 
custody are just a few examples. At an international level, cooperation in the field 
of readmission (so-called enforced return) with autocratic regimes in neighbouring 
countries has been justified in official discourse as a necessary evil. With reference 
to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Brad Blitz and Sara Hamood aptly show in this 
issue how cooperation on expulsion or readmission has been gradually prioritised 
as a policy of containment, at bilateral (Blitz) and multilateral (Hamood) levels, 
regardless of whether the country of readmission already possesses the capacity to 
fully respect the fundamental rights and to protect the dignity of readmitted 
persons.  
These initiatives have been presented as a bitter remedy or a necessary evil, turning 
cooperation on readmission and reinforcement of border controls into a rational 
solution to fight effectively against unauthorised migration (Joffé 2007). There is 
no question that this cause-and-effect relationship gives rationality and sense to 
official discourse and means of action. They also discard any alternative 
interpretation regarding the actual problem by monopolising the legitimacy of 
specific solutions. 
2. Pervasive top-down schemes of interpretation 
But no evil is necessary, for no evil is unique. To understand this, we need to 
question why this is so and whether it could be otherwise. Why is the issue of 
reintegration so marginal, if not non-existent, in the mechanisms that have been 
implemented so far by state agencies? Various elements account for the short-
sightedness of current “return” policies.  
The first element perhaps lies in the labelling of policies that are primarily 
designed to secure the effective departure of unauthorised migrants from 
destination countries. The terms “expulsion” or “removal” would be far more 
consistent with the actual rationale for these policies, which have developed 
extensively. However, despite this obvious distinction, it is striking to note the 
resilient confusion between return and expulsion or return and readmission. This 
terminological confusion is not fortuitous, for it results from the concerted effort to 
build a top-down framework of understanding justifying actions in the above-
mentioned hierarchy of priorities. 
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Any scholar having worked on return migration would soon notice that such a 
terminological confusion was not part of the open and recurrent debates about 
return migration during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Kubat 1984; King 1986). Return 
was not mixed with expulsion, let alone with readmission, and migrants’ 
motivations to return home, on a temporary or permanent basis, as well as their 
manifold patterns of reintegration and readaptation, constituted at that time the 
main research interests of scholars across various disciplines (Cassarino 2004). 
Since the 1990s, the growing politicisation of international migration movements, 
the ensuing adoption of restrictive laws regarding the conditions of entry and 
residence of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees, reinforced border controls, the 
heightened debates on national sovereignty and identity, constitute the main 
ingredients that have gradually been conducive to different perceptions of 
migration, in general, and to return, in particular. Such new taxonomies as 
“voluntary return” and “forced return” started to shape more intensive public 
discourse and action by governmental and intergovernmental institutions.  
The gradual pervasiveness of this dichotomy (voluntary versus forced return) in 
public discourse and policies on migration and return is today unquestionable. 
However, the extent to which it reflects the composite nature of return flows and 
returnees’ experiences is highly debatable. There are two interrelated reasons 
supporting this argument. The first lies in the fact that the dichotomous approach to 
return, as it stands now in current policy measures, serves security-oriented 
purposes and proposes one-size-fits-all solutions aimed at securing the effective 
departure of unauthorised migrants and rejected asylum-seekers. The second reason 
is that neither conditions in countries of origin after “return” (or expulsion) nor 
reintegration are considered. 
Despite the seemingly impeccable reference to voluntariness, the frontier between 
“voluntary” and forced return could only turn out to be blurred, given the purposes 
it serves.4 As Tine Davids and Marieke van Houte argue in this issue, citing Gregor 
Noll, “return can never be voluntary when there is no plausible (legal) alternative”. 
Furthermore, the dichotomous approach to return would not have been dominant 
without the production of an expertise or a form of knowledge reifying the 
managerial centrality of the state and turning the state and its administration into 
the legitimate producers of this form of knowledge. The selective allocation of 
public funds to given research projects viewed by civil servants and the state 
bureaucracy as being “concretely useful” to their “actions”, is a direct offshoot of 
the desire to produce and legitimise a form of top-down knowledge about 
migration, in general, and return, in particular. Clearly, the production of a new 
technical expertise has been aimed at reinforcing the above-mentioned hierarchy of 
priorities.  
 
4 In its report on return migration, the European Migration Network observed that “it is important to 
note, however, that there is no clear boundary between Voluntary and Forced Return, since there 
are different understandings of these terms by the Member States and it sometimes depends on the 
legal status of a returnee (legal or illegally resident). Whether return can truly be considered as 
voluntary … is another consideration” (EMN 2007: 6). 
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Some investigations have been prioritised above others, explaining how reality 
should be understood. Today, the production of knowledge about migration issues 
has become crucial in political terms. By obstructing any alternative interpretation 
of a given problem (“we cannot do otherwise”), the production of top-down 
knowledge does not only pave the way for dealing with a given problem, it also 
strays from the cause of the problem and subtly justifies a unique technical solution 
as the necessary evil. This is how surveillance systems, detention centres and 
readmission agreements have been presented as the necessary instruments aimed at 
deterring and fighting unauthorised migration turning the resilient economic and 
political gaps between destination and origin countries (in terms of undemocratic 
governance, life expectancy, average per capita incomes, political instability, 
disastrous environmental conditions, underemployment and poverty) into 
secondary causes prompting numerous migrants to leave and seek better living 
conditions abroad. 
Admittedly, the identification of priority actions, and their unquestioned 
“necessary” solutions, has consolidated so far a migratory regime aimed at dealing 
with consequences more than causes, and overlooking the actual conditions 
shaping migrants’ patterns of reintegration after return. It is of course easier to 
focus on security concerns because they can be internalised in public discourse and 
also because they can be presented as solutions based on commonplace 
assumptions. 
3. Going beyond dominant schemes: bottom-up perspective 
Studies show that return migrants constitute a highly heterogeneous group of actors 
in terms of migration experiences, length of stay abroad, patterns of resource 
mobilisation, legal status, motivations and projects. Over recent decades, an array 
of studies, from various disciplines, has explained the manifold factors shaping 
migrants’ patterns of reintegration in their country of origin (Cassarino 2004). They 
all share the assumption that migrants’ patterns of reintegration are shaped by three 
interrelated elements. First, the context of reintegration in the home country. 
Second, the duration and type of migration experience lived abroad, which should 
be optimal (King 1986: 19), i.e. “neither too short nor too long”, so that migrants 
have the opportunity to invest their human and financial capital acquired abroad 
upon return (Dustmann 2001; Kilic et al. 2007). Finally, the factors or conditions 
(whether favourable or not) in the host and origin countries which motivated 
return, i.e., the pre- and post-return conditions.  
Taking into account these three interrelated elements (place, time as well as pre- 
and post-return conditions) is indeed critical in showing that different variables 
shape migrants’ modes of reintegration in their country of origin. 
There exists, however, a basic and too often overlooked condition that intimately 
connects any person who returns home from abroad, regardless of the place of 
origin, social background, motivations, prospects, skills and occupational status. 
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Beyond the plurality of return migrants’ experiences there is a primary element that 
needs to be taken into consideration: return preparedness. 
Return preparedness is not a vague notion. It refers to a process which, by 
definition, takes place in a person’s life, through time, and is shaped by changing 
circumstances (i.e. personal experiences, contextual factors in sending and 
receiving countries) in their broadest sense. It is not only about preparing for 
return. It is about having the ability, though not always the opportunity, to gather 
the tangible and intangible resources needed to secure one’s own return home. 
Additionally, return preparedness calls for a twofold question. Why do some 
migrants have a stronger degree of preparedness than others? How is the issue of 
return preparedness dealt with or taken into consideration in the framework of 
contemporary migration management policies? This is what the contributions to 
this issue are all about.  
4. Free will and readiness to return 
Free will and the readiness to return are the two fundamental elements that 
compose return migrants’ preparedness.  
Free will is the act of deciding or choosing on one’s own initiative to return. Free 
will is the subjective power to choose to return at a certain time, because it seems 
to be a timely and logical phase in the migratory process. The freedom to choose to 
return, i.e. free will, may appear superficial, because the migrant as a person will 
necessarily have to weigh the pros and cons, the costs and benefits, of the decision 
to return. However, what matters is the subjective feeling that the decision to return 
was neither dictated by others nor by external circumstances, regardless of whether 
it is justified in absolute terms or not. Free will refers to whether it is the time, and 
whether it is right, to choose to return or not.  
Clearly, given the heterogeneity of return migrants’ experiences and profiles, free 
will is far from being a constant, for it does not happen all the time in the return 
process. Sometimes, unexpected events or obstacles may disrupt the migration 
cycle and compel migrants to return home at shorter notice than expected. In this 
case, return is not chosen and the lack of freedom to choose to return might have 
severe implications on the conditions of the migrant.  
Readiness to return reflects the extent to which migrants have been in a position to 
mobilise the adequate tangible (i.e. financial capital) and intangible (i.e. contacts, 
relationships, skills, acquaintances) resources needed to secure their return, 
whether it is temporary or permanent. This notion allows the manifold resources 
mobilised by migrants to be analysed. It also stresses the need to view return as an 
ongoing process, as Davids and van Houte argue, which requires time. As 
mentioned above, migrants have different capacities for readiness. Some may be 
optimal, others may be insufficient. Time, resources, experience, knowledge and 
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awareness of the conditions in the host and home countries, constitute the main 
factors shaping their capacities for readiness to return.  
Free will and readiness to return reflect the ability of a person to decide how, when 
and why it is time to go back home. This ability is not a given, for the conditions of 
return may vary substantially, leading to various degrees of preparedness. In other 
words, not all migrants choose to return on their own initiative, nor do they have 
the readiness to do so.  
Preparedness pertains not only to the free choice of migrants to return home, but 
also to their readiness to return. In other words, to be optimally prepared, return is 
an issue of individual capacity to decide freely to return and to mobilise the 
tangible (i.e. financial capital) and intangible (i.e. contacts, relationships, skills, 
acquaintances) resources needed to secure return (i.e. readiness). Clearly, at the 
same time, readiness to return varies with the types of experience of migration and 
with migrants’ context of return. 
5. Degrees of return preparedness 
The authors’ contributions are, at various levels, reflective of different degrees of 
return preparedness. Regardless of the heterogeneous experiences of migration and 
return conditions that are analysed here, three main degrees of preparedness may 
be identified. 
The first degree refers to actors who feel they have gathered enough tangible and 
intangible resources to carry out their projects in their home countries. These 
returnees have a strong degree of preparedness. They have also developed valuable 
contacts, and acquired skills and knowledge that can constitute a significant adjunct 
to their initiatives. They have had time to evaluate the costs and benefits of return, 
while considering the changes that have occurred in their countries of origin, at 
institutional, economic and political levels. Some of them may maintain their 
residential status in their former areas of settlement with a view to securing their 
cross-border mobility. 
Of course, despite their strong degree of preparedness, return migrants are not 
immune to a process of readaptation in the home country and to a personal 
“reflective experience of belongingness” that Anastasia Christou extensively 
analyses with reference to the narratives of her respondents who returned to 
Greece. In a similar vein, return-friendly state-sponsored programmes and legal 
measures in countries of origin may be viewed as a positive change by returnees 
able to instil new social dynamics and changes not only in the origin but also in the 
former destination country. This double-edged process is interestingly analysed by 
Edson Urano and Lucia Yamamoto.  
The second degree pertains to migrants whose length of stay abroad was too short 
to allow tangible and intangible resources to be mobilised. These returnees have a 
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weak degree of preparedness impacting on their capacity to reintegrate. They 
consider that the cost of remaining is higher than returning home, even if few 
resources were mobilised before their return. Hence, resource mobilisation in 
receiving countries remains extremely limited and the returnee will tend to rely on 
resources available at home (e.g. local social capital). 
The third degree refers to migrants who did not freely choose to return at this stage, 
nor did they have the opportunity to provide for the preparation of return. Adverse 
circumstances, in their broadest sense, prompted them to leave, leading to the 
abrupt interruption of their migration cycle. Their degree of preparedness is 
nonexistent, as Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai shows in her study on Afghan and 
Iraqi refugees repatriated from the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Readiness and free will to return are closely intertwined in the notion of return 
preparedness, although they differ substantially. The former lays emphasis on the 
ability to mobilise with time the resources needed for return, whereas the latter 
focuses on free will and the individual choice to return or otherwise. Clearly, there 
are as many degrees of preparedness as there exist pre- and post-return conditions, 
for circumstances have a decisive impact on return migrants’ reintegration process 
and ability to convey new ways of thinking about governance and rights, as Diane 
King observed interviewing returnees in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Admittedly, the three degrees mentioned above roughly plot the actual plurality of 
conditions facing return migrants. Nonetheless, the rationale for identifying various 
degrees of return preparedness lies precisely in emphasising that, regardless of the 
heterogeneity characterising return migrants’ experiences and profiles, free choice 
and readiness to return constitute key elements to understand why some succeed in 
reintegrating back home whereas others do not. 
Return preparedness provides a response regarding the variety of patterns of 
reintegration back home. At the same time, it also generates many questions as to 
whether and how state authorities involved in the management of migration have 
taken this into consideration in their political agendas. 
This issue calls for an analysis combining a top-down (Blitz, Hamood, Van 
Engeland-Nourai) with a bottom-up (Davids and van Houte, Christou, Urano and 
Yamamoto, King) approach to return migration. It is through this combination that 
we can comprehend return and returnees’ modern conditions, beyond their intrinsic 
plurality and beyond dominant schemes of interpretation.  
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Libyan Nationals in the United Kingdom:  
Geopolitical Considerations and Trends in 
Asylum and Return 
BRAD K. BLITZ 
Oxford Brookes University 
This article explores the evolving geopolitical importance of Libya as 
a strategic partner for the United Kingdom and considers the way in 
which policies on migration have been used to cement the renewed 
relationship between the two countries. It considers in particular, the 
impact of the Memoranda of Understanding between the UK and 
Libya and the use of related readmission agreements to facilitate the 
return of Libyan nationals from the UK. It analyses some of the 
challenges facing Libyans seeking asylum and settlement in the UK 
and the prospect of their return to Libya in the light of the UK’s 
domestic policies on asylum and security interests regarding the “war 
on terror”. This study establishes a profile of Libyans currently in the 
UK and examines existing case law and Home Office guidelines to 
explain the conditions under which Libyans have been granted or 
refused asylum and subsequently removed from the UK to Libya. The 
main finding study is that the imperative of security cooperation has 
increased the likelihood that more Libyan migrants will be returned 
from the UK, and this poses a worrying scenario, especially given 
Libya’s record of refoulement and other human rights abuses. In the 
absence of a system for dealing with asylum inside Libya, returning 
Libyan nationals and transit migrants from neighbouring African 
countries are particularly vulnerable. 
here are few statistics on migration between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and 
the United Kingdom. Italy has traditionally been the first port of call for 
Libyan asylum seekers and others from Egypt, Niger and sub-Saharan Africa who 
transit via Libya (Africa Research Bulletin 2006; Baldwin-Edwards 2005; Betts 
2006; Hamood 2006; Messineo 2005). Today, the Italian island of Lampedusa is 
the initial destination for these Libyan and other migrants into Europe1 and by 
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1 The Italian Government has refused UNHCR access to the reception centre on Lampedusa on 
several occasions and actual statistics of migrants passing through are difficult to obtain, in part 
because of the rapid return of people to Libya and the lack of identification prior to return 
(Messineo 2005). The centre was designed to hold 160 people but more than 1,000 have passed 
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contrast the 16,700 Libyan arrivals (2004) in the UK appear rather insignificant 
(Home Office 2006). Although numbers of Libyans entering the UK have 
increased by almost 50 per cent, those seeking asylum, and thus most likely to be 
returned in the event of a refusal, are few. Official statistics from the Home Office 
record that from 1997 to 2005 there have only been 1,255 applications for asylum 
received from Libyan nationals; the largest number of 200 occurred in 2002 when 
total UK applications reached an all-time high of 84,130 (Heath et al. 2006).  
In spite of the small presence of Libyans in the UK, migration has become an 
increasingly important theme in Libya’s external relations with the country. Over 
the past five years Libya has enjoyed a remarkable rapprochement with the UK and 
is now considered a valuable international partner for British interests in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. After a period of intense confrontation with 
the UK throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Libya began a programme to dismantle its 
nuclear programmes in 2003 and has since agreed to provide intelligence to the UK 
and the United States and cooperate in the global campaign against terrorism 
(Reveron 2006). Libya’s commitment to reform has been cited to justify closer 
diplomatic cooperation, as former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair recommended in 
March 2004: 
Libya’s actions in the past have caused grief and pain to many individuals and 
families, which we cannot forget … But if change in Libya is real, we should 
support it. It is the beginning of a process, and we should take it step-by-step. But 
I believe that a Libya free of WMD and with no links to terrorism is 
overwhelmingly in our interest and it is right to pursue this dialogue, and we will 
(Blair 2004). 
Now migration also features alongside a host of other areas as a theme of policy 
cooperation between the two states, above all the fight against terrorism.2  
Recent evidence for the evolving cooperation in the area of migration between the 
UK and Libya may be gleaned from two Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). 
The first was signed on 18 October 2005 on behalf of the UK Foreign Office and 
Libyan Ministry for European Affairs and aims to facilitate both the development 
of trade, processing of visas, and the deportation of nationals suspected of activities 
associated with terrorism (British Embassy Tripoli 2005; Foreign and 
 
through at a time. According to the European Parliament’s own report on Lampedusa, the Italian 
authorities presented a configure picture of overall numbers of migrants passing through when it 
visited in 2005: “The Italian authorities informed the MEPs that on the day of the visit there were 
11 people at the centre. The delegation was surprised at this, as the figure did not in any way 
reflect the everyday reality of the Lampedusa centre. The Questore of Agrigento replied that on the 
previous day there had been 56 people. When asked how many had been present at the centre 
during the previous 96 hours, the authorities stated the number of arrivals as 200 on 21 August, 
148 on 7 September and 29 on 11 September. This did not explain the total number of inmates 
during the days leading up to the MEPs’ visit” (European Parliament 2005: 1). 
2 For example, Libya and the UK have been cooperating in the case of Omar al Degahyes, a British 
national and former refugee from Libya who has been detained in Guantanamo Bay and threatened 
with deportation to Libya (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
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Commonwealth Office 2005).3 Under this agreement, Libya has also provided 
assurances that persons returned would not be subject to abuse.4  
The second was signed by former Prime Minister Tony Blair and President 
Muammar Gaddafi on 29 May 2007 during Blair’s farewell tour to Africa and 
extends the notion of bilateral cooperation significantly. The one-page agreement 
records “the desire of both sides to strengthen judicial co-operation, in the context 
of [their] increasing joint efforts in the field of justice and home affairs, and 
specifically of [their] recently enhanced co-operation on counter-terrorism” (BBC 
News 2007). It also sets out the basis for mutual legal assistance in the field of 
criminal law, mutual legal assistance in the field of civil and commercial law, and 
cooperation in the area of extradition, and prisoner transfer. While this agreement 
has generated controversy over the prospect of transferring the convicted Lockerbie 
bomber from Scotland to Libya (Mulholland 2007), at present, the scope of the 
MoU is limited to those under criminal investigation and extradition cases.  
The rationale for these agreements is both context-specific and influenced by wider 
European trends, above all the expansion of readmission agreements and the 
establishment of large European Union programmes on return and border 
management.5 The common feature of the two Anglo-Libyan agreements is the 
degree to which they rely on cooperation from third parties to facilitate return and 
controlled entry to the European Union. In this, the above-mentioned accords are 
reminiscent of the fashion for readmission agreements which are valued by 
European Union institutions and implemented at the bilateral level by individual 
EU member states (Cassarino 2007). To date, Italy, Malta and the UK have signed 
accords with Libya and Spain is also in the process of negotiating an agreement.6 
While these agreements vary in scope, they share the characteristic of being 
informal declarations that provide a skeleton for further cooperation which have 
traditionally favoured the interests of the European signatory (Peers 2003).  
 
3 According to the Foreign Office, “the MoU is a significant step towards making the Libyan market 
more accessible to British business people and offers important assurances for the promotion of 
trade and investment between the two countries”. It also provides a mutual undertaking to consider 
most visa applications within one week and to consider issuing multi-entry visas (British Embassy 
Tripoli, 2005). 
4 This promise has recently been challenged by UK courts which contest Libya’s declarations of 
reform. On 27 April 2007, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled against 
deporting two terrorism suspects to Libya despite promises of humane treatment from the Libyan 
Government (Human Rights Watch 2007; SIAC 2007). 
5 The European Union has dedicated large sums over the period 2007–13 to address these two issues. 
The European Return Fund is funded up to €676 million to improve the management of the return 
of illegal migrants by encouraging cooperation with the countries of return, while the External 
Borders Fund received €1,820 million to improve control efficiency at the external border of the 
EU. 
6 Italy has signed two agreements on 13 December 2000 and 3 July 2003; and more recently a 
Memorandum of Understanding on 18 January 2006. Malta signed a bilateral agreement on police 
cooperation in 2001. 
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This article explores some of the challenges facing Libyans seeking asylum and 
settlement in the UK and considers the prospect of their return to Libya in the light 
of the evolving cooperation between the two countries. It begins with a brief 
review of the research context, namely the development of relations between the 
UK and Libya, before establishing a profile of Libyans currently in the UK. It then 
examines the existing case law and guidelines to help to explain the conditions 
under which Libyans have been granted or refused asylum and subsequently 
removed from the UK to Libya. The third section considers the impact of UK 
domestic policies on asylum and security interests regarding the “war on terror” for 
future asylum seekers from Libya. I conclude that the imperative of security 
cooperation has increased the likelihood that more Libyan migrants will be 
returned from the UK, just as the bar for admission through asylum channels has 
been raised following Libya’s readmission to the international community. The 
potential fall-out from the confluence of migration and security policies for 
returnees and non-Libyan migrants in Libya is particularly worrying.  
1. Research context 
The small number of Libyans in the UK also reflects the state of international 
relations between the two countries and the extreme difficulty of Libyans reaching 
this distant country. Not only is it hard for Libyans to reach the UK legally, but 
following the break in diplomatic relations between the two states for almost two 
decades, the presence of Libyans in the UK has not attracted the patterns of “chain” 
migration that other European states have experienced. The country officially 
broke off diplomatic relations with Libya in 1984 following the shooting of WPC 
Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan People’s Bureau in Central London. The 
shooting of a police officer apparently from a diplomatic office, and the total lack 
of cooperation from the Libyans in assisting the subsequent investigation, led to 
considerable public resentment and polarised relations between the UK and Libyan 
governments. Relations further deteriorated following the 1987 Eksund incident. 
The Eksund was a vessel bound for Ireland, which was intercepted by Irish and 
French authorities and found to contain large amounts of explosives,7 weaponry 
and money that had been supplied by the Libyan state and security forces.8 
Although there had been other shipments to the IRA beforehand, this was by all 
accounts an overt expression of Libya’s support of terrorism against the UK.  
Relations between the UK and Libya became further strained followed the 
Christmas bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over the Scottish border town of 
Lockerbie. All 259 passengers and crew were killed, as were eleven local residents 
on the ground. This act of terror led to a major international crisis involving several 
 
7 The Eksund was found to contain approximately 120 tonnes of weapons including semtex and more 
than 1 million rounds of ammunition that was being smuggled to support the Provisional IRA’s 
campaign of terror against the United Kingdom. 
8 Moloney (2003) claims that the Eksund shipment also contained military mortars. It is also 
estimated that Gaddafi gave the Provisional IRA the equivalent of £2 million along with the 1980s 
shipments. 
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state parties as two-thirds of the victims were American and forty-four were 
British; moreover, the criminal investigations involved transnational and 
international agencies and jurisdiction over this matter remained with Scotland. 
During a series of protracted investigations, the Libyan Government actively 
frustrated any attempt at cooperation with the British and American authorities. 
This continued for several years until November 1991 when the US Acting 
Attorney General finally issued warrants for the arrest of two Libyans, Lamen 
Khalifa Fhimah and Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, who were formally accused of 
placing a bomb on board the aircraft in Malta, and charged with murder.  
As Gaddafi refused to hand over the suspects and comply with UN Security 
Council Resolution 731, the Security Council first imposed sanctions against Libya 
in March 1992 and again in November 1993 following the introduction of Security 
Council Resolution 883, which remained in force until 1999 (UNSC 1992, 1993, 
2003). During the period of sanctions,9 Libyan officials repeatedly maintained that 
a trial held under Scottish jurisdiction would be biased and refused to cooperate. 
This impasse was only broken when in August 1998 the UK and US governments 
agreed to allow the trial to be held in the Netherlands before an off-shore Scottish 
court.10 Finally, on 5 April 1999 Al-Megrahi and Fhimah were flown from Tripoli 
to the Netherlands where they stood trial. Their arrival promoted the suspension of 
the EU legislation that implemented the UN sanctions. Full diplomatic relations 
were resumed three months later following an agreement between the two 
governments when Libya accepted “general responsibility” for the shooting of 
WPC Fletcher, issued a formal apology, and promised to pay compensation to the 
Fletcher family. The Libyan Government also undertook to cooperate with and 
abide by the findings of the British police investigation into the shooting. This 
agreement paved the way for an exchange of diplomatic personnel. The first British 
Ambassador to Tripoli for fifteen years arrived in December 1999 and a new 
Libyan Ambassador arrived in London in January 2001. 
 
9 The following UN Security Council resolutions instituted a series of sanctions against Libya: 
(a) S/RES/731 (1992) 21 January 1992 Security Council condemning the destruction of Pan 
American flight 103 and Union de transports aériens flight 772; (b) S/RES/748 (1992) 31 March 
1992 imposing an arms embargo and selective travel ban; and establishing a Security Council 
Sanctions Committee; (c) S/RES/883 (1993) 11 November 1993 extending the travel ban and 
imposing financial sanctions; (d) S/RES/1192 (1998) 27 August 1998 strengthening calls upon all 
states to cooperate with the initiative for the trial of the two persons charged with the bombing of 
Pan Am flight 103; (e) S/RES/1506 (2003) 12 September 2003 Security Council lifts the sanctions 
measures set forth in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of its Resolution 748 (1992) and paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7 of its Resolution 883 (1993) and dissolves the Committee established by paragraph 9 of 
Resolution 748 (1992). 
10 In order to bring about the possibility of a trial, and hence diplomatic resolution of the Lockerbie 
matter, it was necessary to introduce a further UN Security Council Resolution, 1192 (1998) on 
27 August 1998 and amend Scottish and Dutch law, and introduce a new treaty between the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Concerning a Scottish Trial in the Netherlands, 18 September 1998, 38 I.L.M. 926 (1999). 
Libyan Nationals in the United Kingdom – Asylum and Return 111
 
                                                
The Lockerbie trial began shortly after the resumption of diplomatic relations and 
on 31 January 2001 Al-Megrahi was found guilty and Fhimah not proven.11 In the 
following months, trilateral talks were held to discuss how Libya could meet the 
Security Council’s remaining requirements and ensure the lifting of all remaining 
sanctions. During these talks, the UK emerged as the leading advocate for Libya 
and in August 2003 tabled a resolution recommending that the Security Council lift 
the remaining UN sanctions against Libya. That resolution was passed by the 
Security Council on 12 September 2003 and removed important travel restrictions 
on Libyan nationals.12
Since the lifting of UN sanctions against Libya, the nature of British-Libyan 
relations has shifted significantly to draw Libya into the circle of friendly nations. 
Diplomatic priorities have focused on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
engaging Libya in the global war against terrorism. Although the UK has expressed 
concerns about human rights violations in Libya and notes in particular restrictions 
on freedom of expression and assembly, the treatment of political prisoners, 
arbitrary detention and conditions in Libyan prisons (SIAC 2007), over the past 
three years, in particular, Libya has enjoyed a positive relationship with the UK. In 
2004, Libyan Foreign Minister Abd al-Rahman Shalgam visited London and 
proved to a significant marker in UK-Libyan relations. Not only was it the first 
visit to the UK by a Libyan foreign minister since Gaddafi came to power, but it 
paved the way for the first of two visits by former Prime Minister Tony Blair in 
March 2004 – the first visit by a British PM since 1943. During Blair’s meeting 
with Gaddafi, the two leaders discussed initiatives to help Libya dismantle its 
nuclear weapons programme and in September 2004, Libya issued a formal 
declaration affirming that it was ending its nuclear weapons programme and sought 
British assistance in this endeavour. This declaration enabled the UK Government 
to press for the US to lift the remaining sanctions against Libya and engage the 
country in a new security compact that focused on European-Mediterranean 
cooperation in defence, justice and migration. It also opened the door to further 
controls on migration between the two countries and the possibility of returning 
Libyan nationals back to Tripoli. 
Since 2004, Libya’s geostrategic importance to the UK has become more and more 
evident. Libya is an oil-rich state that has extensive relations with sub-Saharan 
Africa and influence over the Sudan and Algeria, two large states that have 
witnessed internal conflicts and population movements (amid charges of genocide 
in the case of the Sudan);13 both are mineral-rich and reported centres of terrorist 
and al-Qaeda activity. Libya’s geopolitical interests also spill over into Egypt, 
Niger and Chad and throughout the Middle East where Libya has recently been 
 
11 “Not proven” is a Scottish verdict given in cases where there is still some doubt as to the guilt of 
the defendant.  
12 See: § 4 of UNSCR 748 (1992), UNSCR 883 (1993) and UNSCR 1506 (2003). 
13 Although a UN Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan did not pursue a policy 
of genocide in the Darfur region, the state is still being investigated by the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court.  
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accused of supporting the armed rebellion in Sa’ada in northern Yemen.14 These 
realities, in addition to the fear of more states developing of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), on the back of Libya’s now dismantled programmes, pose a 
particular challenge to the UK as one of the leading actors in the war on terror, 
hence the policy of engagement. The value-added of the new British-Libyan 
alliance includes the possibility that such engagement can be reproduced in current 
“rogue” and enemy states where the threat to UK interests is high, in addition to the 
UK’s significant commercial interest in Libya.15  
The development of cooperation on asylum and migration management between 
the UK and Libya cannot be divorced from the above-mentioned geopolitical 
framework. Over the past five years the tendency to treat migration, traditionally an 
area of home affairs, in the context of the UK’s external relations has complicated 
the task of assessing the actual impact that transnational migration may have on 
domestic political agendas, national resources and public services. For this reason, 
evolving security framework must be taken into consideration when analysing the 
state of migration between Libya and the UK and the potential impact of the 2005 
and 2007 Memoranda of Understanding on future waves of migrants, as discussed 
below.  
2. Libyan migrants in the United Kingdom 
The only statistics available on migration between Libya and the UK are from 
Home Office sources and present a limited picture of both regular migration, as 
identified through the International Passenger Survey, and data provided by the 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate (Heath et al. 2006). There is no 
mention of information gathered from Eurodac sources.16
In terms of regular migration, the statistics record that not only are the numbers of 
Libyans reaching the UK growing, but there is increasing variety in the categories 
of Libyans admitted into the UK, as indicated in Table 1.  
These recent arrivals partially confirm broader migratory trends, elsewhere 
described in the context of differentiation, i.e. varied groups of migrants, increasing 
feminisation of migration, and transnational flows as identified from 
multidirectional movements of people between sending and receiving states, as 
 
14 As a result, Yemen recently recalled its ambassador (Mounasser 2007). 
15 There is already a well-established British Business Group in Libya and an emerging export market 
for UK goods. Visible UK exports to Libya in 2005 totalled £210.6 million and consisted largely of 
industrial machinery for the oil and gas sector. Invisible exports are estimated to double this 
amount (UK Trade and Investment 2007). 
16 In 2000, the European Council passed a resolution creating Eurodac, a system for the comparison 
of fingerprints of asylum applicants and illegal immigrants which aimed to facilitate the application 
of the Dublin Convention regarding the determination of the state responsible for examining the 
asylum application. See Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning 
the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
the Dublin Convention (Official Journal L 316 of 15.12.2000). 
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well as between receiving states and third countries (Castles et al. 2003). 
Differentiation has been attributed to the globalisation of travel, the development of 
regional conflicts as a major push factor, and the weakening of colonial ties which 
has encouraged the settlement of new migrant groups in non-traditional countries 
of reception and settlement. From Table 1, it is evident that a range of migrants is 
admitted into the UK, though there is little evidence of feminisation, as suggested 
by the categories of migrants “admitted as a husband or fiancé” or “admitted as a 
wife or fiancée”.  
Table 1: Number and types of arrivals by Libyan nationals in the UK (2005) 
Ordinary 5 350 
Business 2 500 
Students 2 900 
Au pairs n/a 
Work permit holders + 12 months 25 
Work permit holders – 12 months 10 
Dependants 55 
Admitted as a husband or fiancé 15 
Admitted as a wife or fiancée 35 
Passengers in transit 1 030 
Passengers returning after a temporary absence 3 290 
Refugees exceptional leave cases and their dependants 30 
Others given leave to enter 1 460 
Accepted for settlement on arrival 5 
Passengers refused entry at port and subsequently 
removed 30 
Total 16 735 
Source: Home Office (2006). 
In terms of asylum, however, the picture is less attractive and defies the diversified 
pattern of arrivals through legal channels. The first point to consider is the 
relatively low number of asylum applications. 
While the number of applications has grown recently there is little variation in the 
type of asylum seeker recorded. Most Libyan asylum seekers in the UK are young 
males, even though the average age is relatively higher for this group than asylum 
seekers from other countries (Heath et al. 2006). In 2005, for example, out of 135 
applications for asylum (excluding dependants), the vast majority of applicants 
were under 35 and were male. There is also an important gender dimension missing 
– women barely feature in the asylum statistics provided by the Home Office and 
only a handful of unaccompanied minors have applied for asylum, on average only 
five per year. Arguably, few women are applying for asylum in the UK.  
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Figure 1: Number of asylum applications received from Libyan nationals between 
1997 and 2005 
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Source: Home Office (2006). 
Second, the presence of Libyan asylum seekers in the UK case does not appear to 
reflect the new modalities of migration where states may simultaneously act as 
sending, receiving, and transit centres. For example, there is no mention of the 
presence of UK-bound Libyans in Lampedusa, although this may be a feature of 
the tightening of Italy’s asylum policies, the rapid increase in returns to Libya, and 
the introduction of tough penalties for those returned Libya (Hamood 2006; Human 
Rights Watch 2006b; Messineo 2005). There is also little evidence of Libyans in 
the UK having benefited from the development of alternative routes of entry 
created by smuggling networks in other South European states. Again, this may 
reflect the increasing attempts to regularise migration at source through bilateral 
agreements, such as the one signed between Italy and Libya in 2004, rather than a 
lack of smuggling activity even though the official statistics provided by the Home 
Office suggest that only very small numbers have been able to reach the UK 
independently; the largest number of arrivals by this method being just thirty 
overall (Heath et al. 2006). Unlike Algerians in the UK, there is virtually no record 
of Libyans arriving via a third country.  
Third, as indicated in Table 2, the level of refusals is particularly high. Of the total 
145 applicants in 2005, over 90 per cent were rejected (Heath et al. 2006). This 
figure stands above the average of 83 per cent in 2005 (Home Office 2006).17  
                                                 
17 According to the Home Office just under a third (31 per cent) of the 25,710 applications in 2005 
resulted in the granting of asylum (8 per cent), Humanitarian Protection or Discretionary Leave 
(12 per cent) or in appeals that were allowed by the IAA adjudicators (12 per cent) (Home Office 
2006: 12). 
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Table 2: Initial decisions on applications received from Libyan nationals for 
asylum in the UK, excluding dependants (2005) 
Total initial decisions 145 
Recognised as a refugee and granted asylum 10 
Not recognised as a refugee but granted humanitarian protection * 
Not recognised as a refugee but granted discretionary leave * 
Total refused 135 
Refused asylum HP or DL after full consideration 115 
Refused on safe third country grounds 10 
Refused on non-compliance grounds 10 
Source: Home Office 2006 
The above findings raise further questions regarding the quality of applications 
submitted and the grounds for refusal and inform the context for an investigation 
into the manner in which unsuccessful asylum seekers have been returned. The 
Home Office data record that few applications were made at port rather than in 
country, suggesting that most asylum seekers came into the UK under a different 
status, quite possibly as students. The number of refusals (13518 in 2005) in 
contrast to the number of Libyans recorded in the UK and relative to the number of 
persons removed (30 in 2005) suggests that most Libyans have not been returned 
either voluntarily or forcibly but have remained in the UK. This finding is further 
supported by the evidence of 210 Libyan asylum seekers in the UK who were in 
receipt of support from the National Asylum and Support Services (NASS) at the 
end of 2005. Arguably, while few Libyans have managed to secure asylum status 
or benefit from humanitarian protection or discretionary leave, equally few have 
been removed, in spite of the emphasis on removals at the policy level.19
From a review of the official data, the following facts complement the emerging 
picture of Libyan nationals in the UK: 
- The vast majority of Libyans in the UK are students and business people. 
- Most of those granted extensions to remain in the UK were students (950 
out of 1,340) but 100 Libyans were granted rights to settlement (Home 
Office 2006).  
- The number of asylum applications from Libyans over the past ten years 
has risen, but only slightly. 
                                                 
18 This figure excludes dependants.  
19 Home Office figures record few removals nationwide. In 2005, 13,730 principal asylum applicants 
were removed from the UK (including assisted returns and voluntary departures following 
enforcement action) while 2,905 principal applicants left under Assisted Voluntary Return 
Programmes run by the International Organization for Migration (Home Office 2006: 15). 
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- The overwhelming majority of applications for asylum were submitted by 
Libyan nationals already present in the United Kingdom.  
- The numbers of Libyan nationals who have been granted asylum are 
particularly low and are falling. 
- Current figures for those granted leave to remain and humanitarian 
protection record that successful claims have fallen to a trickle and are now 
estimated at ten per year. 
- The number of refusals has correspondingly shot up between 1997 and 
2005; at least 125 Libyan nationals were removed from the UK. 
- Like most new arrivals, those granted asylum or “humanitarian protection” 
have been dispersed across the UK. The overwhelming majority of 
Libyans (125) were relocated to areas of north-west England, a region 
which is economically troubled; none were settled in Greater London and 
only five sent to south-east England. 
- Five Libyan nationals were held in detention under Immigration Act 
powers in 2005 (Heath et al. 2006).  
3. Case law and guidelines on granting asylum 
The small number of Libyan asylum seekers in the UK raises the question of the 
conditions under which are they being admitted to the UK and, further, why the 
refusal rate is proportionately so high. The existence of case law and policy 
guidelines produced by the Home Office offer some possible explanations for these 
trends. 
There have only been three “starred determinations” (i.e. advisory cases) 
concerning Libyan applicants who have appeared before the UK’s Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal (AIT).20 However, these taken in consideration with the 
Country Determination Guidelines and Operational Guidance Notes produced by 
the UK Home Office’s Border Agency provide a useful insight into the criteria for 
determining the granting of leave to Libyan nationals. The vast majority of claims 
for leave to remain in the UK have been made on the grounds that applicants have 
well-established fears that, should they be returned, they may suffer human rights 
violations and in particular mistreatment at the hands of the Libyan state 
authorities. In this context, the majority of applicants have cited their membership 
of, involvement with or perceived involvement with, political and Islamic 
opposition groups to substantiate their fears of victimisation by the Libyan state 
apparatus. In previous years, other applicants claimed that their membership of 
ethnic minority groups, above all the Berber communities, has left them equally 
vulnerable to abuse by the state and thus they too had human rights grounds for 
seeking asylum in the UK. 
 
20 ME (Risk – Failed Asylum Seekers – Hassan) Libya CG [2003] UKIAT 00200 2003 UKIAT00200E 
(UKIAT 2003a).  
HH (Risk – Failed Asylum Seekers) Libya CG [2003] UKIAT 00202 HX/18773/03 (UKIAT 2003b). 
KK (Failed Asylum Seeker) Libya CG [2004] UKIAT 00151 Added to list 24.06.04 (UKIAT 2004a). 
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4. Human rights claims 
The existing case law provides a series of standards for granting asylum and leave 
to remain to Libyan nationals. It also contains some general characteristics to 
suggest that English tribunals and the Home Office have taken a rather narrow 
interpretation of human rights claims made by Libyan applicants and that the bar 
for granting asylum claims remains extremely high. This is evident from the most 
widely reported ruling regarding a Libyan national, in the case of ME (Libya) CG 
[2003] UKIAT 00200 (judgment given 17 December 2003) who eventually lost his 
claim for asylum in the UK.21  
Prior to ME there had been a decision in the case of Hassan [2002] UKIAT 00062 
which relied on documentation from the Foreign Office affirming that “anyone 
returned to Libya after an absence in excess of six months is subject to 
interrogation by the security authorities. Such people are routinely imprisoned by 
administrative order for ‘having shown disloyalty to the state’.” Although the AIT 
recognised the authenticity of ME’s fears, it rejected his application for asylum on 
the grounds that Libya had since abandoned such practice.22 It also noted that the 
applicant’s identity as someone who challenged the state by submitting a report to 
human rights groups abroad had not been exposed and that political opposition and 
membership of a group was not in itself sufficient grounds for granting asylum. In 
its conclusion the Tribunal noted that unsuccessful asylum seekers who had been 
returned to Libya were able to resume a life without fear of torture and thus 
insisted that claims made on the basis of persecution needed to be further qualified: 
“the bald assertion that any returned asylum seeker will be persecuted because they 
will be perceived as someone taking a stance against the government is wrong”. 
For his part, the adjudicator provided his own qualification that ill-treatment was 
largely visited on those who had either been involved in or were suspected of being 
involved in “serious political activity” or were “radical Islamic supporters”. 
In 2004, the Tribunal further clarified what was meant by “serious political 
activity” in MA (Libya) [2004] UKIAT 00252 (judgment given 14 September 2004) 
but again left the door open to further interpretation (UKIAT 2004b). In MA, the 
Tribunal reinforced the findings of ME and noted that the act of seeking asylum 
does not in itself give rise to claims of persecution.23 The adjudicator argued that 
 
21 ME was a medical practitioner who had been called upon to treat four prisoners, and in the course 
of their examination concluded that they had faced ill-treatment in prison. One of the prisoners died 
and the applicant’s colleague was asked to certify that the death had been as a result of natural 
causes. Instead, the doctor and his colleague submitted a truthful report to two human rights 
organisations, one in Switzerland and one in the Netherlands. After two colleagues were arrested, 
the applicant fled the country and sought asylum in the UK. 
22 The Home Office records that “The Tribunal looked at the Dutch report on returnees of 2002, 
which stated that since 2002 the authorities no longer applied the six-month rule. The report also 
found that even if they were held it was only for a few days for interview. Length of absence 
abroad was not a determinative factor.  
23 In 2005, a similar case was heard concerning AA, an asylum seeker from Zimbabwe whose request 
was granted even though the AIT did not find that, in general, Zimbabwe was unsafe for returning 
asylum seekers.  
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ME referred specifically to those cases involving “high degree activities” where 
claimants would be at risk. These activities were eventually defined by the Home 
Office to apply to certain types of opposition and in April 2007, the Home Office 
issued its own guidelines which further attempted to qualify what was meant by 
“high-risk activities”. 
The current advice from the Home Office is that given the degree of repression 
against dissenters, opposition political and Islamist activists, applicants who fall 
into such categories could be granted asylum in the UK. 
If it is accepted that the claimant has in the past been involved in opposition 
political activity or is a radical Islamic activist for one of the opposition political 
or Islamic groups mentioned above then there is a real risk they will encounter 
state-sponsored ill-treatment amounting to persecution within the terms of the 
1951 Convention. The grant of asylum in such cases is therefore likely to be 
appropriate (Home Office 2007: 7). 
5. Torture and mistreatment in prison  
The most controversial issue for Libyan asylum seekers and those seeking 
humanitarian protection regards concerns claims made on the grounds of 
mistreatment in prison. Many applicants have argued in their requests for leave to 
remain and humanitarian protection that conditions in Libyan prisons are so poor 
that the act of return and imprisonment could fall under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) which addresses instances of torture and 
inhuman treatment. This view has been challenged by the Home Office which 
affirms the appalling state of Libyan prisons and notes that individual cases may 
give rise to a genuine claim of mistreatment under ECHR Article 3, and similarly 
under Article 8 (the right to respect for his private and family life) for those with 
mental illness, but concludes that conditions in Libya are now unlikely to reach the 
threshold of Article 3 except for political prisoners (Home Office 2007: 11). For 
this reason the Home Office advises against granting humanitarian protection in 
such cases. The Home Office view has been contested by human rights 
organisations which oppose the return of such categories of claimant on the 
grounds that Libyan prisons are still in a deplorable state and are sites where torture 
and mistreatment takes place (Amnesty International 2005; Human Rights Watch 
2006a, 2006b; US Department of State 2007). The reports in July 2007 that 
followed the release of the five Bulgarian medics who had been sentenced to death 
and later imprisoned for allegedly infecting approximately 400 children with HIV, 
confirm the appalling state of Libyan prisons and the use of torture and other 
coercive measures to extract confessions. 
5.1 Gender-based claims of persecution 
In other areas of human rights, however, the British authorities have been 
remarkably progressive, for example in their recognition of gender-based claims, 
which include victimisation at the hands of both state and non-state parties and the 
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mistreatment of minors. While such cases previously fell outside the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, following the House of Lords 1999 ruling in Shah and Islam, 24 there 
is now a basis in English case law to support the claims of women alleging well-
founded fear of persecution, whether they do or do not fall within the category of 
being members of a particular social group. 
In its 2007 report, the Home Office noted that there was an increase in applications 
from Libyan females in particular who had made claims for asylum on the grounds 
of gender-based violations of human rights. The most common complaint was that 
they were or would be victims of mistreatment and feared 
… being killed, at the hands of their family as the result of them having had an 
extra-marital affair, having been raped or suspected of transgressing moral 
codes/family values more generally (Home Office 2007: 8). 
The Home Office also recognised claims may involve, or be made on the basis of, 
a fear of punitive detention (also known as “social rehabilitation”) by the state 
authorities which was a form of mistreatment. Given the prevalence of gender-
based discrimination and the reluctance of Libyan state authorities to protect 
women in particular from harm, the Home Office guidelines provide a constructive 
approach to granting asylum in such cases, especially when internal relocation is 
not an option. 
In addition, the UK has taken a more favourable position towards minors claiming 
asylum in their own right. As is the general rule, the Home Office recommended 
that minors who have not been granted asylum or Humanitarian Protection cannot 
be returned to Libya unless it can be proved that there are appropriate reception 
facilities and established levels of care. Given the admission that the UK 
authorities do not have “sufficient information to be satisfied that there are 
adequate reception, care and support arrangements in place” (Home Office 2007: 
12), the conclusion is that the UK will not return minors to Libya. 
5.2 Berber and minority ethnic groups 
In the case of ethnic-based persecution above all Berbers who seek asylum on the 
grounds of fear of mistreatment by state authorities, the UK has, however, been 
considerably less permissive. Although the Berber communities have a long history 
of cultural denationalisation in Libya (Prah 2001), the UK authorities have 
concluded that their claims may not amount to persecution under the Refugee 
 
24 This case concerned two Pakistani women who had been forced to leave their homes by their 
husbands and were at risk of being falsely accused of adultery in Pakistan. They claimed that they 
would be unprotected by the state and would face the risk of criminal proceedings for sexual 
immorality if they were forced to return to Pakistan. See. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
another, ex parte Shah (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees intervening); Islam and 
others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees intervening) House of Lords [1999] 2 AC 629, [1999] 2 All ER 545. 
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Convention. In its clearest statement regarding Libyan applicants, the Home Office 
recorded: 
Though the Libyan authorities maintain control over all ethnic and tribal 
minorities in the country, membership of the Berber group and expressions of 
Berber culture do not cause any problems for those involved. Those who simply 
cite membership of the Berber group as the sole basis of their claim are therefore 
unlikely to encounter state-sponsored ill-treatment amounting to persecution 
within the terms of the 1951 Convention. The grant of asylum in such cases is not 
likely to be appropriate (Home Office 2007: 8). 
6. Implications and future trends 
The difficulties Libyans face in receiving asylum status, and leave to remain in the 
UK, must be considered in the light of the current direction of UK asylum and 
return policy, as well as against the backdrop of renewed UK-Libyan relations. 
Over the past fifteen years, the UK Government has introduced six acts on 
immigration and asylum25 which have made the process of applying for asylum 
considerably harder for applicants. It has also recently proposed to deny refugees 
the possibility of indefinite protection, thus increasing the prospect of return.26 
Coupled with this, the Eurodac system has introduced stricter border controls by 
following the US model of fingerprinting all visa applications and carrying out 
electronic checks on people entering and leaving the country. Under the 2004 
Asylum and Immigration Act (Treatment of Claimants), it is now an offence for 
migrants to attempt to enter the UK without a valid immigration document unless 
the person can show a reasonable excuse or “other defence” and there is further 
punishment for those who present forged documents. Although there has been a 
provision in the 1987 Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Act that penalises agents 
who facilitate the entry to the UK without valid travel documents and visas, the 
2004 Treatment of Claimants Act now penalises applicants too. Many asylum 
seekers, who cannot apply legally in the UK, must now apply closer to home where 
it is often harder to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. Libyans 
seeking asylum and the right to remain in the UK have been directly affected by 
the above-mentioned developments. Although the number of Libyans removed 
from the UK is still relatively small, 27 their return contributes towards the broader 
goal of meeting government targets and helps to legitimise populist claims that 
many claimants are “bogus” and primarily interested in accruing benefits (Sales 
2007). The net effect has been especially detrimental to vulnerable individuals and 
 
25 These are: Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 
2004, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. 
26 Under the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, the UK Government has signalled its 
intention to stop granting “Indefinite Leave to Remain” to refugees, thus increasing the prospect of 
return. 
27 The number of North Africans removed, however, is increasing. For example, in 2005, 510 
Algerians were removed from the UK, including 270 asylum seekers. Of these 240 were returned to 
Algeria, the rest to third countries. 
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has undermined the principle of refugee protection by increasing destitution among 
asylum seekers and placing large numbers of individuals in detention (ECRE 
2007). Future removals include unsuccessful Libyan asylum seekers who could be 
returned under the terms of the 2007 MoU (Home Office 2006). 
For new asylum seekers, the picture is less bright. In recent years the UK has 
supported a Voluntary Repatriation Scheme coordinated by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), which provides some financial assistance to 
those who have failed to settle in the UK and wish to leave the country 
permanently. However, British policy is now not simply aimed at coordinating 
removals but also containing potential asylum seekers. If the 2006 Anglo-Algerian 
accord is an accurate indicator of the trend in migration controls between Libya 
and the UK, then one may expect a framework of formal reciprocal obligations, the 
introduction of standards on data protection, and instruments enabling travel 
documents to be issued as well as agreements on escorting and removing 
migrants.28 In spite of the few removals to date; the direction is clearly towards a 
much more heavy-handed policy of removals. 
The form of the recent MoU and basis upon which policy coordination has been 
laid introduces several additional sources of concern. Just as with the 2006 
readmission agreement with Algeria, the 2007 MoU between the UK and Libya 
reflects a wider European tendency to regularise migration on the back of short 
informal declarations that contain several exclusion clauses and do not have 
parliamentary backing but make return as condition for further cooperation and aid 
(Cassarino 2007). However, while the British position bears some similarity to the 
agreements signed by Italy and Malta, and indeed the European Union’s 
Community Return Policy, the MoU between the UK and Libya has significantly 
less legitimacy because the two countries are currently outside the “core” of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) and the Hague Programme on 
Freedom, Justice and Security in the European Union.29 Both have ring-fenced 
their concerns over the potential loss of sovereignty over migration and asylum 
issues: in the case of the UK this is illustrated by its “opt-in” clause which permits 
selective engagement in European policies on Justice and Home Affairs; Libya is 
 
28 The Agreement on the Circulation of Persons and Readmission between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, signed in London on 11 July 2006. 
29 The objective of the Hague programme is to improve the common capability of the Union and its 
Member States to guarantee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to 
justice, to provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other 
international treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration flows and to control the external 
borders of the Union, to fight organised cross-border crime and repress the threat of terrorism, to 
realise the potential of Europol and Eurojust, to carry further the mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions and certificates in both civil and criminal matters, and to eliminate legal and judicial 
obstacles in litigation in civil and family matters with cross-border implications. According to the 
European Council, this is an objective that has to be achieved in the interests of European citizens 
by the development of a Common Asylum System and by improving access to the courts, practical 
police and judicial cooperation, the approximation of laws and the development of common 
policies. 
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not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, nor the Refugee Convention, has no 
formal relationship with the European Union and has no system for dealing with 
asylum. The development of their cooperation in these areas is thus not only based 
on an informal agreement but one that has less standing under EC law. 
The MoU of May 2007 must also be examined in light of the UK’s security 
interests and in particular the “war on terror”. According to Michael Nguyen 
(2006), the UK has agreed to offer Libya security assurances and strengthen their 
mutual security relationship in an effort to encourage other countries to follow 
Libya’s lead in abandoning its chemical and nuclear weapons programmes. 
Although the connection between migration and protection from WMD is not 
direct, the externalisation of migration policy as evidenced by the multiplication of 
enforcement initiatives in transit and source countries (patrols, interceptions, escort 
and return) is linked to the development of intelligence capacity which has been 
cited as the “first line of defence against terrorism” (Reveron 2006). The 
introduction of counter-terrorism measures in the Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 2006, including a clause regarding the grounds on which the 
government can exclude people from asylum, further affirms the policy connection 
between security and migration which has Libya at the very core. 
Finally, it is important to mention the potential licence that the Anglo-Libyan 
agreement gives Libya to address its own vast migrant populations and indeed 
returning nationals. UN estimates for the number of legal immigrants in Libya 
stand at 617,536 (UNDESA 2005) but there is little explanation given for such 
figures and others suggest that the number of non-Libyan nationals may be as high 
as 30 per cent (Andrijasevic 2006). The number of illegal migrants in Libya – 
many of whom could be classified as refugees according to the Convention (Betts 
2006) – range from between 750,000 to 1.2 million out of a total population of 
5.8 million (European Commission 2005). It is this population which is especially 
at risk (Human Rights Watch 2006a). Although a signatory of the Organization of 
African Unity Convention, Libya does not have an asylum system in place and 
treats asylum seekers and refugees in the same vein as economic migrants 
(Hamood 2006). Having once welcomed economic migrants in the 1970s, Libya 
has been condemned recently for placing non-citizens in deplorable camps, 
subjecting thousands to long periods of detention where they have faced ill-
treatment by enforcement officers, and for engaging in regular and large-scale 
forced migration and expulsions (Amnesty International 2004; Hamood 2006; 
Human Rights Watch 2006a, 2006b). 
Libya’s record on refoulement is particularly worrying. Between 2003 and 2005, 
Libya repatriated 145,000 people, including some refugees to Egypt, famine-
stricken Niger and war-torn Eritrea and was formally condemned by international 
monitoring organisations (Afrol News 2006; Amnesty International 2004; Hamood 
2006; Human Rights Watch 2006b). There is evidence to suggest that the signing 
of additional bilateral agreements may precipitate further human rights violations 
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against those returned to Libya.30 Potential risks including the prospect of ill-
treatment and abuse during detention, removal to third countries, not to mention 
deaths31 and injury in transit (UNESCO 2005), as was the case when Italy sent 
back thousands in 2004 and 200532 (Andrijasevic 2006; Betts 2006; Hamood 2006; 
UNHCR 2005).33  
7. Conclusion 
As more European states are calling upon Libya’s support to manage irregular 
migration into the European Union, two essential questions need to be addressed: 
first, how the 2007 declaration between the UK and Libya will affect both future 
admissions and removals in the name of judicial cooperation; and second, what 
impact it will have on Libya’s domestic political situation. Several human rights 
organisations have already condemned the practice of readmission agreements with 
friendly states on the grounds that the policies are essentially tilted in favour of the 
European actor and that the agreements themselves are unbalanced, unequal, 
inhumane and internally contradictory (Cassarino 2007; Peers 2003). In the case of 
Libya, however, the linking of migration to justice and home affairs, extradition 
and counter-terrorism introduces additional fears over the degree to which 
migrants, many of whom may have claims to asylum, will be protected as they seek 
to enter the UK and in the event of their return to Libya (Human Rights Watch 
2007). 
In spite of the small number of Libyan asylum seekers in the UK, migration is now 
an instrumental hook that has helped to organise British domestic and international 
interests around controls on asylum and border security. It has also been 
instrumental in fostering Libya’s readmission to the international community. From 
the above discussion, there is little rationale for increased cooperation purely on the 
basis of migration between Libya and the UK. Indeed, even if other European 
states are directly affected by irregular migration via Libya, for the UK it is most of 
all Libya’s geopolitical value that is now the basis for much cooperation between 
the two countries. 
For Libyan asylum seekers trying to reach the UK, the recent rapprochement 
between the two countries may reduce the likelihood that their claims will be 
accepted. There are many reasons for this, including the increasing restrictions that 
 
30 Andrijasevic reports that, according to NGOs, the signing of an agreement between Libya and Italy 
in August 2004 “led to widespread arrests in Libya of individuals from sub-Saharan Africa, and that 
106 migrants lost their lives during subsequent repatriations from Libya to Niger”. 
31 From 1 January 1993 to 10 April 2005, there were a reported 232 deaths as a result of crossings 
from Libya to Italy (UNESCO 2005). 
32 According to Messineo (2005), “many of those deported from Lampedusa to Libya in the past 
months were not even aware of the real destination of their flight and believed that they were being 
sent to ‘another centre’ on mainland Italy to be ‘properly identified’.” He claims that people were 
not identified before being returned. 
33 According to the UNHCR (2005), Libyan officials were flown to Lampedusa by the Italian 
authorities and were given access to Libyans seeking asylum. 
124 Brad K. Blitz 
 
disable individuals from making asylum applications and the UK Government’s 
belief in Libyan claims of reform, as recently accepted by English case law and the 
Home Office. The fact that Libya’s statements of goodwill have been dismissed by 
human rights authorities (including the Special Immigration Appeals Commission) 
does not seem to have tipped the balance in favour of applicants and the refusal 
rate is increasing. That said, there are still some notable exceptions that may 
benefit from the way in which British authorities have interpreted the human rights 
situation in Libya, above all female asylum seekers; a larger number of applicants 
in this category might be expected in future. Whereas few Libyans have been 
removed from the UK, the trend is to accelerate the practice of removals. In the 
absence of a system for dealing with asylum inside Libya, returning Libyan 
nationals and transit migrants from neighbouring African countries are especially 
vulnerable. 
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Europe’s Security Approach Failing to Halt 
Migration from Libya 
SARA HAMOOD 
Researcher 
The rising numbers of arrivals in Italy and Malta from Libya since 
around 2000 have created an urgent desire within the European 
Union to prevent arrivals from this new point of departure, leading to 
the initiation of cooperation between the EU and Libya on migration. 
As in many other settings, this cooperation has predominantly 
comprised two elements: to secure the borders of the EU to prevent 
entry; and to return so-called illegal migrants to their countries of 
origin, or at least to the country of transit. This article focuses on the 
processes of return both from Italy to Libya and from Libya to 
countries of origin, which put so-called migrants at risk of 
refoulement, either indirectly or directly. It argues that returns from 
both countries follow a similar collective approach to arrivals, which 
predominantly fails to deal with cases on an individual basis, and 
results in a violation of the right to asylum. It contends that this 
approach is ineffective as a method to prevent entry into the EU, given 
the lengths that people are willing to go to in order to reach the EU 
and their awareness, in advance of travel, of the risks and hardships 
they might face both en route and on arrival. 
ince around 2000, the media, government officials and non-governmental 
organisations have increasingly highlighted migratory flows from the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya to Italy and Malta as Libya began to move away from its 
traditional role as a destination country for migrants seeking employment to a key 
transit country for migrants and refugees trying to reach the European Union. 
Recent IOM figures put the number of “illegal migrants” in Libya at 2 million 
among an indigenous population of just under 6 million (IOM 2007). UNHCR 
figures indicate that 19,900 people arrived in Italy by boat from North Africa in 
2007 compared with 22,000 in 2006, with at least 471 reported dead or missing in 
2007 (UNHCR 2008).1 Most depart from Libya’s west coast by the border with 
Tunisia, and some from Tunisia itself. At peak times, usually during summer, 
hundreds of migrants and refugees, the majority from Egypt and sub-Saharan 
Africa, arrive at the small Italian tourist island of Lampedusa each week, either 
S 
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1 In 2004, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (Vienna) estimated these 
figures to be much higher, at around 80,000 arrivals in Italy and Malta each year.  
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directly or more often after being caught or rescued by Italian authorities in the 
surrounding waters. In the week of 22–27 February 2008 alone, 1,104 people, 
including eighty-seven women and eighty-four children, arrived at Lampedusa, 
setting a new record for the usually quieter winter months (UNHCR 2008). 
The EU has responded to the development of this new migratory route to its 
territory primarily with a security strategy despite increased EU recognition of the 
need for a “global approach” to migration tackling various angles (security, 
development and human rights). EU-Libya cooperation on migration has been 
based on the EU’s urgent desire to prevent arrivals from this new point of 
departure. In line with EU cooperation on migration with Libya’s North African 
neighbours, especially Morocco, cooperation comprises two central elements: first, 
to secure EU borders to prevent entry; and second, to return so-called illegal 
migrants to their countries of origin, or at least to the country of transit (European 
Parliament 2006). 
This article explores a key aspect of this strategy, the policy of returns and 
readmissions, and considers whether these returns comply with the parties’ 
international human rights obligations. It further examines other tactics used by the 
EU to reduce the numbers of arrivals from Libya, specifically attempts to prevent 
departures of boats of migrants from Libyan shores. It also analyses the extent to 
which these measures can be said to meet EU claims to be tied to humanitarian and 
human rights concerns and principles. Finally, it questions whether these strategies 
are likely to be effective in meeting the EU aim to stem the flow of arrivals in the 
Libyan context. To respond to these questions, it is critical to draw on a detailed 
understanding of the real-life experiences of migrants and refugees in Libya.2  
1. An overview of EU-Libya cooperation on migration 
Informal cooperation between the EU and Libya on migration has been developing 
gradually since November 2002. The EU has found ways to work around the lack 
of formal relations between the two parties which prevent full cooperation, akin to 
that established with other North African countries.3 A key moment was in October 
 
2 This article reports on research conducted over a six-month period in 2005 in Egypt, Italy and the 
Sudan. The research focused on a sample of sixty-five Egyptians, Sudanese, Eritreans, Ethiopians 
and Somalis, selected to represent a range of nationalities of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants 
entering Libya from its southern and eastern borders. The inclusion within the sample of asylum 
seekers, refugees and migrants provided the opportunity to draw comparisons between refugees and 
asylum seekers on the one hand, and migrants on the other. A research visit to Libya was initially 
envisaged, but proved not to be possible after my application for a visa was rejected by the Libyan 
authorities. The failure to access informants in Libya itself is not significantly detrimental to this 
study given that interviews within Libya put informants at risk of reprisals from the authorities, 
potentially compromising the value of the research. This remains true despite Libya gradually 
opening up to international scrutiny (e.g. visits by Amnesty International in February 2004 and by 
Human Rights Watch in May 2005). 
3 Since the late 1990s, Libya has begun a process of reintegration into the international community. 
However, relations remain informal as Libya is not party to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (or 
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2004 when the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC, 
Conclusions on Libya, 11 October 2004) announced a new phase of relations with 
Libya, “a policy of engagement”, after removing the 1986 EU arms embargo on 
Libya, and thereby enabled Libya to acquire military equipment for border 
surveillance (BBC 17 September and 8 October 2004). More recently, in October 
2007, the GAERC agreed to “open discussions on an EU-Libya framework 
agreement which will include areas of mutual interest, such as human rights, 
migration among others …” (GAERC, Conclusions on Libya, 15 October 2007).  
Since 2005, the EU has carefully framed its cooperation with Libya as being 
guided by humanitarian concerns and tied to human rights principles.4 In June 2005 
the European Council adopted conclusions on the initiation of an “ad hoc dialogue” 
and cooperation with Libya on migration issues, in recognition that full cooperation 
could not take place in the absence of formal relations between the two parties. It 
noted that:  
Cooperation between the EU and third countries is guided by principles of full 
respect for human rights, respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and the 
demonstration by those countries of a genuine commitment to fulfil their 
obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees or other relevant 
international conventions (European Council 2005a). 
It further stated that the extent and development of cooperation with Libya will 
depend on its commitments on asylum and fundamental rights. Already in 2005, 
the EC had raised concerns about refugee protection and conditions in migrants’ 
camps following two notable EC missions to Libya in 2003 and 2004 focusing on 
migration. The final mission report’s recommendations set the direction for future 
cooperation (European Commission 2005). 
This cooperation is developing against a backdrop of increased EU recognition of 
the need to tackle migration in a holistic manner, teaming security measures with 
those that will address development and human rights concerns. This is articulated 
in the “Global approach to migration: Priority actions for focusing on Africa and 
the Mediterranean”, adopted by the Council in December 2005, and later in the 
EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, hosted in 
Tripoli in November 2006. Yet the willingness and ability of the EU to pursue an 
integrated approach has been questionable from the outset, with early signs of the 
 
Barcelona Process), the framework governing political, economic and social relations between EU 
Member States and partners of the southern Mediterranean. Libya, the last of the southern 
Mediterranean countries to join the Barcelona Process, currently only holds passive observer status. 
The EU aims to involve Libya as a full partner. The European Neighbourhood Policy, adopted in 
2003, further aims at intensifying existing cooperation between the EU and its southern 
Mediterranean partners on several areas, including migration management and border control. 
4 This human rights and humanitarian framework draws on the 2004 Hague Programme (for the years 
2005–10), which seeks to achieve a more coordinated policy on asylum, immigration and border 
controls for the twenty-five EU member states. At the time of its adoption, the Council called on 
the EU to exert efforts to prevent the loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea as a result of attempts to 
enter the EU illegally. 
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continued prioritisation of security elements already apparent. An example is the 
debate held at the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting in July 2006 on the 
“Global approach”, in which the Executive Director of the EU Border Agency, 
FRONTEX,5 updated the EU on its implementation and concentrated primarily on 
aspects such as coastal patrols and surveillance of maritime borders (European 
Council 2006).  
2. Migrants and refugees in Libya: risk of detention and refoulement  
Foreign nationals in Libya, who are thought to constitute approximately one 
quarter of the total population (IOM 2007), have long been subject to an unclear 
legal framework defining their legality or illegality in the country. Refugees and 
asylum seekers face additional problems given a near total absence of refugee 
protection and the subsequent risk of detention and refoulement. Before moving on 
to look at the process of detention and deportation, it is important to understand 
this broader context.  
2.1 Absence of refugee protection  
In effect, all foreign nationals in Libya are subject to the same laws without 
distinction for refugees and asylum seekers. Although there are brief references to 
refugee protection in Libyan legislation,6 Libya has not developed its own national 
asylum legislation nor does it have administrative structures in place to deal with 
refugees and asylum seekers. In 2006 the Libyan authorities confirmed rumours 
that they are considering passing an asylum law, but as of October 2006 no draft 
had been put before the General People’s Congress (Libyan Parliament) nor made 
public (HRW 2006a: 23; HRW 2006b: 10). This means that refugees and asylum 
seekers are not accorded special treatment, leaving them vulnerable to abuse.  
In addition, Libya is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention on Refugees. 
However, it has signed the Organization of African Unity Convention on Refugees, 
which offers a broad definition of a refugee and obliges Libya to consider 
eligibility for refugee status within its territory. Regardless, the majority of those 
interviewed during this research did not consider applying for asylum in Libya to 
be a viable option. F., a recognised Ethiopian refugee in Italy, said, “I didn’t think 
about staying in Libya because there is no life there. They don’t give you any 
documents …. If you want to stay there you must do it illegally, I think, I don’t 
know any other way.” When faced with the possibility of remaining in Libya or 
trying to move on to Europe, many choose the latter, where they go on to apply for 
asylum. S.L., a southern Sudanese man granted humanitarian status in Italy in 
2003, explained that, “you can’t apply for asylum in Libya as a Sudanese national 
 
5 In full: the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the EU. 
6 See Article 11 of the Libyan Constitution Proclamation of 1969 and Article 21 of Law 20 of 1991.  
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because they [the Libyan Government] tell you that Libya is your country. You are 
not a refugee; you are just a Sudanese national.” 
In these difficult circumstances, the UNHCR’s role in ensuring refugee protection 
is severely limited. The UNHCR states that “… ad hoc migration management 
policies do not provide for the identification of and proper response to the needs of 
asylum seekers and refugees, including access to protection” and that it faces 
“significant operational challenges” (UNHCR Country Operations Plan – Libya, 
2006). The UNHCR Tripoli office is still not officially recognised by the 
authorities, preventing it from operating under its full mandate. The office receives 
only a small proportion of potential asylum claims due to an unwillingness or 
inability on the part of potential asylum seekers to apply for asylum in Libya. 
Critically, the UNHCR is not granted access to places of detention, which denies it 
contact with detained refugees and asylum seekers and therefore increases the 
chances of refoulement.  
In contrast, cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is 
under way. In March 2008, the IOM opened its first “humanitarian centre” in 
Tripoli aimed at providing vulnerable migrants with medical assistance, support 
and counselling (IOM 2008). This took place within a broader programme of 
activities implemented since 2005, including the enhancement of three reception 
centres, with the provision of improved health services to migrants; assisted 
voluntary return programmes for irregular migrants, with social and economic 
reintegration assistance for returnees; information campaigns in countries of origin 
and transit, providing information on the dangers of irregular migration; and the 
initiation of dialogue between selected countries of origin, transit and destination 
(IOM 2005).7 While these activities may go some way towards addressing irregular 
migration, the absence of a legal framework to protect refugees and the difficulty in 
accessing the asylum system makes them dangerous as returns may result in 
refoulement. 
2.2 Unclear legal status of foreign nationals  
Research findings suggest that the vast majority of refugees and migrants, in 
particular sub-Saharan Africans, enter Libya illegally or in fear of being illegal due 
to the lack of clarity over their legal status in the country (Hamood 2006; European 
Commission 2005). There seems to be no common understanding among 
foreigners in Libya of how to regularise their situation and little means of finding 
out, especially due to their reluctance to interact with the state. As a result, the 
majority of foreigners do not obtain the formal documentation necessary to 
regularise their stay. Even those who believe they are residing legally on a valid 
Libyan identification document have no guarantee of state protection and they too 
can be arrested and detained. 
 
7 This was known as the Programme for the Enhancement of Transit and Irregular Migration 
Management (TRIM). 
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Law 6 of 1987 on the organisation of entry, residence and exit of foreigners in 
Libya, as amended by Law 2 of 1372 (2004)8 stipulates that foreigners must have a 
valid visa to enter, reside in and leave Libya.9 Those who violate the provisions of 
this law (Article 19 after 2004 amendment) – for example, by not obtaining the 
correct visa, violating the conditions of their visa or overstaying the duration of the 
visa – are liable to a prison sentence without fixed duration and a minimum fine of 
1,000 dinars (approximately US$800). In August 2005 there were reports of an 
additional entry requirement obliging people to carry 500 dinars (approximately 
US$400) to cover their expenses during their stay in Libya (e.g. al-Bayan, United 
Arab Emirates, 19 August 2005; United Press International, 30 August 2005).  
The 2004 amendments add specific reference to activities relating to irregular 
migration, notably smuggling migrants by any means, and creating, supplying or 
carrying false travel or identification documents. These activities are punishable by 
a minimum one year’s imprisonment and a fine of no less than 1,000 dinars 
(Article 19 bis). While the amendments have introduced tighter penalties on illegal 
residence in and passage through Libya and for smuggling, these have not yet been 
matched by parallel legislative amendments to strengthen refugee protection.  
The Libyan authorities have made some efforts to inform both foreigners and 
Libyan employers of the requirements for foreign nationals residing in the country 
and that a stricter application of the law will be enforced. On 10 May 2005 the 
official Libyan Jamahiriya Broadcasting Corporation reported a statement made by 
the Ministry of the Interior10 notifying foreign residents that they must have 
“authorised visa entry or they will be sent back to their countries”. Three 
documents are required to make a foreigner eligible for employment in Libya: “a 
legal visa, valid passport and authorised health certificate”. The ministry stated its 
intention to take “appropriate action against anyone, even foreigners and people 
smugglers who violate legislations, including a prison sentence of more than a 
year, and a fine of more than LYD2,000”. A contract for employment is also a 
requirement, but some flexibility was allowed for it to be obtained after arrival. 
The authorities reportedly reiterated the need for all migrants to obtain a work 
contract or face deportation in February 2007 (Christian Science Monitor, 
13 March 2007). Raids are now reportedly shown on television to spread the 
message to as wide an audience as possible (ECRAN Weekly Update, 19 March 
2007). 
2.3 Risk of detention and ill-treatment 
As a result of this ambiguity, refugees and migrants alike express a constant fear of 
being caught by the police, detained and possibly sent back to their countries of 
origin. At least hundreds, possibly thousands, are thought to be held in police 
 
8 Copy of laws on file with the author. 
9 According to information obtained from the Libyan Embassy in Cairo in October 2005, Sudanese 
and Egyptian nationals do not require a visa but must travel with a valid passport.  
10 Formally known as the Secretariat of the General People’s Committee for Public Security. 
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stations, prisons and migrant camps around the country.11 Some are held 
temporarily for a matter of days, while others are left to languish in cells for 
months and even years, often without understanding the reason for and nature of 
their detention. Those arrested include men, women and minors. 
In 2007, the Libyan authorities widely publicised their efforts to detain 
“infiltrators” or so-called illegal migrants. Figures of detained migrants, accused of 
trying to cross the Mediterranean, are usually published alongside figures of 
returnees. For example, the official Libyan news agency (Jamahiriya News 
Agency, JANA) reported that between 15 and 28 February 2007 the authorities had 
arrested 1,067 people and deported 1,299 others of varying nationalities. They 
claimed that “legal measures were adopted towards the infiltrators” without 
specifying further (JANA, 7 March 2007). In March 2007, IOM Tripoli reportedly 
said that police raids on migrants had increased since February 2007. However, it 
added that no written procedures were available nor were those subject to these 
regulations able to understand the reasoning behind them (Christian Science 
Monitor, 13 March 2007). Therefore, this apparent increase in arrests of migrants 
has not been matched by specific measures to ensure that those under threat better 
understand the laws governing their stay in Libya. 
The detention of migrants is characterised by the lack of a formal process, the 
apparent arbitrary nature of the arrests, and a total deficit of information provided 
to the migrant as to the reasons and duration of their detention. Nearly half of the 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants interviewed for this study were detained 
during their stay in Libya. In almost all cases, there were no formal charges of 
which they were aware. Throughout their time in detention, they had no access to a 
lawyer, nor were they presented to a judicial authority. In addition, to their 
knowledge, no trial took place to establish their guilt or innocence. Effectively cut 
off from the outside world, without the requisite safeguards of a lawyer or the 
opportunity of appearing before a judicial body, those who had been detained 
reported that they often faced beatings, insults and racist remarks from guards and 
difficult conditions in detention. The latter include insufficient quantities of food 
(which is of poor quality), overcrowding and unhygienic conditions.  
2.4 Returns and the risk of refoulement 
While in detention, migrants and refugees are threatened with deportation and 
possible refoulement. Like figures of arrests of “illegal migrants”, deportations are 
also publicised by the Libyan authorities. In November 2006, Libyan Interior 
Minister Salah Rajab reportedly announced that Libya had returned 64,330 
irregular migrants over 2006 (ECRAN Weekly Update, 19 March 2007). Official 
 
11 Little information exists about camps for migrants in Libya and given that the majority of refugees 
and migrants interviewed in this study were unable to explain precisely where they were detained, 
knowing neither the name nor exact location of the place, it is very difficult to obtain information 
about these camps from refugees and migrants themselves. Limited information on the camps for 
migrants can be found in European Commission (2005) and HRW (2006b). 
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Libyan statistics obtained by Human Rights Watch (2008) show that Libya 
repatriated approximately 145,000 foreigners between 2003 and 2005. The 
deportation of foreigners is not a new phenomenon and over the years Libya has 
carried out deportations of people on a collective basis, often according to their 
nationality, to coincide with deteriorating political relations between their country 
of origin and Libya, or following a decline in the economic situation.12  
In recent years, both voluntary and forced returns of nationals from different 
countries from Libya to their countries of origin continued to be reported and at 
times threatened on a wide scale. In January 2008 human rights organisations 
raised the alarm over Libya’s announcement that it would immediately expel all 
undocumented foreigners given the lack of differentiation between migrants on the 
one hand and refugees and asylum seekers on the other (HRW 2008; AI 2008).  
While the Libyan authorities have a legitimate right to deport those residing 
illegally in the country, it is clear that the manner in which deportations are carried 
out fall short of the minimum necessary to ensure that refoulements do not occur. 
Since 2004 several instances of refoulement have been documented (e.g. AI 2004; 
Hamood 2006), although the lack of consistent monitoring of deportations suggests 
that many more are likely to have occurred. An examination of the deportation 
procedure reveals a flawed process in which no thorough individual assessment is 
carried out and there is no opportunity for the individual, regardless of their 
country of origin, to access UNHCR and therefore the asylum procedure once in 
detention (Hamood 2006).  
The findings of a 2004 EC delegation confirmed this, concluding that “[t]he 
decision to return illegal immigrants to their country of origin seems to be taken for 
groups of nationalities rather than having examined individual cases in detail.” 
(European Commission 2005: 14) “The mission [of the European Commission] 
was informed [by the Libyan authorities] that administrative procedures and paper 
work for the purpose of identification is conducted, including involvement of 
concerned national consulates, concluded by a decision taken by the Head of the 
“Commission for deportation” in Tripoli. However, the mission expresses doubts 
about the systematic implementation as well as the efficiency of this 
procedure …. Finally, no individual order of deportation seems to be taken” 
(European Commission 2005: 35).  
Those interviewed in the context of this study were unable to rationalise the 
procedure of how the decision to deport a particular person or group of people is 
taken. The interviews confirmed that there is no individual identification procedure 
beyond asking the person’s name, parents’ names and country of origin. The 
explanation of Sudanese national H.S., who spent nearly one year in Libya 
 
12 For example, Tunisians faced no less than eight expulsions and three waves of large-scale returns 
between 1966 and 1985 (Grimaud 1994, quoted in Pliez 2004). 
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returning voluntarily in May 2005, reflects the descriptions given by several other 
interviewees:  
It all depends on the period of time you are there: sometimes it is easy to enter 
and people arriving by the desert trail, even those without proper documentation, 
enter from the bawaba (gate); at other times, you must bypass the bawaba and 
enter illegally. It is not clear what is needed in order to make your stay legal. One 
day the police will ask you for one particular document, like your passport, and 
the next day you’ll be asked for something else, say the health certificate. It’s 
hard to know which is necessary, for whom, when and why. 
2.5 Collective forcible returns of Eritrean nationals13
On 21 July 2004, 110 Eritrean nationals were returned from Libya to Eritrea, where 
they were at risk of torture. On arrival, they were arrested and reportedly held 
incommunicado in detention – that is without access to the outside world – in a 
secret prison (AI 2004). Until today, there is no news of their fate and whereabouts.  
With this in mind, a group of seventy-five Eritrean men, women and children, who 
were being returned from Libya to Eritrea by military transport on 27 August 2004, 
hijacked their plane, forcing it to land in Khartoum (Sudan), and demanding the 
presence of the UN for their protection.14 As one of them explained to me, “What 
was waiting for us in Eritrea was nothing but death. What we did was for our 
safety. We did not beat or hurt anyone; we just did what we had to because we 
knew that on landing in Asmara Airport we would be greeted by death.” On arrival 
in Khartoum, sixty of them applied for asylum and all were recognised as refugees.  
The fifteen others were identified as the hijackers and detained on arrival. They 
were finally sentenced to two years’ imprisonment by the Supreme Court after their 
initial sentence of five years was reduced. Their final sentence carries an expulsion 
order. Several of the fifteen men are married to women who were also on board the 
aircraft and were recognised as refugees after it landed in Khartoum. They had all 
been arrested in Libya at different times and spent several months in detention 
prior to their deportation. Like many others, they complained of ill-treatment in 
detention, including regular beatings particularly for the men, and of a lack of 
access to legal counsel or due process.  
An examination of the process of deportation reveals that no consideration appears 
to have been given to the risk the men and women would face if returned to Eritrea. 
Ten of the passengers were recognised as refugees in the Sudan before travelling to 
Libya. One such individual, M.M.T., moved to Libya to earn money to send home 
to her family. She said that while in detention, she showed her refugee document to 
an official who apparently responded that he did not know what this was.  
 
13 For other cases of deportation and risk of refoulement, see Hamood (2006: 35–40). 
14 I interviewed several of the passengers in the context of this study in addition to staff of UNHCR 
Khartoum, the Sudanese Commission on Refugees and the SUWEIRA Centre for Human Rights, an 
organisation working on behalf of Eritreans in the Sudan.  
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The sixty men and women granted refugee status in Khartoum should have been 
given the opportunity to claim asylum in Libya or at the very least not returned to 
their country of origin. In contrast, they were not given access to an asylum 
procedure and some were further put at risk through identification by an official 
from the Eritrean Embassy while in detention in Libya. A.I. described being visited 
in detention by an official from the Eritrean Embassy and the Head of the Passport 
Office who informed them that they would be returned to Eritrea. The official 
apparently told him that “his time was up”. In front of this official, he asked the 
Head of the Passport Office to arrange for a UNHCR representative to visit him in 
prison. The response from the Head of the Passport Office was apparently to say 
that he did not know anything about refugees or the UNHCR. At this juncture, it is 
important to recall that UNHCR Tripoli does not have access to places of 
detention, including to those places which serve as deportation centres. 
The rest of the group, who were detained elsewhere in Libya, faced different but 
similarly arbitrary procedures. In their case, their nationality was apparently 
determined merely on the basis of their own assertion. According to those 
interviewed in the context of this study, some of the Eritreans detained at the same 
time as those deported avoided deportation by claiming to be from Ethiopia. B.M., 
an Eritrean national, confirmed that he managed to escape deportation with the 
group of seventy-five by falsely claiming to be Ethiopian. On the other hand, one 
of those on board the hijacked plane was an Ethiopian woman Y.T., who would 
have been returned to Eritrea had the plane arrived at its intended destination. She 
was married to an Eritrean and it therefore seems to have been assumed that she 
was of the same nationality.  
This case reflects an ongoing danger faced by thousands of foreigners in Libya. In 
July 2007, Human Rights Watch (2008) received information that the Libyan 
authorities had detained some seventy Eritrean men and threatened them with 
deportation. A number of them are said to have fled military conscription in 
Eritrea, exposing them to possible torture if returned to their home country. 
3. Italy/Libya cooperation sets the tone for a policy centred on border 
control and surveillance 
It is in this context that the EU and its member states, notably Italy, develop their 
cooperation on migration with Libya. In reality, bilateral cooperation between 
Libya and Italy seems to sideline these factors and to follow a two-pronged 
strategy of returns of undocumented migrants and increasing cooperation with 
Libya with a view to enhancing its capacity to control its borders. This is presented 
as both preventing irregular arrivals and as the main strategy to prevent deaths at 
sea and in the desert and appears to have set the tone for EU policy. 
Since 2000, Italy and Libya developed close cooperation on migration. Italy has 
established collaborative working relations between Libyan and Italian police, 
provided Libya with training and equipment, in particular to assist border 
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surveillance and management, and pledged millions of euros for border control 
equipment (European Commission 2005: 58, 63; Corriere della Sera, Italy, 27 May 
2005). Relations were further enhanced in December 2007 with the signature of a 
partnership agreement to intensify cooperation to fight organised crime and in 
particular illegal immigration. Official Libyan media reports that the agreement 
includes measures to improve the management and coordination of training and 
operational aspects of joint maritime patrol aimed at intercepting boats and to 
continue joint field action (several articles published by JANA on 29 December 
2007). Yet reports indicate European malaise with Libya’s alleged lack of 
adherence to past agreements and its apparent resistance to allow FRONTEX 
patrols to enter its territorial waters (Times of Malta, 11 July 2008; Malta 
Independent Online, 30 August 2008). 
3.1 Readmissions, returns and the risk of refoulement from Italy 
Although Libya and Italy have not signed a readmission agreement, they appear to 
have reached a verbal agreement on returns, which has allowed Italy to restrict 
entry into its territory by carrying out a series of collective expulsions. These took 
place between 2004 and 2006 at times when large influxes of foreign nationals 
arrive at Lampedusa. The two main instances took place in October 2004 and 
March 2005 and were followed by smaller-scale deportations, such as those in May 
and June 2005 (see Hamood 2006: 68–72 for a fuller account). On each occasion, 
individuals of different nationalities were deported to Libya. Some were detained 
on arrival in Libya, without access to UNHCR and where they risked torture or ill-
treatment and others were returned to their countries of origin, where they too 
risked serious human rights violations. In many cases, the fate of those returned to 
their country of origin remains unknown. In addition, Italy has financed a 
programme of charter flights for the repatriation of so-called illegal immigrants 
from Libya back to their countries of origin, returning 5,688 individuals over 2004 
(European Commission 2005: 61–2). To facilitate returns, Italy has also financed 
the construction of a camp for illegal immigrants in northern Libya, apparently in 
line with European criteria; two additional camps in Kufra and Sebha, southern 
Libya, are envisaged (European Commission 2005: 59).  
Since April/May 2006, collective expulsions appear to have ceased. The IOM 
claims that “[f]orced returns from Lampedusa to Egypt, Morocco or Libya stopped 
in April, when IOM opened its office at the centre” (IOM, 12 December 2006). A 
shift in policy may also be linked to the coming to power of a new government in 
Italy in April 2006. Shortly after their victory, the under-secretary for immigration 
in the Ministry of Interior, Marcella Lucidi, announced on 24 May that “there will 
be no more expulsions of immigrants to those countries that have not signed the 
Geneva Convention, and among these Libya …” (HRW 2006a: 112). The public 
condemnations by a range of actors, notably the European Parliament and 
international human rights organisations, may also have played a pivotal role in the 
apparent change in policy.15 However, it is difficult to know whether these 
 
15 For example, “Resolution on Lampedusa”, 14 April 2005 (European Parliament 2005a). 
 Europe’s Security Approach Failing to Halt Migration from Libya 139
 
                                                
deportations are perhaps now taking place at an individual level and therefore go 
undetected. In any case, the EU is resorting to other tactics to prevent arrivals to its 
territory by increasing patrols at sea and counting on Libya to prevent departures. 
3.2 Examples of collective expulsions 
The manner in which the 2004–06 deportations were carried out violates Italy’s 
national and international obligations, particularly with regard to the right to seek 
asylum and the principle of non-refoulement (e.g. International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) 2005; European Parliament 2005b). In October 2004 and 
March 2005, UNHCR was granted delayed entry to the “temporary stay and 
assistance centre” (CPTA),16 in which migrants and refugees are first held before 
they are either transferred to CPTAs in other parts of the country for further 
processing of their case or deported. This meant that by the time they were given 
access, most people had already been deported. In October the UNHCR was only 
granted access to the centre five days after its original request for access and after 
over 1,000 people had already been returned to Libya. In March 2005, UNHCR 
Tripoli reiterated that it still did not have access to the places of detention where 
those returned in October 2004 were held (UNHCR 2005a).  
In October, in its preliminary evaluation of the returns, the UNHCR said that “the 
rushed method used to sort out the incoming persons by nationality has not allowed 
individual persons from all national groups concerned to claim asylum” (UNHCR 
2004). After field research conducted in Italy, the FIDH added its voice of concern 
about the speed of the process and about the process of identification of the 
arrivals. “It appears the ‘identification’ was essentially based on the intuition of the 
two interpreters present (a Moroccan and a Tunisian) to accord to the migrants a 
different nationality than that claimed.” This apparently arbitrary system was used 
to declare that the majority were Egyptian, although many claimed to be 
Palestinian.  
In March 2005 a further violation occurred when the Italian Minister of the Interior 
informed parliament that Libyan officials had been allowed entry into the CPTA to 
help Italian officials to identify human traffickers. In addition to voicing similar 
concerns to those raised in October 2004, the UNHCR condemned the access given 
to Libyan officials because “[i]f there was any Libyan asylum seeker in the group, 
this would run counter to basic refugee protection principles, and could create valid 
refugee claims sur place” (UNHCR 2005b).  
3.3 Preventing entry to the EU 
Deportations have been accompanied by EU efforts to increase its own and the 
Libyan capacity to prevent people from leaving the Libyan coast by boat. Since 
 
16 Known in Italian as Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza (CPTA). The treatment of 
foreign nationals in CPTAs, including the one in Lampedusa, has raised concerns among 
international and Italian human rights organisations. For more information, refer to Amnesty 
International (2005) and FIDH (2005).  
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July 2003, the Italian navy, operating under a decree from the Ministry of the 
Interior, has been allowed to carry out interceptions at sea. The navy is tasked with 
intercepting boats of migrants and asylum seekers and trying to force them back to 
the territorial waters of the countries from which they came. However, the decree 
does not consider the responsibility of its officials to address any protection needs 
of persons on board (HRW 2006a: 113). In September 2006 Italy announced an 
agreement to deploy its police in Libya along the coastline to help Libyan law 
enforcement prevent boat departures (HRW 2006a: 13). At the same time, Libya 
has been resisting the idea of sea patrols close within its territorial waters and has 
denied access to FRONTEX, forcing the patrols to operate in international waters 
close to the Libyan coast (Malta Independent Online, 8 April 2007). 
Further measures were outlined in the June 2005 conclusions (European Council 
2005b), including calls to initiate specific operational actions at sea, including joint 
sea operations for which EU Member States’ vessels and aircraft should be made 
temporarily available; send EU Immigration Liaison Officers to sea ports and 
Tripoli International Airport; and improve border control at the airport. In May 
2006, former European Commissioner Franco Frattini announced that a field 
mission would be sent to southern Libya later in the year to assess possibilities for 
EU assistance to prevent entry at Libya’s southern borders, mainly involving an 
assessment of the logistic needs of the Libyan police (European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, 26 May 2006).17  
Such measures were also seemingly at the heart of discussions at a seminar 
organised by the EC on 20 July 2005 under the title of “saving life at sea and in the 
desert”. Despite the apparent focus on humanitarian concerns, a closer reading of 
the conclusions suggests that discussions between the EU and Libya dealt almost 
exclusively with developing methods to strengthen Libya’s border surveillance. 
According to the conclusions, in late 2005 a joint EU-Libya committee was 
scheduled to discuss the following: the establishment of a contact network with 
round-the-clock coverage; a joint search and rescue plan with emphasis on an 
“inventory of technical requirements”; joint search and rescue exercises; joint 
training for external border management, search and rescue and asylum and 
protection issues.18 Despite the mention of asylum and protection issues, including 
the role of the UNHCR, there was no detailed development of the exact means to 
be used by the EU and Libya to save the lives of those intercepted at sea or in the 
desert. Importantly, there is no mention of the means to be utilised by the EU and 
Libya to ensure that the right of those intercepted at sea to seek asylum is 
guaranteed and that the principle of non-refoulement is upheld.  
As noted above, although the EU has framed its cooperation with Libya within 
humanitarian and human rights concerns, when examined in practice it appears to 
 
17 By the end of 2006 this mission had still not taken place. 
18 Agreed conclusions of seminar on “saving life at sea and in the desert” held in Malta on 20 July 
2005, published by the Maltese Government’s Department of Information 
(http://www.doi.gov.mt/en/press_releases/2005/07/pr1102a.doc). 
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be pushing forward a security agenda without insisting on corresponding action on 
other aspects. Consequently, as shown above, few if any human rights 
improvements have been implemented by Libya since the initiation of cooperation.  
4. Border control and surveillance: effective tools for reducing 
migratory flows? 
The EU’s prioritisation of border control and surveillance is built on the premise 
that insufficiently managed migration flows not only allow greater numbers of 
people to enter the EU but also result in loss of life (European Council 2004). 
However, numerous studies have challenged the notion that increased border 
control and surveillance bring about a reduction in the numbers of arrivals to the 
global North (e.g. Andreas 2001; Castles 2004). Rather, increased border 
restrictions relegate refugees and asylum seekers to the status of “illegal”, leaving 
them with little choice but to take ever more dangerous routes and place their lives 
in the hands of smugglers (e.g. Morrison and Crosland 2001).  
A security approach fails to take into account the realities on the ground and in 
particular the experiences of migrants and refugees themselves. First, it disregards 
Libya’s vast land and sea borders,19 the expanses of desert at most land borders and 
the absence of demarcation in many locations, which will probably render border-
control efforts largely symbolic. Moreover, most inhabitants of Libya’s desert 
border regions, who move fluidly between Libya, the Sudan and Chad, pay little 
heed to these borders which they view as an artificial construct.  
Second, this approach does not recognise the extreme lengths that both refugees 
and migrants will go to in order to reach Europe (see Hamood 2008). The findings 
of my research show that the overwhelming majority of refugees and migrants are 
aware of the risks of life in Libya and of the journey to Europe prior to travel. Both 
refugees and migrants describe a sense of compulsion as they try to escape the 
political, economic and/or social situation of not only their countries of origin but 
also asylum or transit. This is borne out for almost all the Egyptians and sub-
Saharan Africans that I interviewed, some of whom further explained that they 
decided to move on to the EU due to the unpredictable and uncertain nature of life 
in Libya. S.L., a southern Sudanese respondent, summed up the feelings of many 
others, saying that he left Libya, “because the situation was very difficult. Living 
there, you are always scared that one day they will kill you just like a dog and there 
is nothing that can be done.” An awareness of the risks, including the prospect of 
death, does not appear to deter the vast majority of people.  
Even the experience of terrible hardships, including detention and deportation, is 
often not a sufficient deterrent. Two Egyptian migrants I interviewed revealed a 
determination to reach Italy despite having been deported from Libya and Italy 
respectively. Y.S. was sent back from Libya in 2004 and although he says he never 
 
19 4,400 km of land borders with six countries and 1,770 km of coastline. 
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wants to return to Libya having been detained there, he was determined to travel to 
Italy again through another route. A.A. was detained in Italy for five days in 2001 
after flying in on falsified travel documents. In 2004 he made a second attempt and 
was detained and deported from Libya after trying to get to Italy, this time by boat. 
5. Conclusion  
In May 2006, former Commissioner Franco Frattini reportedly expressed his 
satisfaction at Libyan cooperation on immigration (European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles, 26 May 2006). Three years after the initiation of the “ad hoc dialogue” 
and cooperation with Libya on migration, and a commitment by the EU to ensure 
respect for human rights and refugee protection, the EU appears to be failing to 
link cooperation to steps by Libya to improve its current legal framework and 
treatment of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. An examination of 
developments in Libya demonstrates that the Libyan authorities have failed to take 
measures to improve the situation of refugees and migrants.  
The lack of positive action to address human rights issues leads to scepticism over 
the extent to which the EU has accounted for the finding of the EC technical 
mission to Libya that, “in practice, international protection of refugees is not 
assured” (European Commission 2005: 13). It also makes the assurances, given by 
the European Council in November 2004, that support and cooperation with transit 
countries on migration will be tied to a demonstration of the “genuine commitment 
to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva Convention on Refugees” appear 
hollow. 
As this article demonstrates, the two most elaborate aspects of EU-Libya 
cooperation to date are the policy of returns and readmissions and that of 
preventing boat departures from the Libyan coastline. On a more positive note, 
Italy appears to have put an end to its practice of collective deportations since mid-
2006, but deportations from Libya continue to be reported. These policies and 
practices not only violate international human rights standards but are also likely to 
meet with failure.  
The EU has recognised the need to adopt an integrated approach to migration 
across the board but has yet to meet its objectives in practice. In addition to the 
long-term objective of addressing the root causes of migration, urgent measures 
need to be taken to strengthen legislation and safeguards in countries of origin and 
of asylum or transit. Clearly, a multi-pronged approach is complex to implement, 
but only then can border control and surveillance measures be both more effective 
and adhere to EU values and international commitments. 
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Repatriation of Afghan and Iraqi Refugees 
from Iran: When Home is No Longer Home 
ANISSEH VAN ENGELAND-NOURAI 
McGill University 
The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the largest refugee population in 
the world. The 2001 national census figures included approximately 
2.55 million documented refugees. The numbers for 2007 are 
different: there are 1,025,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the 
country. Among them are 940,400 Afghan refugees and 54,400 Iraqi 
refugees, the two largest refugee communities living in Iran. They are 
difficult to locate as they not only live in camps but also in cities, at 
the margins of Iranian society. These refugees were tolerated by Iran 
until the immigration policy shifted to the decision to repatriate them 
to their home countries, Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran has signed a 
tripartite agreement with Afghanistan and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the repatriation of Afghan 
refugees on a voluntary basis. The plan for repatriation of Iraqi 
refugees has been set up by the UNHCR alone. While the repatriation 
programme for Afghanistan is still going on, the repatriation plan for 
Iraq has been suspended because of the instability and violence in the 
country. The living conditions for Afghan and Iraqi refugees have 
become incredibly difficult in Iran and most of them choose the 
voluntary repatriation option. However they often find desolation, 
war, insecurity and unemployment on their return. This raises 
questions about the sustainability of repatriation programmes in a 
country at war such as Iraq and in an unstable country such as 
Afghanistan. This article, based on extensive fieldwork carried out in 
Iran, explores pre- and post-return conditions for Afghan and Iraqi 
refugees: how do they live in Iran? What are the options given to them 
regarding their future in Iran? What are their conditions after 
repatriation?  
A fter the three main waves of arrivals in 1980, 1991 and 2003, the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted up to 500,000 Iraqi refugees (Ashraf 2003). The 
country today hosts some 50,000 Iraqis (USCRI 2006). They tend to concentrate in 
areas bordering their homeland. A minority of Iraqi refugees live in the eleven 
remaining camps. The largest camp of Iran, Ashrafi Esfahini in Khuzestan 
province, was dismantled in 2004 and its occupants were repatriated to Iraq 
(UNHCR 2003b). 
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The Iraqi refugees arrived in Iran over three decades. The flow began in 1975: Iraqi 
Kurds were forced to leave some zones when an agreement between Saddam 
Hussein and the Shah of Iran allowed Baghdad to crush Kurdish rebellions. 
Afterwards, and from 1980 until 1981, some 200,000 Iraqis, the Faili Kurds, were 
expelled by their own government: the latter claimed that they were descendants of 
Iranian immigrants and not of Iraqi citizens (USCRI 1999). These people were 
actually descendants of the Iranian clergy and pilgrims who had settled in the 
religious centres of Iraq in the eighteenth century (Izady 1992). They were accused 
of collaboration with Iran during the war between Iraq and Iran. Their forced 
departure for Iran was quite tragic: they could not speak Persian, they had to leave 
in a hurry and their assets and goods were confiscated by the Iraqi Government.  
With the Iran–Iraq war, more people fled across the border, mainly from the 
Kurdish and Shia areas of Iraq. At the same time, Iran had to deal with many 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the war: Therefore the Iranian 
Government had to cope with an important number of Iranian IDPs concurrently 
with Iraqi refugees. During the Iraqi occupation of Khuzestan, the government had 
to shelter 1.5 million IDPs and refugees. As a consequence, the Iranian authorities 
built up camps in Shiraz, Tehran and other cities to house all these people. 
Iraqi Kurds, largely Sunnis, fled to Iran following the Anfal campaign (i.e. the 
chemical bombardment of Halabja) in 1988. In 1991, during the first Gulf War, 
1.3 million Iraqi refugees poured over the border to escape the fighting when 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion army was forced to withdraw from Kuwait and when 
rebellions against his rule erupted in southern Iraq. Between 1992 and 1994, more 
people crossed the border due to the destruction and the drainage of the 
Marshlands. Around one-fifth of the estimated half million Marsh Arabs then lived 
in Iranian refugee camps (Dabrowska 2000). In 1999, tens of thousands of Iraqis 
fled to Iran after the assassination of Mohammed Sadiq al Sadr, the prominent Shia 
religious leader, fearing new persecutions. 
An important arrival of refugees was expected with the war in Iraq in 2003. The 
Government of Iran opened nineteen new camps under the supervision of 
Médecins Sans Frontières and the UNHCR at the border with Iraq. As the border 
area was littered with tanks, landmines and remains from the 1980–88 conflict, it 
had to be thoroughly cleared before the establishment of the camps. The UNHCR 
donated US$1 million for the costs and spent US$8 million to stockpile relief 
items. These items were initially supposed to help Afghan refugees in Iran 
(UNHCR 2003b). In the end, the war in Iraq caused more internal displacements 
(IDPs) than refugees. There were waves of refugees as the war went on, but most 
of them flew to the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan, which are Arabic-speaking 
countries, rather than to Iran. 
Soon after the beginning of the war in Iraq, the UNHCR launched a repatriation 
programme. Most Iraqi refugees had lived in Iran for two decades before going 
back home on a voluntary basis. The UNHCR realised that the Iraqi community 
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was actually looking forward to going home (UNHCR 2003b). There were some 
issues pertaining to their repatriation and the programme had to be suspended. For 
example, citizenship of these refugees is sometimes questioned, as both states, Iran 
and Iraq, claim sovereignty over them or, on the other hand, reject them (USCRI 
1999). Those who were able to prove that they have family ties in Iran were 
granted Iranian citizenship. 
1. The Afghan community 
Afghans have been streaming into Iran for decades, fleeing war, drought, extremist 
leaders and economic crisis. They can be located throughout the country. These 
Afghans are mostly from the Shia community, the Hazarat. There are also Tadjiks 
and Turkmens from the north of Afghanistan. Some come from Herat, a region that 
borders Iran.  
Many Afghan refugees arrived after the 1979 Soviet invasion: they were fleeing the 
fighting between Afghan resistance groups and government forces assisted by 
Soviet troops. The Iranian Government began developing specific policies 
regarding Afghan refugees as early as 1984. Iran received no international help to 
support these refugees. The government opened several camps close to the Afghan 
border and tried to shelter and feed the refugees. As the camps were located near 
cities, the inhabitants of these camps benefited from municipal services such as 
access to water and free schools (for registered refugee children only) (UNHCR 
2005b). Soon Afghan men left the camps for the cities to find work and their 
families stayed behind. At first, the police would catch them and bring them back 
to the camps. But the Iranian Government understood the economic interest of 
having refugees doing the lowest social jobs and refugees were free to move. 
Besides, the policy of open doors was justified by the idea that a jihad was taking 
place in Afghanistan; consequently Iran had a duty according to Islamic 
brotherhood to host Afghan refugees, which explains the tolerance towards them. 
There was another wave of refugees when civil war broke out in Afghanistan in 
1992. As these new refugees were not fleeing religious persecution, the Iranian 
Government classified them as regular refugees, according to the 1951 United 
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to which Iran is a party, and 
was less tolerant of them than of the previous refugees (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 
2005). The next wave of refugees arrived between 1994 and 2001 due to Taliban 
rule. In 2000, almost a quarter of a million Afghans sought refuge in Iran. The 
refugee crises heightened when the United States invaded Afghanistan and the 
stream continues today. Afghan people enter Iran in order to flee insecurity in their 
country.  
Most of the refugees who reach Iran are in a terrible state because of the drought, 
starvation and the long and dangerous trip, as well as war. They suffer from 
tuberculosis, dysentery, bronchial affections or skin diseases. Most of these 
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diseases had been eradicated in Iran so the government had to take health measures 
to avoid propagation. 
Torbat-e-Jam refugee camp is probably the most important Afghan camp. It is 
located in Khorassan province, about 150 km from Mashhad and 70 km from the 
Afghan border. Built ten years ago with a capacity of 10,000 people, it looks more 
like a housing complex than a refugee camp (IRIN 2004). It houses about 7,800 
Afghan refugees, mostly Hazaras. Two sections of the camp share a health centre 
and a school. There are avenues, parks, a football field, a gym and a bazaar. The 
third section, made up of tents, is the deportation section; it is here that Afghans 
who are apprehended and found without documents are brought pending their 
deportation.  
Refugees who have left camps live in villages and cities. For example, Niyatak is a 
refugee-village built in the traditional style, close to Zabol. It hosts 5,000 refugees. 
The different tribes have ensured the construction of the houses. Most of the men 
in the camps do not work as the drought has stopped all labouring and harvesting 
activities in the region (Michel 2001). 
Then there are deportation camps: undocumented Afghans are gathered there until 
they are deported back to Afghanistan. The detention camp of Adimi, near Zabol, 
is an illustration: Afghans who have recently crossed the border and are 
undocumented are gathered there after their arrest. The refugees will be sent 
back/deported to Afghanistan, in violation of the Convention of 1951. There are 
other deportation camps such as Ghagharouk or Mile 46 inside Afghanistan. These 
camps have been set up by the Iranian Government inside Afghanistan, just like the 
camp of Makaki. 
In 2006, there were some 26,000 Afghan refugees living in camps. This means that 
only 5 per cent of Afghan refugees still live in camps today (Roy 2000). In 
comparison, 54,000 Iraqi refugees remain in Iran and only 5,000 live in twelve 
refugee camps (UNHCR 2007b).  
2. Refugees and Iranian law: new laws and the new refugee policy 
In March 2001, the Iranian Government decided to close its border with 
Afghanistan in an effort to curb drug smuggling and flows of refugees. It spends 
US$18 million every year to keep that border closed and under scrutiny. In order to 
contain the arrivals, refugee camps such as Makaki camp and Mile 46 were 
established several kilometres inside the Afghan border, although the UNHCR 
disagreed with this closure of the border and the opening of Iranian camps inside 
Afghanistan. It has asked Iran to keep its borders open, as international UN staff 
are currently barred for security reasons from crossing into Afghanistan. The 
camps inside Afghanistan are not safe and have been the targets of US-led military 
strikes. For example, at one time, hundreds of refugees were stranded for days 
around Makaki camp, which was filled beyond capacity. Some of the refugees 
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were forced to sleep out in the field, where their security was not assured. Makaki 
camp is indeed near a Taliban-controlled area (HRW 2002b). The area was 
susceptible to bombing and refugees were prey for Taliban seeking new recruits. In 
the other camp, Mile 46, children have died because of the poor health conditions. 
Eventually the sanitary situation was such that the Iranian Red Crescent moved the 
Afghans to another place in order to register them and make sure that they had 
access to healthcare (OCHA 2001). 
Concomitantly, the Iranian Government took various legal measures to encourage 
refugees to leave Iran. Laws are constantly enacted to restrict the activities of 
illegal immigrants as well as those of documented immigrants. On 22 June 2001, 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs made employers of foreign illegal 
workers subject to heavy fines and imprisonment. Many small businesses 
employing Afghans were shut down. Afghans with residence cards were permitted 
to work in sixteen categories of mainly manual work (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005). 
These regulations affect refugees harshly. Many of them have gone back to the 
camps, which was the aim of the Iranian administration. There is indeed a general 
pressure for refugees to leave the country: The Iranian Government has taken 
various legal steps to induce departures, cutting down on the help, support and 
advantages illegal and legal immigrants have been granted until now, aiming to 
make it less attractive for them to extend their stay in Iran (IRIN 2005b). 
Concurrently, the UNHCR has ended all its support programmes relating to Afghan 
refugees. The rationale is that Afghan refugees should return home now that the 
Taliban are gone from power. The situation for Iraqis is different and they still 
benefit from the help of humanitarian organisations as they cannot go home for the 
time being.  
3. Registration of refugees 
Some Afghan refugees hold white refugee documents. Most of these documents, 
which use the correct word for refugees, panahandegan, were issued in the pre-
revolutionary period.1 The white card, actually a booklet, provides greater rights 
and benefits than the mohajerin blue cards (see below), such as exemption from 
taxes, the right to work, and the right to obtain travel documents; but it also 
requires holders to renew their status every three months and to report movement 
and residence to the authorities. Since the Islamic revolution, the government has 
continued to issue white cards on an irregular basis, mostly to highly educated 
individuals and established professionals, and more often to Iraqis than to Afghans 
(USCRI 1999). 
Between 1979 and 1992, refugee status used to be granted to incoming Afghans on 
a prima facie basis. Indeed, from 1979, Afghan refugees entering Iran were called 
mohajerin or “involuntary religious migrant” (Turton and Marsden 2002). The 
 
1 The label is essential. Indeed a mohajerin is an honourable term while the notion of panahandegan 
has in Persian a derogatory meaning (Rajaee 2000).  
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Islamic principle of hijrat asserts that Muslims fleeing their own country on the 
grounds that they are unable to properly practise their faith deserve the status of 
mohajerin. This was the case for the Afghans fleeing communism at a time of jihad 
(Rajaee 2000: 44–63). These refugees were issued blue cards indicating their status 
as mohajerin. Blue card holders were granted indefinite permission to stay in Iran 
legally. Until 1995, blue card holders had access to subsidised healthcare and food, 
and free primary and secondary education; but they could not own their own 
businesses or work as street vendors, and their employment was limited to low-
wage, manual labour. All these social advantages ended in 1995. One of the issues 
with the blue card is that the duration of stay is not specified, so the card can be 
revoked at any time. Sometimes, the authorities have removed blue cards from 
holders in order to deport them, especially when the holders are living with 
undocumented relatives. 
After the civil war broke out in 1992, Afghans entering the territory were no longer 
considered as mohajerin but as refugees, panahandegan. The new war was 
occurring between local factional parties and Afghans were no longer victims of 
religious intolerance. After 1993, the Iranian Government started issuing temporary 
registration cards to undocumented or recently arrived Afghan refugees to register 
them for repatriation (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005).  
There is another category of Afghans (Karegar-e Fasli or seasonal workers) 
entering the Iranian territory: temporary labour migrants. They cross the border to 
find seasonal job opportunities in Iran and the family stays in Afghanistan (USCRI 
2004). 
In 2000, the Iranian Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA) 
conducted a major exercise in registration of all foreigners. It then issued 
certificates to documented foreigners that superseded all previously issued 
documents, which became null and void. These new documents took away many 
former rights such as access to healthcare. 
Recently, the authorities stopped registering Afghan refugees. Contrary to the 
UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom) Conclusion No. 91 on the registration of 
refugees, Iran refuses to register new arrivals from Afghanistan.2 Instead Afghan 
refugees are labelled “economic refugees” (HRW 2002b) therefore they cannot be 
eligible for any economic assistance from the government. Thus, new migrants are 
denied refugee status. Some documented refugees hold an averagan (vagrant) card, 
rather than refugee status, and many of them have no documents at all. These 
undocumented people live in hiding, in fear of being caught by the police and sent 
back to Afghanistan. They have no access to healthcare, education or work 
opportunities (USCRI 1999). The Iranian police know where to find them. The 
 
2 ExCom Conclusion No. 91, “Registration of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers” (2001), specifically 
requests states “to take all necessary measures to register and document refugees and asylum 
seekers on their territory as quickly as possible”. This request is made after ExCom “acknowledges 
the importance of registration as a tool of protection, including protection against refoulement”. 
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police even have a special squad made up of women to investigate “alleged female 
rooms”, which are separate rooms where only women live and are allowed to enter, 
and where illegal Afghan males try to hide as the Iranian male police officers 
cannot enter (Bad Jens 2001). During the police raids, hundreds of refugees have 
been arrested and deported. Some of them were documented refugees caught up in 
the wave of arrests. The UNHCR is now able to secure the release of documented 
refugees caught in these raids while not carrying their papers (USCRI 2006). 
Most undocumented refugees found by the police, and even some with papers, are 
deported on a regular basis. Iran is therefore not respecting the obligations 
contracted under the Refugee Convention, and is in particular in breach of 
Article 33 relating to non-refoulement. Indeed the rule is that the country cannot 
return a refugee in any manner to a territory where his or her life is threatened. This 
means that involuntary repatriation of those in need of protection should not 
happen.  
In general, Iraqis receive a green card, which is comparable to the blue card issued 
to Afghans. However new measures have barred them not only from working but 
also from accessing education or medical treatment. 
4. From crisis management to migration management 
Since the 1980s, voluntary repatriation has been promoted by governments, non-
governmental organisations and United Nations agencies as the ideal last-resort 
solution for refugees (Ghanem 2003). In their rush to repatriate the refugees, 
organisations have often disregarded the impact that repatriation has on refugees 
and how they live this process. Indeed someone who “goes back home” is often not 
welcome there; in addition, it is very difficult to “de-refugise” a human being. 
Someone who has been uprooted and displaced finds it difficult to relocate, 
whereas for organisations it is a normal ending to “re-root them”; the return home 
is perceived as the end of the refugee cycle. This assumption is problematic in the 
case of refugees from Iran. The main aim of the Iranian Government and the 
international organisations is to successfully handle the return of refugees and turn 
the current situation into successful state crisis management. In practice, the return 
does not go smoothly for returnees. 
4.1 Before 2002 
For decades, the Iranian Government has been tolerant, keeping its doors open to 
refugee arrivals. It has also provided documented refugees with free primary 
education, free healthcare, and allowed them to benefit from state subsidies 
(USCRI 1999). One of the reasons for this was the financial and economic 
advantage that refugees represented for the country. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
Iran had some domestic economic and social concerns that had an impact on 
refugee policy, which shifted from accommodation to an emphasis on prevention 
and repatriation (Rajaee 2000). 
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In 1998–99, the first deportation programme was launched by the Iranian 
authorities, targeting undocumented Afghans. In 1995, the government announced 
that all Afghan refugees had to leave Iran. Later, Iran closed the border with 
Taliban Afghanistan and repatriations were suspended. Instead, the Iranian 
authorities tried to confine refugees in camps. There were consequently as many as 
98,000 living in camps in 1999 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005). 
In 1999, the UNHCR and the Iranian authorities tried in vain to negotiate a 
repatriation agreement. At the time, the government maintained that refugees who 
were not willing to go back to Afghanistan would be held in camps (USCRI 1999). 
The UNHCR disagreed with this policy. Iraqi refugees did not meet the same fate 
and were still free to move around. Eventually, there was no agreement with 
UNHCR but the government agreed to let refugees be self-sufficient as long as 
they remained in designated areas. 
4.2 Tripartite agreement for Afghan refugees 
The parties reached an agreement once it was clear that Iran could not carry on 
shouldering the burden of being the primary country hosting refugees in the world. 
A tripartite agreement was signed in April 2002 between Iran, Afghanistan and the 
UNHCR in order to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from 
Iran. The programme was reinforced when Taliban rule ended. The agreement, 
known as the Joint Programme for Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Refugees 
from Iran, has since been renewed every year. It underlines the voluntary nature of 
the repatriation operation and also ensures the provision of basic support and 
assistance during the process including transport, medical facilities and customs 
procedures (IRIN 2005a). 
This joint programme of support for voluntary repatriation is made up of three 
parts: an information campaign describing the programme and options for 
voluntary repatriation; financial incentives to encourage voluntary repatriation – 
the UNHCR is offering money and crops to returnees; refugee status screening for 
people claiming a continuing need for protection. 
The first step was a registration programme that lasted for six months, during 
which deportations were suspended. Then BAFIA analysed the cases of volunteers 
ready to go back to Afghanistan. These documented refugees volunteering to go 
back to Afghanistan were not so keen to go “home” as the Iraqis (UNHCR 2004b). 
Indeed, Afghan refugees were forced out of the country by the Iranian authorities 
and the UNHCR, calling into question the notion of “willingness” to leave Iran. If 
BAFIA rejected a referred case, the claimant had the right to appeal jointly to 
BAFIA and the UNHCR (IRIN 2005b). Instead of tackling the issue of real and 
deep motivation to leave a country that has become home in order to face the 
unknown, the UNHCR made new proposals in 2006 to improve the targeting of 
those to be sent back home: There should be categories of people that will not be 
repatriated to their home countries because it would endanger their physical safety 
and well-being, given their extreme vulnerability and the nature of their special 
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needs. These categories include unaccompanied females, single women with no 
family or close relatives in Afghanistan (widows might also fall into this category); 
single parents with small children and without a breadwinner; unaccompanied 
elderly people; unaccompanied children; victims of serious trauma (including 
sexual violence); physically or mentally disabled people; and those with a medical 
illness (contagious, long-term or short-term) (UNHCR 2006a). 
4.3 Repatriation programme for Iraqis 
As far as Iraq is concerned, the UNHCR began repatriating in 2003. The 
programme was initiated by the organisation alone, which at the time was deployed 
in Iraq’s three regions (UNHCR 2005c). When the repatriation programme was 
launched for Iraqis in 2003, High Commissioner Lubbers visited the Ashrafi camp 
in Iran’s Khuzestan province and met many impatient refugees ready to go home 
(UNHCR 2003a). The repatriation programme already seemed difficult to process, 
and started on a very small scale. This explains why many refugees decided not to 
wait for the UNHCR to set up the programme and went back of their own accord. 
The border between Iran and Iraq is one of the most heavily mined in the world, 
making spontaneous crossings extremely dangerous, and the UNHCR has strongly 
advised Iraqi refugees not to attempt the crossing on their own.  
A new border crossing was opened and used mainly by Iraqi Kurd refugees. Most 
of the Iraqi refugees have now been repatriated (USCRI 2006). As the situation in 
Iraq remained unstable and precarious, the UNHCR interviewed all returnees 
before their departure, briefing them on security conditions in Iraq and ensuring 
that their decision to return was voluntary and well-informed. The aim of the 
interviews was to make sure Iraqis had received proper training and information, 
and knew what and where they were going back to. A transit centre was set up in 
Dyana where food, mine awareness training and medical assistance were provided 
by International Rescue Committee (IRC) and other non-governmental 
organisations. Refugees were provided with cash.  
In 2004, the UNHCR (2004c) called upon all states to suspend repatriations 
because of the violence in Iraq. In addition to suspending all repatriation 
programmes, the UNHCR (2006c) called for the suspension of all forcible returns 
to Iraq, considering that the situation was too volatile to ensure safe return and 
reintegration. It cancelled its convoys but could not prevent refugees from going 
back by themselves and the Iranian state from expelling Iraqi refugees (UNHCR 
2004b); but this happened after many Iraqis had already returned from Iran. By 
2007, the UNHCR guidelines regarding repatriation of Iraqi refugees had not 
changed because the situation was still deteriorating in Iraq (UNHCR 2004d). The 
UNHCR held an international conference on the issue in 2007 and called on states 
not only to welcome new waves of refugees but also to avoid any repatriation for 
now (UNHCR 2007a). It is interesting to underline that the UN organisation 
stresses the difference between voluntary return occurring within the framework of 
a repatriation programme and forcible return as a policy enforced by states. It does 
not criticise these forcible returns of refugees that call into question the very 
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definition of refugee, as someone who flees a country to take refuge. Why should 
that person be sent back even after a war or regime collapse when he has resettled 
and began a new life elsewhere? In addition, considering all the initiatives taken by 
the Iranian Government and the UNHCR to push documented refugees to leave the 
country, the question arises whether documented Iraqi refugees really volunteer 
wholeheartedly to go back to Iraq.  
This qualifies the notion of “voluntary return”: does a refugee, established in Iran 
for decades, who finds himself and his family suddenly deprived of all basic rights 
have any other option than to leave Iran? Iraqi (or Afghan for that matter) refugees, 
documented or undocumented, suffer from inequalities and discrimination. They 
are inherently a fragile group. The laws voted by the Iranian Government and the 
end of UN support to these families can lead to only one solution: to depart from 
Iran to ensure the livelihood, well-being and security of the family. Refugees, 
especially documented refugees, are given no choice: they have to repatriate. Can 
we consequently speak of a “voluntary return” to Iraq? 
Between 2003 and 2005, more than 400,000 Iraqis returned home but the trend has 
since reversed. The Iraqi refugees now constitute the most significant displacement 
in the Middle East since 1948. The 2007 UNHCR conference on Iraq dealt with 
financial, economic and technical support. However António Guterres, the High 
Commissioner, made it clear that the safe return of Iraqis remained priority and the 
programmes would resume as soon as possible (UNHCR 2007a). 
4.4 Repatriation process for Afghans 
There is a trend among international experts to assert that repatriation is a natural 
process. After being “de-rooted”, refugees are to be naturally “re-rooted”. Hocké 
explains this perfectly well: “The point can never be too strongly stressed: refugee 
movements are a contemporary scourge which spares no continent. … [T]he most 
natural solution is still voluntary repatriation, for it enables refugees to rediscover 
their social and cultural roots, which give them the comforting feeling of 
belonging to their country of origin. … We entered 1989 with a renewed hope that 
more refugees will be granted their wish to return to their homeland” (Hocké 
1988). The return of the refugee is perceived as ending the refugee circle (Black 
and Koser 1999) and the return to life as it was before the conflict (Castles et al. 
2003: 48–49). This reasoning relies on the idea that refugee status is meant to be 
temporary. The UNHCR considers it to be part of its mandate to find solutions for 
refugees to ensure that they will not remain refugees. There are three solutions to 
this: voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement in a third country 
(Masih 2007). Eventually the right to return is invoked (UNHCR 1996). This 
applies to countries that have undergone major changes. For example, Afghanistan 
is considered to have a new regime since the fall of the Taliban. This is a justice-
based argument for repatriation (Blitz et al. 2005: 182–200): Afghanistan is in a 
post-conflict stabilisation era and return is therefore possible. This explains the 
existence of the voluntary repatriation programme. The programmes regarding 
Afghans and Iraqis living in Iran are therefore experiences in that part of the world. 
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These programmes rely on specific progress including registration, training and 
return. 
The Iranian authorities conducted several registration processes for the Afghan and 
Iraqi populations. There was a first process in 2001 and then a process in 2003 
open to those who had registered in 2001. In November 2006, BAFIA began to re-
register Afghan refugees who had registered for voluntary repatriation and turned 
in their refugee cards for exit papers. The registration exercise was open only to 
those who registered initially in 2001 and re-registered in 2003. In March 2006, 
BAFIA began to allow Afghans who did not re-register in 2003 to regularise their 
status, provided they could give a valid reason for having missed the 2003 exercise. 
BAFIA then issues exit permits, for which a fee is charged to every refugee. The 
UNHCR is in negotiations with BAFIA to waive this exit fee. 
There are eleven voluntary repatriation centres (VRCs) located throughout Iran. 
There, volunteers for repatriation are provided with an assistance package, 
including a small cash grant to facilitate their return. Iran’s Dogharoun frontier post 
is one of the most important points for the repatriation programme. The UNHCR 
and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) assist Afghan refugees with voluntary repatriation (Romano 2005: 430–
53). The authorities in Tehran is studying a plan to strengthen and expedite the 
process of voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees; for example, the head of the 
family could be given a working visa for a specified period prior to the repatriation 
(IRNA 2005).  
BAFIA is in charge of selecting and electing who is accepted for return. The 
UNHCR controls the return process in the field. The main idea is to avoid the 
“revolving door scenario” of Afghans who slip back into Iran to re-enter the 
repatriation process in order to receive benefits for a second time (IRIN 2005a). 
The next step is a confidential interview with a UNHCR representative to check 
that the decision to return is really a voluntary one. The interview is used to 
monitor the willingness of Afghans to go home and their awareness of the situation 
in Afghanistan. Refugees are asked about their plans upon return and their projects 
for reintegration. This is also when the UNHCR identifies those with specific needs 
or in need of assistance. It has found that some refugees leave because of the 
improved political and security situation in Afghanistan but also for economic 
reasons: they have difficulties finding jobs in Iran under the new laws (UNHCR 
2005c). Then the UNHCR informs the refugees of their rights under the 
repatriation programme and they are given an overview of the situation in 
Afghanistan. At this stage any vulnerable cases, such as disabled people, 
unaccompanied children, or female heads of households, are identified for special 
attention. The UNHCR issues a voluntary repatriation form to serve as proof and a 
travel document to enter and stay in Afghanistan (IRIN 2005a). Finally, the 
Afghans are given food, money and logistical supplies. 
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In the UNHCR handbook (1996), the organisation insists on a key matter: return 
must occur on a voluntary basis. It is ironic to see the willingness factor underlined 
here, considering that Afghan refugees have no other choice but to depart from 
Iran. The interview with the UNHCR helps in clearing up some issues: For 
example, to trace a family member in Iran or in Afghanistan, an Afghan refugee 
only needs to fill in a tracing form. There is no need to fill in a repatriation form: it 
is essential for the two not to be linked otherwise it would jeopardise the notion of 
voluntariness. People might think that they have to accept repatriation in order to 
find their loved ones (UNHCR 1996). 
There is a screening process for illegal migrants who are arrested in the streets and 
deported. Dogharoun frontier post is the last chance deportees have of being 
allowed to stay. Iran has allowed the UNHCR to veto deportations of illegal 
migrants who would be persecuted upon return. Therefore, all deportees are 
entitled to an interview with the UNHCR. It is also essential that the UNHCR 
checks that the deportees presented to the screening process are not documented 
refugees. Deported people must go back to their home countries on foot and cannot 
benefit from the buses arranged for those repatriated voluntarily (IRIN 2005a). 
According to a former agreement with the Iranian Government, the UNHCR does 
not have access to Afghans whose deportation was ordered by a court of law. There 
are ongoing discussions with the judiciary for the UNHCR to have access to court 
cases.  
Since the beginning of the programme in 2002, more than 1.5 million Afghans 
have gone back to their country (Table 1). At the end of 2005 the Iranian 
authorities registered some 920,000 Afghan refugees holding valid identity cards. 
There has been a decline in the number of voluntary returnees since 2006: there 
were only 5,000 returns the following year (IRIN 2007a). The reason is that 
Afghan refugees have heard the outcomes of other refugees’ return and would 
rather stay in Iran. Many of them are expected to decline the option of voluntary 
repatriation and remain in the country. This will require a review of UNHCR 
operations. Even if the first volunteers had undergone training and spoken with the 
UNHCR to make sure that they were aware of the situation in Afghanistan, it 
seemed that reality was harsher than expected (UN News Centre 2007). 
Table 1: Number of Afghan refugees who have returned home through the 
repatriation programme 
Overview 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Pakistan 1 565 066 332 183 383 321 449 391 133 338 2 863 299 
Iran 259 792 142 280 377 151 63 559 5 264 848 126 
Other 9 679 1 176 650 1 140 1 202 13 848 
Total 1 834 537 475 639 761 122 514 090 139 804 3 725 273 
Source: UNHCR (2007b). 
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On 15 April 2007, the Ministry of Interior called on Afghan refugees holding long-
term orange exit permits and special ID cards to re-register for voluntary 
repatriation from 9 April. The 12th Tripartite Commission Meeting on the Joint 
Programme for Voluntary Repatriation of Afghan Refugees from Iran, held in 
Mashhad on 27 February 2007, allowed for the establishment of a new agenda 
(IRNA 2007a). During this meeting, approaches and modalities of the voluntary 
repatriation of Afghan refugees, as well as obstacles to repatriation, were 
discussed. The participants also analysed the sharp decrease in the number of 
returnees in 2006. 
5. Training and preparation to go home 
Before leaving Iran, all refugees also received mine awareness training provided by 
the Ansar Relief Institute and sponsored by OCHA. Afghan Government officials 
came to Iran to visit the refugees and inform them about the living conditions in 
their home country.  
The training was improved after the 11th Tripartite Commission Meeting held in 
Geneva on 9 October 2006. It was decided that vocational training and education 
should be provided to all refugees volunteering to go back to Afghanistan (IRNA 
2006). 
5.1 Obstacles 
The fear of going “home” 
Many refugees are terrified to go “home”. Some of them have been in Iran for 
decades and feel that it is home. In Afghanistan and in Iraq, the situation seems too 
precarious and for some, it is no longer home. Moreover, it is difficult for them to 
go back as they are excluded from Afghan and Iraqi societies and often end up very 
poor and living at the margins of society (HRW 2002a). They would rather stay in 
Iran, whether in camps or in cities. Some refugees prefer to be discriminated 
against in Iran than live in terror in Afghanistan or Iraq. 
Among those who are not eager to go home are Afghan women: many of these 
women have benefited from a new social setting in Iran: they have taken advantage 
of the destabilised power relations within the family (Bad Jens 2001). Men’s 
domination has been questioned; Afghan women have challenged local traditions 
and norms that became increasingly difficult to sustain when the family moved to 
Iran. For example they may refuse to abide by traditional demands of total 
obedience, or interference from in-laws. Immigration has also broken the social 
network that families used to be part of: community ties have been broken and 
women have seized these new opportunities for independence. Afghan women now 
dare to complain if a man is violent with them. In addition their rights are being 
defended in Iran, thanks to the legal support set-up and the Afghan Embassy. 
Therefore, Afghan women often dread the return to their home country as they do 
not know if they will find similar social structures. 
158 Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai 
 
Security issues 
Iraqi people in general look forward to going home but, since the war broke out, 
there are numerous problems impending on their return. The country is war-torn 
and there are already many internally displaced persons fleeing war zones. 
Refugees and IDPs are perceived as strategic tools amidst the mayhem (Romano 
2005: 430–53). There is also a problem with collaboration partners in Iraq: no one 
is able to work with the UNHCR in assisting and funding the repatriations. So the 
situation remains volatile. 
Afghan refugees may encounter problems at the borders during the repatriation 
process. At one point, the programme had to be suspended because of violence at 
the Afghanistan / Iran border: refugees were stopped by poppy farmers protesting 
against government decisions to put an end to cultivation. Factional fighting has 
also stopped the convoys. Then, when they do go home, Afghan refugees have to 
face factional fighting, the resurgence of the Taliban, warlords and drug dealers. 
Many of them are not aware of the fact that they have to pay taxes to open a 
business, live on their land or simply protect the lives of their family members. 
Human Rights Watch has reminded participants in the repatriation programme that 
the security of returning refugees in Iraq and Afghanistan is not guaranteed (HRW 
2002b). Furthermore, the organisation claims that refugees who volunteer for 
repatriation are ill-informed about the situation in their home countries and should 
receive substantial information rather than financial packages as incentives to go 
home. A UN-backed report on obstacles returnees face once home was issued in 
2007 (UN News Centre 2007). It was quite surprising to have a report backed up 
by the United Nations acknowledging that returnees face heavy difficulties, a 
statement that indirectly criticises the voluntary repatriation programme’s aim 
(AIHRC 2007). The report did not however tackle the issue of voluntariness or the 
information given to Afghan refugees prior to departure. 
Amnesty International has declared that “there is a total lack of coordination as far 
as assistance to, and monitoring of returnees, is concerned. A deteriorating security 
situation covering two-thirds of Afghanistan but also affecting Kabul means 
returnees are often unable to reach their intended destination and are being forced 
into internal displacement or to flee the country. The security situation has led to 
serious doubts about the capacity of the international community, including the 
UNHCR, to monitor what is happening to returned refugees” (Amnesty 
International 2003b).  
6. The return “home”: return to Afghanistan 
The reintegration of returnees is a challenge for the Government of Afghanistan. 
As Enayatullah Nazari, the Afghanistan Minister of Refugees and Repatriation, has 
said, “Repatriation should be respectful, gradual and should take into account the 
absorption capacity of our country” (Amnesty International 2003b).  
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For many refugees the return is a shock. Some complain that their lives have never 
been so hard. Many refugees go back to the only place they knew before they left: 
their native province. Some, when they reach “home”, find misery, starvation or 
war and leave again to become IDPs. Others do not go very far and remain near the 
border. They sleep in open-air settlements and shelter as much as they can. The 
problem is that winter is very harsh and local families do not welcome the former 
refugees into their homes. The government does not give them land and children 
have no access to school (Tan 2007). These returnees live in limbo. Some have 
been attacked on their way back, harassed by local people, forced to give away the 
goods granted by the UNHCR to robbers or pay taxes to local headmen (Amnesty 
International 2003b). For others, notably the returnees living in Khost, the situation 
is different as they went back to their traditional way of life among the nomadic 
Kuchis.  
Those refugees who had money have been able to buy houses and resettle. Others 
struggle every day: townships have appeared near cities and many families relocate 
there as accommodation is less expensive than a house in the city. The UNHCR 
distributes shelter units and the Afghan Red Crescent distributes relief items. 
Despite all these efforts, the situation remains dramatic. Returnees have no land, no 
houses, no jobs and no food. Children are the first victims and many die. The 
UNHCR tries to find solutions for them and negotiates with the government. The 
most important element is to give returnees land and avoid the scenario of 
returnees turning into IDPs, which gives rise to many land disputes, especially 
when they claim their former possessions. 
Of the returnees, 40 per cent live in the provinces of Kabul, Herat and Nangarhar, 
in better conditions than the other 60 per cent. So the return dynamic is complex to 
understand: some returnees find their way back home and into the new Afghan 
society while others find themselves living at the margins of this society. The 
returnees who gained skills in Iran and have an education enjoy higher status in 
Afghan society. The Afghan labour market is still very informal and the best way 
to find a job is through connections and family. For refugees who have in general 
lived in Iran for more than ten years, it is not easy to have such contacts and 
connections. However some returnees, those with skills, have found an opportunity 
in less than a year (Macleod 2006). The returnees who are successful declare that 
they do not intend to go back to Iran, while for others there seems to be no other 
solution. 
The conclusion is that the infrastructures of Afghanistan are not ready to welcome 
returnees. The country is already burdened with local problems. For those who 
were unsuccessful in their return and have become IDPs, living in Afghanistan is 
like an endless search for a refuge. As Amnesty International has stressed, the 
obstacles towards reintegration are so significant that the voluntary repatriation 
programme might seem unsustainable (Amnesty International 2003a). 
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6.1 Return to Iraq 
Part of the security plan is to ensure the return of Iraqi IDPs and refugees to their 
homes. It is difficult to evaluate how many returnees are back home as no 
organisation or expert can go to these highly volatile areas to check (Fadel 2007). 
So no one really knows how the refugees who left Iran on their own or through the 
UNHCR repatriation programme are faring. 
The main issue for Iraqi returnees is that they are going back to a country at war, 
divided into factions. There is no security, no work, no money, no school and no 
assistance. This is the reason why UNHCR stopped repatriation from Iran in 2004. 
The only safe area was the north of Iraq until the authorities declared they had a 
shortage of houses and could not relocate all returnees (BBC News 2004). It is also 
said that some returnees were beaten up upon returning, threatened or held by the 
police (Morris 2006). 
7. Is this a sustainable repatriation programme? 
Many now discuss the sustainability of such programmes. Indeed Iraqi and Afghan 
refugees are going back to war-torn countries affected by major economic crisis 
and insecurity. There is no suitable job market for refugees, most of whom are 
unqualified or trained in areas that are not relevant in their countries, with the 
exception of teachers. There are very few housing opportunities. The reintegration 
process is not easy and therefore it is legitimate to wonder why these refugees are 
“forced to leave a country”, on “a voluntary basis”, that they may have lived in for 
decades to move to countries that clearly are not yet ready to welcome them.  
A UNHCR report also underlines that poor repatriation planning can lead to 
internal displacement and instability (Petrin 2002). Indeed, with the exception of 
very few success stories, most of the repatriated do not reach their final destination 
for the above-mentioned reasons and become IDPs or poorer among the poor. Thus 
some of them have decided to re-cross the border to go back to Iran. What is the 
point of turning refugees into IDPs? Is the repatriation process “taking refugees for 
a ride” (Turton and Marsden 2002)? Another report suggests that there should be a 
connection between sustainable reintegration and transnational social networks, 
proposing “undertaking in-depth, qualitative research to improve our knowledge of 
refugee decision-making and the regional and transnational networks that sustain 
the incomes of Afghan households and families” (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2005). 
Basically, when economic incentives are strong, refugees will recross the border, as 
in the case of Afghan refugees coming back to Iran. The UNHCR reaches the same 
conclusion and acknowledges the need for a new framework for approaching 
repatriation (UNHCR 2005c). There is indeed a need to develop new strategies for 
repatriation that would take into account the context of each country, instead of a 
“one size fits all” scheme. The UNHCR also suggests that there should be bilateral 
negotiations and advice given to the Government of Afghanistan on how to provide 
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minimum standards of security and income for Afghan returnees in the longer 
term. 
At the 11th Tripartite Commission Meeting (2006), the parties agreed that the days 
of mass return were over and innovative approaches were necessary to sustain the 
return momentum (IRNA 2007b). One of the improvements was the cash grant 
increase for repatriation. This increase probably worked as an incentive for 
Afghans to register for return. Afghan refugees received a sixfold increase in cash 
grants upon their return to their home country (IRIN 2007a). In addition, the 
UNHCR said that it would provide extended reintegration support to the “most 
vulnerable” families of Afghan refugees possessing registration cards from Iran. 
The UNHCR had a budget of US$52 million for its Afghanistan operations in 
2007, and aimed to use part of this money to help about 11,000 disadvantaged 
families to rebuild their houses in the war-torn country. 
The Afghan repatriation programme is really being put to the test, as the Iraqi 
process has now been suspended. Therefore all negotiations surrounding the 
Afghan programme must be analysed. During the 12th Tripartite Commission 
Meeting in 2007, proposals for improvements were voted upon: means of 
encouraging and facilitating voluntary return to Afghanistan; allocation of land 
upon return, issue of Iranian work visas for one member of a returning family and 
eventually cover of all return expenses.  
The return programme set up by the tripartite agreement begs the question of what 
a voluntary return is. Indeed the programme is based on the voluntary participation 
of Afghan refugees and on their willingness to go back home. It seems, however, 
that in practice documented refugees are incited by the Iranian Government and the 
UNHCR to go home. Indeed most UN support programmes have been cut. In 
addition, the Iranian Government has passed a number of laws to deny 
undocumented Afghans basic rights (including that of being acknowledged a 
refugee, in full violation of the 1951 Convention) and documented Afghans of 
rights such as the right to work, to be educated or to have a house. The Iranian 
Government has never shied away from its policy: it wishes to see the documented 
and undocumented Afghans leave the territory. The Iranian police even round up 
documented refugees and destroy their documents. The argument is that 
Afghanistan is no longer at war and that the reasons – cultural, religious, political 
or ideological – why the Afghans fled are now terminated. It is only logical for 
them to go back home. The UNHCR is also quite keen to see Afghan refugees 
going home: it believes that refugees need to be re-rooted and that their burden and 
plight should come to an end. One cannot live in a transitory state forever, 
stabilisation is needed. This is why a return is indicated. 
8. Conclusion 
As Chimni underlines, the growing emphasis on repatriation has turned the 
attention of the international community towards the problems of returning 
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refugees (Chimni 2000). The reality is that returnees often face huge issues when 
they go back “home” to a place where they no longer belong: the country has 
changed and is often in a worse situation than when the refugees left (Chimni 
1999). The government is often not in a position to welcome and reintegrate 
returnees as it has to deal with many other issues at the same time. In times like 
those Afghanistan is going through, and despite a specific programme for 
returnees, it is difficult to differentiate between refugees and IDPs and treat 
refugees as if they were the only persons displaced who had suffered a loss 
(Gorman and Kibreab 1997: 42). Therefore the return of so many people to a 
country devastated by war is very much criticised. It looks like shifting the 
“refugee problem” from one side of the border to the other without taking people’s 
safety into consideration. A backflow is ensuing as Afghans would rather live in 
Iran. Research findings indicate that most Afghans living in Iran would prefer to 
remain there in order to continue accumulating capital to purchase land, a house or 
shop in Afghanistan before returning “home”. They are also waiting for evidence 
of development and political stability in Afghanistan. But the Government of Iran 
does not seem to have the time or patience to wait, fearing that the refugees will 
stay for good. 
Furthermore, the process of voluntary repatriation has not been thoroughly 
researched and the example of the repatriations of Iraqi and Afghan people from 
Iran has demonstrated that contexts should be taken into account. Indeed 
repatriation is sometimes and in some situations and contexts far from being the 
best solution (Harrell-Bond 1989: 41–69). In addition, as Helton (2002) has 
underlined, “modern refugee crises require solutions that pair crisis response with 
nation building and private agencies with national and international actors”. So 
before repatriation, human rights issues “at home” should be dealt with (Abbasi-
Shavazi et al. 2005): rights such as housing or education must be implemented 
first. 
The parties to the Tripartite Commission are aware of all these difficulties. During 
the meetings, the three parties pledged to work to remove all the obstacles to 
Afghan repatriation and to aim at enhanced cooperation and coordination in the 
field (UNHCR 2006e). The 13th meeting, which took place in Geneva in October 
2007, put forward the low trend of voluntary repatriation. This did not influence 
the decision of the three parties, who want to maintain the gradual return while 
taking into account the Afghan security background and its capacity to 
accommodate the returnees (Iran Times 2007). Iran, Afghanistan and the UNHCR 
are aware of the security issues but it does not deter them from their goal. If the 
statement issued after the meeting sounds as if it does not take into account the 
hardship of the Afghan community in Iran and the fear of Afghan refugees when 
returning home, it is clear that the parties are trying to learn from their mistakes: 
they called for the reconstruction process in Afghanistan to be intensified in order 
to “secure greater assistance for the reintegration programmes for returnees in 
Afghanistan” (IRNA 2007a). In addition, there has been significant progress on the 
Iranian side: the country offered to grant temporary work and temporary residence 
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permits to Afghan refugees returning to Afghanistan. This is of course a major step 
as it entitles seasonal migrants to come back legally to Iran and their family to 
change their minds if the situation in Afghanistan is too difficult. Finally, the 
Afghan Government has improved the welcome offered to returnees as now they 
are allocated land and housing. A further meeting took place in Kabul in January 
2008. 
There are many challenges pertaining to reintegration. Some of them are beyond 
the mandate of the UNHCR and deal with human rights such as development, 
gender, education, housing or legal status. The mission to enforce basic rights lies 
elsewhere than in the mandate of the UNHCR: there is a part of the Bonn 
Agreement devoted to Afghan returnees and the tripartite agreement negotiated 
with Afghanistan. There are also agencies working on the human rights issues 
mentioned, but they do not include the UNHCR as its mandate does not cover 
returnees’ rights but refugees’ rights (UNHCR 2000). This being said, the 
organisation faces changes in its mandate: it is extending its services to IDPs and 
has to support pressure from donors, deal with refugees becoming a political tool 
and manage the blurring of legal definitions among the refugee population. 
Therefore, it seems that the UNHCR is slowly turning into a human rights 
organisation (Chimni 2000). The repatriation process is also increasingly perceived 
as being a human rights issue rather than a humanitarian one, dealing as it does 
with so many rights in the host country and in the home country (Coles 1989: 195–
211). 
The main problem is that repatriation is perceived in the following way: “Not only 
is it humanitarian but it is cost-efficient when you think of the destruction and 
endless crises and costs that arise from conflict” (IRIN 2005a). World Bank studies 
show that it is far cheaper to help refugees to rebuild their lives than to leave them 
abandoned in a social network where further social problems and instabilities 
might arise. 
Despite repatriations, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to be the main country 
of exile for Afghans and other communities (UNHCR 2006d). By the end of 2006, 
Pakistan and Iran were hosting one out of five (21 per cent) of the world’s 
refugees. Most of the refugees now look for a third country of resettlement, 
especially Iraqis, in order to avoid deportation or return. So the solution does not 
seem to reside in repatriation (Strand et al. 2004). Perhaps the policy should be 
oriented towards immigration control or better development of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Another solution has been the development of commercial agreements 
between Tehran and Kabul since 2002: this has opened a commercial legal path 
that Afghan workers can use instead of border smuggling. Comparative lessons 
should be drawn from this example of management of the Iranian refugee crisis at 
local and at international level. One of the lessons that the UNHCR draws from this 
experience is that there should be a comprehensive migration management 
approach: the future of the relationship between Afghanistan and Iran is economic 
and therefore Iranian officials need to work on improving the new status for 
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economic migrants. The conclusion is that the four “Rs” – repatriation, 
reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction – should be put forward (IRIN 2005a). 
Decision-makers and migrant practitioners often overlook issues such as 
preparation for repatriation. This is why the four “Rs” are so important: 
collaboration between the UNHCR and other agencies is necessary not only to 
prepare refugees to go home but also to welcome them when they become 
returnees. The preparation of refugees for going home is essential as it will 
determine their ability to become actors of change upon their return (Cassarino 
2004: 253–79). It is also during this phase of preparedness, as Cassarino calls it, 
that the willingness to go home must be evaluated, which is what the UNHCR 
handbook recommends (UNHCR 1996). It seems however that this process is not 
completed by the UNHCR as refugees still lack crucial information about 
Afghanistan. Mine awareness risk training and some security training is offered, 
but most refugees go back to a country that they left decades ago and do not know 
who the new belligerents are. They may thus become victims of drug dealers and 
warlords as soon as they go home. Unaware of local practices such as paying taxes 
to warlords, their security can quickly decrease. 
An argument invoked by many who favour repatriation is the positive role that 
returnees can have on state-building: the reintegration of trained returnees can help 
the development of the country (IOM Campaign). This is the human capital 
argument according to which refugees can contribute to the stabilisation of the 
country thanks to their skills (Blitz et al. 2005: 182–200). The return is also proof 
that returnees believe in the new government and this grants it legitimacy. 
Eventually, returnees should play an active role within civil society (Petrin 2002). 
The question then is how we can sacrifice refugees to the building of a state they 
often do not feel connected to. They have stayed away from “home” for too long 
and their social links as well as family and clan links have been severed. As noted 
by Petrin, most of the time repatriation is carried out for the sake of repatriation, 
without looking at the best interests of the returnees, as this paper also 
demonstrates. Meanwhile, despite all the obstacles, doubts and critics, the UNHCR 
programme for 2007 has been set up, mostly unchanged. It foresees the voluntary 
repatriation of 100,000 Afghans and 4,000 Iraqis for the year.  
The word “home” has different meanings for Afghan and Iraqi refugees in Iran: 
while Iraqi refugees feel that Iraq is home, Afghan refugees feel better in Iran. 
Going “home” for the latter can be surreal. However in this “new era of return” 
(IRIN 2005a), it seems that refugees are hardly listened to. The promotion of 
refugee returns is not only typical of Iran: other countries have also entered 
voluntary and non-voluntary return programmes (Blitz et al. 2005: 182–200). 
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Remigration, Development and  
Mixed Embeddedness: An Agenda for 
Qualitative Research? 
TINE DAVIDS AND MARIEKE VAN HOUTE 
Radboud University Nijmegen 
This article explores the processes that returnees are caught up in 
trying to re-embed in their countries of origin, as part and parcel of 
forced and voluntary return. It does so by taking a closer look at 
several small qualitative pilot studies following mainly Dutch 
returnees to their countries of origin and carried out in such diverse 
contexts as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea and Suriname. 
These studies were executed in 2006 by Master’s students as part of a 
research project of the Centre for International Development Issues 
Nijmegen (CIDIN) Radboud University (Netherlands). They had the 
common aim of studying the relation between development and 
remigration, through researching remigration from a bottom-up 
perspective, i.e. following the returnees in their attempt to reconstruct 
a livelihood in their countries of origin. In particular they investigated 
whether these livelihoods can be considered to be sustainable, taking 
as a point of departure that sustainability of livelihoods can be 
explored through the processes that returnees experience in trying to 
get embedded again. The central focus of this article therefore is the 
exploration of how returnees become re-embedded in their contexts of 
origin, taking into account economic, cultural and social 
embeddedness and different factors that influence these processes, 
such as contextual and personal factors in the pre-migration, 
migration and remigration phases, government policies and 
organisations working for, and with, returnees. As such it reflects on 
the applicability and possibilities of the concept of mixed 
embeddedness as an agenda of research in the context of remigration. 
S erif, a Bosnian Muslim returned refugee, is happy that he can practise his Dutch language on his visitors. Despite the worries in his eyes, he looks 
energetic. Kadefa, like her husband in her fifties, does not participate in the 
conversation and sits at the stove. She is severely traumatised and does not want to 
be reminded of the time she was raped and abused in a prison camp, nor of the 
fourteen years of insecurity that followed. Now they are back in Bosnia. Back to 
their village, where Muslims constitute a minority in the now Serb territory. The 
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stove barely burns. They do not have money for fuel and it is freezing cold in the 
house. They should not be living here anyway. The period that the house was 
rented for them has long expired, but they have no other place to go. So they wait. 
They are back in their village, but are they back home?1
In recent years the relation between (forced) migration2 and development has 
received renewed attention from policy-makers, multilateral organisations and 
scholars. De Haas even speaks of a remarkable renaissance of interest in the issue, 
mainly instigated by the spectacular increase in remittances, which amount to well 
over twice the amount of official development assistance (De Haas 2006: 6–14). 
Remigration takes a somewhat special place in this renewed attention. In the 
Netherlands this, among other influences, is related to considerable changes in 
policy and thinking towards immigration and forced migration. While former 
policies placed emphasis on encouraging integration in the host countries, from the 
1970s onwards increasing numbers of asylum seekers from more diverse countries 
resulted in more strict rules for the admission of new arrivals, and an emphasis on 
return rather than integration (see also Black and Gent 2004: 4–5). In the 
Netherlands, the policy towards immigration became significantly more restrictive 
from 1997 onwards, to contain the increasing influx of migrants and asylum 
seekers (Ministry of Justice 1998). The integration of new asylum seekers came to 
be actively discouraged. At the same time, for those able to enter the country, 
integration became a strictly guided process in which Dutch language and culture 
set the norm and less space was left for integration with safeguarding the identity 
of the immigrant as had previously characterised the so-called period of tolerance. 
Return and remigration, forced3 or not, thus became part and parcel of a central 
right-wing political discourse in which more progressive non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) working with migrants, refugees and development were very 
reluctant to take part (PON 2004).  
The Netherlands Minister for Alien Affairs and Integration, Rita Verdonk, 
continued this policy and furthermore suggested in 2003 that development 
cooperation should be used as a strategy to contain the influx of migrants (Verdonk 
2003: 5). The Minister for Development Cooperation, Agnes van Ardenne, wrote 
in a policy memorandum that, although containment of migration and development 
cooperation are not the same, they are indeed linked (Van Ardenne 2003). She 
 
1 Excerpt from life story of two informants who were part of an investigation by Marieke van Houte 
(CIDIN) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2006. 
2 There are several reasons why people migrate. If for reasons of safety, they are recognised as 
refugees. But socio-economic or cultural factors can also leave people no choice but to migrate 
(AIV 2005). Instead of refugees, we therefore use the term “forced migrants” to include these last 
categories.  
3 There is some confusion about the terms “voluntary return” and “forced return”. How voluntary is a 
return when someone decides to go back because there are no perspectives for staying 
permanently? Therefore we speak of voluntary return when “after reviewing all available 
information about the conditions in their country of origin, refugees decide freely to return home. 
Thus, the decision to repatriate is based on a free and informed choice” (Dimitrijevic et al. 2004: 
29). Here, all other forms of remigration are considered as involuntary. 
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suggested that an effective return could be possible through development 
cooperation. In addition, sustainable return could contribute to development. This 
approach was quite new in the discussion about the relation between migration and 
development, in which optimists were until then mainly focused on the 
development potential of remittances, as mentioned above.  
Before, migration was seen mainly as a result of underdevelopment. When it 
became clear that migrants who make it to the Western countries are not usually 
the poorest of the poor of their country, and in some cases even the middle and 
upper class who can afford to make the costly journey and take the risk to build up 
a better life, migration was seen as brain drain, as in the main the best educated 
people left the country (De Haas 2005). De Haas however sees a positive 
development potential in migration. Many migrants eventually return to their home 
countries and therefore generate brain gain. In this approach, return is seen as a 
strategy to stimulate peace processes in post-conflict countries and as a possible 
development potential. It implies that the input of capital, knowledge and a 
different way of thinking will give a significant impulse to development in the 
society of origin.  
However, De Haas (2005) warns that the development potential strongly depends 
on the possibilities provided by the contextual factors of the political, economic 
and social dimensions. Furthermore, he points to the overemphasis on a macro-
economic perspective in the discussion about the relation between migration and 
development (De Haas 2006). What is lacking is a micro and qualitative 
perspective on this theme. The same holds true for policy-oriented discussions on 
remigration and development. Government bureaucracies are told to meet quotas of 
migrants they are supposed to send back (Kleinhout 2006), while hardly any 
monitoring takes place on the situation of individual returnees after return.  
In the current situation, the question is whether the authorities’ efforts are enough 
to make a success of their own policy of development through remigration. Non-
governmental organisations linked to development and migration are worried about 
the return policy of the government. According to them, return should always take 
place in a context of safety, dignity and prospects for the future. Only under these 
circumstances may return migration contribute to development. However, the 
question is whether the government does enough to make sure that these conditions 
are met. NGOs are in a difficult position in this discussion. They do not want to 
contribute to a policy of forcibly returning migrants but, at the same time, they do 
not want to leave their clients with no solution (Stegeman 2006). A few NGOs, 
such as the Mediation Agency for Return and the Refugee Council in the 
Netherlands, choose to be pragmatic on this issue and try to help returning migrants 
with the obstacles they face upon return. 
The Mediation Agency tries to find small-scale solutions to specific obstacles that 
individual returnees meet. The Refugee Council concentrates on providing 
information about different sources of assistance and the options open to (rejected) 
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asylum seekers: voluntary or forced return, or staying illegally in the host country. 
For an optimal assistance by these NGOs for the returnees and to monitor whether 
their approach is successful, substantial information should be available about the 
possibilities and obstacles for returning migrants. But this information is limited. A 
member of parliament stated in the Dutch TV show Netwerk on 1 December 2005: 
“We should start following ex-asylum seekers to every country, to see how they are 
doing. Now we know nothing, absolutely nothing about the processes during and 
after return.” 
Therefore, in cooperation with some NGOs mentioned above, the Centre for 
International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN) started a small-scale pilot 
project of various qualitative studies on this subject, aimed at the micro levels, 
which were carried out by Master’s students at the centre. The point of departure 
for every study was that in order to contribute to development, return should be 
sustainable in all aspects of life. The studies were carried out both in the host 
country (the Netherlands) and in the countries of origin (Angola, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Guinea, Suriname). One case study was carried out in a country of 
relocation (United Kingdom).4 Furthermore, the focus of the studies varied 
according to the perspective (individual or institutional) and motivation for return 
(forced or voluntary). Although the studies varied greatly, there were a number of 
evident similarities in the results. 
This article, based on the results of the different studies, points out that the 
sustainability of return is dependent on many interrelated factors, and should be 
studied simultaneously from an economic and social as well as from a cultural 
perspective. It therefore promotes the use of mixed embeddedness as a conceptual 
framework for studies on sustainability of (re)migration and hopes to make 
intelligible that identity formation and the establishment of social networks do 
interfere with economic success and vice versa. Therefore, in addition to the use of 
quantitative data, it pleads for a qualitative approach to these kinds of studies, in 
particular through the methodology of life histories. First, the question of how 
sustainability of return can be explored through studying processes of 
embeddedness is explained. The argument is further developed by describing the 
stages of pre-migration, migration and remigration, and pointing out the influence 
these stages have on the diverse dimensions of the process of re-embeddedness.  
1. Sustainability and embeddedness as a conceptual framework 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
successful reintegration requires access to reasonable resources, opportunities and 
 
4 In total, 131 remigrants were interviewed, of which 20 in Angola, 26 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 
in Guinea, 22 in the Netherlands, 25 in Suriname and 30 in the United Kingdom. 46 of these 
returnees were returned involuntarily, 34 returned voluntarily, 17 were still living in the 
Netherlands but were about to return involuntarily and 30 were relocated voluntarily. These 
interviews were complemented with information from key informants and organisations working 
with returnees and migrants. 
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basic services to establish a self-sustaining livelihood in conditions of equal rights 
with other residents and citizens (Dimitrijevic et al. 2004: 38). Self-sustainability is 
an important aspect of successful return of migrants (see also Reinsch 2000). 
However, the realisation of self-sustainability also depends on social networks, 
which in turn are related to questions of identity, often decisive in which networks 
will be opened up to certain persons and which not. Successful returning also 
includes feeling safe, feeling at home and having a sense of belonging to the 
society around the returnee. Moreover, it is quite possible that returnees who do not 
have an autonomous income can feel at home again and have a sense of belonging, 
despite, or maybe even thanks to, the fact that they are living with and depending 
on others, such as family (Van der Putten 2006; Van Hattum 2006). In order to 
really understand the sustainability of return, all aspects of life have to be 
examined. All these aspects, from the point of view of the social dimension and 
identity, influence each other in a continuously ongoing process, which makes it 
difficult to define exactly when a return becomes successful. 
When is someone really fully embedded in the society that surrounds them? 
Besides the fact that this is only possible to define from a subjective perspective, it 
is a continuum of which the other extreme is easier to pinpoint. When a returnee 
decides to relocate again, moving further on or moving back to the first country of 
migration, and when this decision is motivated by negative factors, i.e. not being 
able to embed again in the home country, this process of remigration can be 
considered as unsustainable. That is if we consider migration to be a clear-cut 
dichotomous process of origin and destination, divided into categories as 
temporary and permanent. As here we consider migration to be a circular process, 
in which migrants develop transnational engagements (see also Boyd and Grieco 
2003; De Haas 2006; Black and Gent 2004; Ypeij 2005), we reformulated the 
question from when to consider remigration successful into an explorative question 
as to which factors influence the processes of embeddedness of a returnee and to 
what extent this process can be labelled sustainable. Sustainability thus was not 
defined beforehand, or taken as a pre-given entity, but rather as an entity in need of 
exploration, based on the everyday epistemologies of returnees.  
We therefore labelled the process of (re-)migration as a process of mixed 
embeddedness. Embeddedness is a concept used mainly within the context of 
institutional economics, as developed in 1985 by Granovetter in measuring trust as 
part and parcel of social networks that are crucial for the successful transactions of 
companies (Granovetter 1985), or as mixed embeddedness used by Aldrich, 
Waldinger and Kloosterman in exploring immigrant entrepreneurship 
(Kloosterman 2006; Aldrich and Waldinger 1990; Waldinger 1995). We took up 
the basic idea of this concept as the process in which a person, organisation or 
company is able to integrate in a given society both socially and economically, and 
added a cultural dimension to it.5 Translated to our remigration research, 
 
5 For completeness, a dimension of political embeddedness should also be integrated into the concept 
of mixed embeddedness. As in only two of the studies exploration of the political embeddedness 
seemed opportune from the perspective of the returnee, it remains outside the scope of this article. 
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embeddedness has a multidimensional concept that refers to an individual finding 
their own position in society and feeling a sense of belonging to and participating 
in that society. 
The concept of mixed embeddedness might be seen as close to the concept of 
integration. However, where integration has become a synonym for adaptation to 
the dominant society, especially in policy-oriented discussions and documents, 
embeddedness encompasses more (Ter Maat 2002: 135). In contrast to integration, 
the concept of embeddedness sets no norm and leaves room for considering 
processes of integration with safeguarding an individual identity as sustainable or 
successful. Moreover it sees the process of return as ongoing, while integration 
suggests success as soon as adaptation to the dominant society is accomplished. 
This process is relatively open-ended and highly influenced by factors at the micro 
level, such as experiences before and during exile, the conditions of return and the 
decision to return, as well as the personal strategies and capacities of the individual 
(Black et al. 2004; Kloosterman 2006). The opportunities that these micro factors 
offer are limited or encouraged by the framework of macrostructures, such as 
opportunity structures offered by the governments of both home and host countries, 
discourses of power and the political, economical and socio-cultural context of the 
home country (Kloosterman 2006: 14).  
To find out to what extent return is sustainable, the extent to which a returnee is 
embedded should be explored on the economic, social and identity dimensions. 
From an economic point of view, embeddedness can be explored through 
investigating if and in what way re-migrants are able to provide for their own 
means of living and construct a livelihood. Chambers and Conway define this as 
follows:  
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and 
access) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the 
next generation: and which net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global 
levels and in the short and long term (Chambers and Conway 1991: 6). 
In practice, a livelihood is about the extent to which an individual owns, or 
otherwise has access to, resources such as money and stock, and resources such as 
land and water. Besides this, it is about the livelihood capabilities that individuals 
have to expand these assets. In the words of Chambers and Conway, a livelihood is 
sustainable when it can avoid or respond to stress and shocks, or recover from them 
quickly (Chambers and Conway 1991: 10–12; see also Kaag et al. 2004; De Haan 
and Zoomers 2003).  
The social dimension of embeddedness can be explored by social capital. Many 
different definitions of social capital exist. In the context of this article, the 
 
However the political dimension is present in the context factors, policy measures, etc. that 
influence the embedding process, though not as an individual action of returnees.  
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following definition is used – a combination of different definitions from Parnwell, 
Narayan and Pritchett, Robert Putnam and Thin (in Parnwell, n.d.). 
Social capital refers to the features of social organisation, reciprocity, networks, 
information flows and social safety nets that emerge from networks of social 
contacts of individuals in a society. This leads to a more efficient and stable 
position of the individual in society.  
The extent to which individuals can benefit from social capital depends on the type 
of social contacts they have. Not only the quantity and frequency of individual 
social contacts are important. These social contacts only become valuable when 
there is some sort of closeness, the feeling that people can really rely on others. 
This contributes to a sense of safety, which makes them feel at home. A very 
important aspect of social capital is moreover the functionality of a person’s 
network. This can vary from being able to talk about problems, to relations of 
reciprocity on helping each other out in small ways in and around the house, to 
having influential contacts that can help in finding a job or a house.  
In exploring the process of embeddedness, the ability to construct an individual’s 
own identity is also crucial. This gives them a place in society and is at the same 
time the connection between the self and that society. In gaining access to social 
networks, identity politics can be crucial. Identity is always dynamic, 
multidimensional and contextual (Giddens 1991; Hall 1991). Identity is a process. 
As Halleh Ghorashi puts it:  
Identity is not the fixed and given character of a person, or of a group. It is rather 
a dynamic process, a changing view of the self and the other, constantly acquiring 
new meanings and forms through interactions with social contexts and within 
historical moments (2001: 22). 
Discourses as instruments of the politics of representation ascribe certain identities 
to individuals and groups. Negotiating these representations not only depends on 
structural positioning and on identities that are ascribed to people, but also on the 
individual agency of actors and groups. It is through this agency and subjectivity 
that individuals shape their own identities (see also Barker 2003; Davids and Van 
Driel 2005b). 
It may be clear that the situation of migrants can be an example of dramatically 
changing identities, because of the changes in geographical and cultural settings. 
They construct a transnational identity, which is a set of new hybrid cultural forms, 
made up of a combination of different cultures (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 4; 
Brah 1996; Dwyer 2000). Upon remigration, an even more complex situation 
emerges. Their new hybrid identity does not necessarily fit with the society of 
origin, which has also changed throughout the years. In the best-case scenario, the 
migrants will combine the best of both worlds and benefit from this (Ghorashi 
2003: 5). But this situation can also cause a feeling of “in-betweenness”, the 
feeling that they do not belong anywhere anymore (Ghorashi 2001: 119).   
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Return migration is not as easy as it seems. It is not simply coming “home”. 
Migration and return migration are definitely not a matter of going back and forth 
on the same track. This is especially true for refugees. As Ghanem (2003) states: 
“How can it be assumed that refugees are returning ‘home’ when the very reasons 
they left were that they did not feel ‘at home’ anymore?” Rather, return migration 
is a new step in a migration cycle (Black and Gent 2004: 8). As we consider 
migration and remigration to be processes, we distinguish, following Boyd and 
Grieco (2003), different phases of migration and remigration, which all have their 
special bearing on the re-embedding process after return. These phases are the pre-
migration phase in which the motives to migrate are of importance, the transition 
phase of migration, in which motives for return are shaped, and the post-migration 
phase, in which the return and embedding process in the country of origin takes 
place. In the case of return migration, these phases are repeated in the reverse 
direction.  
Remigration starts with migration. To understand why one returnee can become 
embedded and another cannot, the whole migration cycle of individuals, from pre-
migration conditions to the reason for return, should be explored. Because every 
step in this cycle has its influence on the next, we focus here on the influence of the 
pre-migration, migration and return migration phases on the process of 
embeddedness after return. The collection of life histories of migrants gives an 
insight into the factors that have influenced the successfulness of their return. 
Below, we describe how the different phases in the migration cycle had their effect 
on the different dimensions of re-embedding opportunities of the refugees that 
were studied. 
2. Pre-migration conditions and motivations to migrate  
Even when the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army surrounded their Muslim village 
and ordered that all arms be handed over, Serif and Kadefa were not very worried 
about their future yet. They had expected the tensions to pass in a few days. The 
opposite appeared to be true when on 10 May 1992, Serif and seventy other men 
were gathered together and forced to leave the village on foot. Kadefa and her 
children were sent with the other villagers to concentration camps, where they 
were raped and abused. Fourteen years later they returned to their village, which 
now lies in the Serbian part of the country. They can still feel the tension between 
the ethnicities. The severely traumatised Kadefa is stuck inside the house, afraid to 
go out. Afraid to meet the people who raped her. Afraid to see the only – Serb – 
therapist, because she will never trust a Serb any more.  
Migrants may move from their countries for different reasons. Conflict, relative 
economic deprivation (De Haas 2005: 1271), human rights violations, ethnic 
persecution, or environmental deprivation are reasons why people may want to 
escape their country (UNHCR 1993). All respondents from the post-conflict 
countries of the case studies state that insecurity and danger were important reasons 
to flee. But, next to these macro structures, there are always other often personal 
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reasons at the micro level that are the direct motivation to leave the country. The 
caseload proved that motivations to flee or move are never one-dimensional but 
always a complex combination of different factors. Different examples of this are 
described below.  
Serif and Kadefa fled as a result of their traumatic experience which personally 
confronted them with the conflict, by being chased down and raped by an army in 
an attempt to cleanse their people from the area (Van Houte 2006). Besides the 
conflict, a combination of gender-related factors and ethnicity influenced their 
decision to flee. Carlos, a migrant from Angola interviewed in the Netherlands, 
stated that he already wanted to migrate for a long time for economic reasons. 
After a conflict broke out that was internationally recognised he was supplied with 
legitimate grounds for migration and refugee status (Knoben 2006). Fahra from 
Somalia fled the country because not being part of a clan in the new pro-clan 
policy affected her identity and safety. In this way, she became disembedded from 
her society, like many Somalis. At the same time, she fled from her husband, 
whom she did not want to see any more (Van Kruijsdijk 2006). Here, a 
combination of ethnicity, safety and gender reasons formed the basis to flee. These 
are examples of situations where the conflict was an important reason to leave the 
country, but certainly not the only one. Furthermore the case of Fahra shows that 
often migrants are already disembedded from the home country before departure, 
and not only upon departure, as often taken for granted.  
For a minority of the respondents, the main reason why they left can be found 
within the family situation. For example, a young adolescent from Guinea left his 
country after his parents had fled from the government and the only person who 
was taking care of him and his brother had to flee herself. Age is definitely a factor 
that influences motivations to migrate. Adolescent refugees seldom decide 
themselves to migrate – in the majority of these cases the decision is taken for them 
(Van der Putten 2006; Kauffmann 2006).  
Within the caseload in Guinea, in the majority of cases it is a livelihood strategy to 
send one member of the family abroad to escape severe poverty. Money is 
collected within a whole family or community to pay for the journey of one young 
and strong family member, who is expected to become successful enough to 
provide income for the whole family at home. Here conflict coincides with 
livelihood strategies as motives for (forced) migration. 
Individual motivations for migration are structured by factors at the macro and 
micro levels, of sending countries as well as by the relation between sending and 
receiving countries, either because these relations can be characterised as relations 
between developed and less-developed countries or, as in the case of Suriname, 
colonial and post-colonial countries. The old colonial ties with Suriname, for 
example, together with gender patterns, structure the motivations as well as the 
migration patterns of Suriname migrants to the Netherlands, which in turn 
influence the post-migration phase and an eventual return (Bredewold 2006; Huis 
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in‘t Veld 2006; see also Ypeij 2005). Qualitative research and life histories can 
unravel the way in which macro and micro factors in a complex connectivity work 
together in stimulating a person to become a migrant or refugee (Salih 2001). 
Motivations and stimuli can easily appear in large-scale surveys as simply, or 
mainly, economic or political or any other one-dimensional reason. More gender-
related reasons for migration, such as the wish for an autonomous lifestyle for 
women, are particularly easily disguised in that way, for example under the flag of 
family reunion (see also Salih 2001). 
Policy measures and asylum procedures later influence people to structure their 
migration narratives in accordance with accepted categories for asylum, which 
often simplifies their complex stories. Once the confidence of informants is won, 
and life stories can be transcribed, these narratives become far more complex and 
even sometimes altered (Knoben 2006). 
Motivations to leave the country and how migrants deal with them can affect the 
chances of a successful return in an important way. People’s fear and memories of 
the past that come to mind when confronted with the setting where their traumatic 
experiences happened can be a paralysing factor in their social skills and their 
adaptability to new and uncertain situations. For example, Kadefa does not want to 
leave her house because she is afraid to be confronted with old enemies. But she 
does not want to receive friends either, because they “only complain about their 
own problems”, which is too much to handle for her troubled mind. Apart from 
herself, her trauma also limits Serif in his freedom. Kadefa cannot be left alone for 
too long because she suffers from hyperventilation. Therefore, Serif will not be 
able to find a job or leave the house for long to meet friends. A trauma can 
therefore have a major influence on the social embeddedness of returnees.  
People who have left their country because they had no family left there can face 
severe problems upon return because they have no network. Also, people who were 
sent away with money from their families can face great problems upon their 
return. A returnee with no money will be the shame of the community. Problems 
with constructing a suitable identity can arise in this case, as is further elaborated 
below. These micro factors can be a major influence on the successfulness of 
return, on both the identity and the social dimension. As will become clear later, 
there is an effect on the economic dimension. Of course, this also strongly depends 
on conditions in the host country and the motivation for return, described in the 
next section.  
3. Migration  
Serif and Kadefa arrived in Germany in 1994. There they received temporary 
protection, which expired in 1998, when Bosnia and Herzegovina were declared 
“safe”. However, it was impossible for Kadefa and Serif to return to their village. 
Attacks on returning Muslims were, three years after the war, still a daily practice. 
Instead, they moved to a town in the Muslim-Croat entity. They lived in an illegally 
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rented house, but Serif could not find a job to make a living. That is why they left 
the country again after two years, this time to go to the Netherlands. Which again 
demonstrates how circular migration is and how migration motivated by conflict 
collides with economic motivations and livelihood strategies. Serif is a very curious 
man and he would have loved to learn and work in the country, but he was not 
allowed to. Instead, he often went to the library to teach himself. Based on her 
trauma, Kadefa was offered a residence permit, but Serif was not. Because it was 
impossible for them to be separated, they decided to go back together. This time, 
they were helped by the Dutch Mediation Agency for Return. This organisation 
paid the rent of a house in their village for six months, so that they could apply for 
a donation to rebuild their house,6 which they received more than a year later. 
They are supposed to contribute half of the cost of the house themselves, but they 
have no income. Having returned with two bags containing their belongings, they 
have no capital to build up a living. In a country where there is 40 per cent 
unemployment, they are too old to find work but too young to receive a pension. 
They survive by the money their brothers and sisters send them from abroad. 
The way in which the migrants spend their time away from their homes proves to 
be a very important factor in how they can re-embed in their home societies after 
return. In fact, the way in which a migrant embeds in the host country can 
determine for a large part their re-embeddedness upon return. The stay abroad 
often comprises a substantial part of a person’s life. When a migrant is able to 
maintain or develop economic, social and identity opportunities, return will be 
much easier. However, a migrant who does not become embedded in the host 
country may experience significant disadvantages. Both options, positive or 
negative, and their consequences have a stronger impact as the length of time spent 
abroad grows. In the transitional and unstable contexts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Guinea and Angola, the stay abroad proved to be decisive as to whether or not the 
migrants would be able to find their position again in the home society. We 
elaborate further on these contextual factors of the home society in the next section, 
after discussing the opportunity structure in the host country.  
The possibility of participating in the host society can be of great influence to all 
aspects of embeddedness upon return. Most of the people who migrate are of a 
young age where, in a normal situation, they would be studying or starting with 
their first jobs to raise their families. That is what many people of their generation, 
who stayed in their country, somehow manage to do. Not having this kind of 
experience upon return creates an immediate disadvantage for the returnees in 
comparison to the people of their age group. To be able to work and learn and 
interact with people has the potential to provide a “suitcase” to take home, filled 
with capital, working experience and knowledge. The different Western European 
countries have different policies and opportunity structures towards different 
 
6 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, to qualify for a donation, the returnee must already live in the 
municipality of origin. 
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groups of migrants. In this way, the country in which a migrant ends up can be an 
important factor in the process of re-embedding. 
With regard to the economic dimension, it can be of great value to be able to work 
in the host country. Because of the difference in exchange rate, returnees can earn a 
substantial amount of local currency with the modest savings they make in the host 
country. This saved money can be used to build a house, or to invest in a small 
business (Van Houte 2006). Second, the experience and knowledge gained from 
working abroad can be very useful. For example, five respondents out of twenty-
two involuntary returnees to Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to become 
somewhat economically embedded; they had formal jobs, which means a steady 
income (although often low) and insurance, and did not have to rely on others to 
survive. The success factors of these five respondents can all be directly related to 
the opportunities they had in the host country.  
This example illustrates the relation between the former migration phase and re-
embeddedness. However, it is worrying that the potential in allowing people to 
work in the host country is not optimally used, as only a small number of returnees 
have had these privileges while abroad and thus an equally small number manages 
to reach a high level of economic embeddedness. This forms a striking contrast in 
comparison to the cases of voluntary return or relocation, i.e. the examples of 
Surinamese and Somali migrants. Both groups were given Dutch passports and 
were thus allowed to work. Upon return (for the Surinamese) or relocation (for the 
Somali), economic re-embeddedness was relatively easy for the majority of them.  
The extent to which the host country can contribute to or harm the later process of 
re-embeddedness depends largely on its opportunity structure. For example, 
Ahmed from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who stayed in the Netherlands, says he 
“wasted four of the best years of his life” not being allowed to work. Now, he is 
unemployed most of the time. For him, every year he spent in the Netherlands was 
a wasted year, because he did not have the opportunity to develop himself. At the 
same time, Idriz used the time he spent in Germany to work for a company in 
central heating systems. These systems are not very common yet in Bosnia, and 
therefore not many people know how to work with them. Idriz found a niche in the 
market and used his knowledge to start a small but successful enterprise in 
installing and repairing central heating. With his financial situation under control, 
he is happy that he came back, even though that was not his own choice: “I came 
back with knowledge and in the short period that I’m back, I built up a company, 
built a house and my children went to school and got a job. It could have been 
different if I had stayed.” 
This example also shows that being able to participate economically not only 
influences economic re-embeddedness upon return, but also social embeddedness 
(through contact with clients) and the identity aspect of embeddedness. Returnees 
feel proud when they make a success out of their return, and are a successful 
citizen in society. We show in the next section that the identity of a returnee will 
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already be challenged to a great extent upon return, so that a feeling of dignity and 
usefulness can contribute to being able to face this negative approach towards 
them. Regardless of gender and ethnicity in general, working will make them 
stronger and less vulnerable in society. 
Also from the point of view of identity, migrants change and sometimes experience 
personal growth through the possibility of combining different cultures (Dwyer 
2000; Brah 1996). Returnees report having picked up so-called “Western” habits 
such as saving money, planning, being direct and turning up on time for 
appointments, being more careful with disposing of litter, and acquiring habits, 
norms and values that they claim to be new to them, which they can integrate 
within their own culture. Combining different parts of each culture, returnees can 
construct a transnational identity. However, whether they can turn this into a 
positive contribution for themselves or others depends on personal and contextual 
factors, as well as on the time a migrant stayed in the host country. Jasmina (22) 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina does not feel at home at all. She spent nine years of 
her young life in the Netherlands. She explains in a fluent north-western Dutch 
accent: “I thought I was Bosnian, I spoke and ate Bosnian, but that is not true, 
because all that time in the Netherlands, the most important time of my life I was in 
the Netherlands. I grew up there. My experiences and activities there made me to 
what I am now.” 
Many returnees claim to have become more critical towards their government, now 
they have been in states that are less corrupt. When these returnees have the 
opportunity to be different in their home country, this transnationally constructed 
identity might have a broader positive impact on the rest of society. Nato from 
Angola believes that he can be an example for the people around him: “They say 
that I have a feeling of responsibility. People see that I am thinking ahead. People 
here only think about today.” However, success is not guaranteed. Many societies, 
among which the Surinamese, consider returnees with their new “Dutch” habits as 
being no longer real Surinamese. In this way, they are partly excluded from social 
life and tend to form their own social circles of Dutch Surinamese returnees and 
associations (Bredewold 2006; Huis in‘t Veld 2006). This makes returnees want to 
hide or play down their new identity and try to adapt to the dominant practice in 
their country of return. Being a voluntary or involuntary returnee was only a 
relevant factor in this respect in the Guinean context. To be sent back, when the 
whole family had saved money for their migration to Europe, is seen as an 
enormous failure and shameful experience. Therefore, they tend to hide the fact 
that their return was compulsory, which in itself is not very helpful in 
deconstructing the idealised version of the West that a lot of their fellow citizens 
cherish (Van der Putten 2006).  
Being allowed to participate in society gives migrants a feeling of usefulness, 
dignity and strength. Not getting any opportunity to work or participate in society 
can do a lot of damage. Not only will returnees lack the economic advantages 
described above, a passive working ethos and mentality will also be created, 
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especially when this continues for a long period. It will make people used to 
receiving food and money to live, and to not getting natural stimuli to develop a 
sense of creativity, survival drift and motivation to work. After years of being 
forcibly “pampered”, returned refugees can be heard saying “I am waiting for a 
job” instead of “I am searching for a job”. Serif reflects on his own attitude: 
“Somehow I am waiting for something, but there is nothing to wait for.” 
The insecurity about their status, the constant state of transition, also has an 
important influence on this passive attitude, which makes many migrants even 
more depressed and traumatised. According to psychologists, traumatised people 
need a secure and stable situation to be able to concentrate and work on their 
trauma. In fact, the majority of forced migrants become (more) depressed because 
of the insecurity and the problems they face during their stay in the host country. 
This applies especially to those migrants who have no chance of making 
themselves useful with work or study in the host country. Yuan, a forced migrant 
from China interviewed in the Netherlands, says: “I do not like thinking too much. 
Because I almost get sick. … Too much pressure what will happen tomorrow. I am 
exhausted” (Knoben, 2006). 
The extent to which migrants benefit or experience damage from their stay abroad 
is largely dependent on opportunity structures in the host country. This does not 
mean that migrants and returnees are mere victims of these structural and 
contextual opportunities. Part of their chances to work and learn despite restricted 
policies, or their ability to cope with stress, depends on individual personalities.  
4. Returning 
In the last stage of the migration phase, one other factor can be very influential on 
re-embeddedness: motivation and preparation for the return. At this point, it 
becomes important whether the return is voluntary or involuntary. We only 
consider a remigration to be voluntary when, “after reviewing all available 
information about the conditions in their country of origin, refugees decide freely 
to return home” (Dimitrijevic et al. 2004: 29), as opposed to what is generally 
referred to by policy-makers and NGOs as “voluntary return”, where a migrant is 
obliged to return to their country of origin, and does so without being forcefully 
expelled. However, it can be argued that return can never be voluntary when there 
is no plausible (legal) alternative (Noll 1999: 9–10). This is important to note, as it 
puts the intention to return in a completely different perspective. Thus, in contrast 
to the terminology common to NGOs and policy-makers, in this research project 
those migrants who did not manage to obtain permanent permission to stay and/or 
return outside of their own personal desire to do so are referred to as involuntary. 
Those who decide freely to return without being pushed one way or another 
through the circumstances in host countries, we refer to as voluntary returnees.  
Taking the latter group, motives to return voluntarily can be based on the difficulty 
of becoming embedded in the host country, especially from the point of view of 
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identity. The Somali respondents especially named this aspect and indicated a 
combination of motivations for relocation. They decided en masse to relocate to the 
United Kingdom, because of a change in the social and cultural environment in the 
Netherlands, which turned more hostile and discriminating towards Muslim 
migrants after 9/11 and the assassination of the film director Theo Van Gogh. The 
hostile discourse towards Muslim religion and culture of former member of 
parliament Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali woman herself, was a strong influence herein 
(Derksen 2006; Van Kruijsdijk 2006).  
These Somali migrants claimed not to be able to express their religious identity as 
they wanted. Furthermore, settlement policies in the Netherlands isolated families 
and friends from each other as they were not able to live together. But they also 
mentioned economic problems. In general the group of Somalis had a relatively 
high educational level but diplomas in the Netherlands were not valued at the same 
level as in Somalia or the UK, for that matter. Furthermore, British regulations and 
protocols on starting a business were less strict than in the Netherlands. Also, 
British high schools are compelled to teach the language of an ethnic group as soon 
as they enrol a certain number of pupils, which has resulted in Dutch/Somali 
adolescent migrants receiving Dutch language classes in the city of Leicester. 
Finally, the ancient jawilaad system of sending money to relatives in their country 
was more accessible. In sum, the UK offered the migrants a better chance of 
embedding while at the same time safeguarding their Somali identity (Derksen 
2006; Van Kruijsdijk 2006).  
Another incentive to voluntary return or relocation is discrimination. Also, a 
common motive for return is a certain desire for the home country, often combined 
with ageing and the wish to retire in the home country and eventually die there. 
Many Surinamese decide to return for these reasons. Voluntary returnees have the 
opportunity to prepare their return and will probably only do so when they have 
good reason to believe that they will manage to become embedded in the country 
of origin, at least from an economic point of view. The Surinamese migrants from 
the research sample have enough opportunity to prepare their voluntary return, 
some by going back and forth a few times, for example to build a house. However, 
few of them take into account the social and identity dimensions. Many returnees 
complained of no longer being understood and accepted by the community of 
return as one of them. Also, not all voluntary returnees prepare themselves 
adequately enough to hold a realistic view of the (often dramatically changed) 
situation and opportunities in their home country. In the case of Suriname it was 
significant that those who returned independently and without any assistance were 
better prepared than those returning within the government-sponsored programme, 
as this financial incentive to return often led to decisions being made too quickly. 
Thus, although not totally a failure in terms of building up a livelihood in 
Suriname, voluntary return did not guarantee successful economic, social and 
identity embeddedness (Bredewold 2006; Huis in‘t Veld 2006).  
184 Tine Davids and Marieke van Houte 
 
Involuntary returnees have no realistic options left other than to return, even 
though they often do not have sufficient means to do so. On all dimensions of 
embeddedness, the extent to which returnees manage to become embedded again 
strongly differs. The factor that plays a crucial role in the re-embeddedness process 
of involuntary returnees is the living conditions in the host country. The level of 
participation in the host society, the longevity of the stay and the preparation for 
return all play a very important role in the return process. Furthermore, 
preparedness to return, or the lack thereof due to time restrictions, is problematic 
for involuntary returnees. In the Netherlands asylum seekers have to leave the 
country within twenty-eight days after a negative decision. If they are staying 
illegally in the country, they can be transported unannounced after spending weeks 
or months in prison. This does not contribute to the sustainability of the return. 
Moreover, partly due to this short period of preparation, but also due to a lack of 
reliable information, many involuntary returnees are not aware of the possibilities 
open to them and the obstacles they may meet upon return. This makes the shock 
of return even bigger.  
While the majority of involuntary returnees in the caseload felt great resistance 
against returning, there were certain returnees who, after years of living in 
miserable conditions, deprived of their freedom and separated from their family 
members, consider the return as a relief from the long period of insecurity and 
forced passiveness. These are often people who migrated for predominantly 
economic reasons.  
Government-related organisations such as the Netherlands’ Central Agency for the 
Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA) and the intergovernmental International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) provide practical assistance in terms of helping 
with obtaining travel documents, paying for plane tickets and an allowance for 
immediate needs upon return. This type of assistance is however merely focused on 
facilitating a sustainable act of return rather than trying to make the process of re-
embeddedness sustainable (Kleinhout 2006). In this sense, it cannot be said that 
such assistance contributes to the envisioned policy of “development through 
remigration”. To put these words into practice, a more active commitment is 
needed to making the return a success. Alternatively, NGOs such as the Mediation 
Agency for Return could make more effort to remove the obstacles to return and 
try to make the process of re-embeddedness sustainable. This assistance mainly 
takes place after return, as described in the next section.  
5. Re-embedding 
After having been away for twelve years, Kadefa and Serif do not feel at home any 
more. “Everything has changed. Even the houses don’t stand on the same place 
any more. The people are different. Many have left. The children have grown up, 
others have died. I don’t know anyone any more”. Serif tries to make people forget 
that he and his wife returned from abroad. If he fully adjusts to the local behaviour 
and mentality, there might be a chance that people will treat them equally in 
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distribution of jobs, medical care and housing. But the adaptation is difficult: “I 
feel like a stranger here. I can’t talk to people any more, I can’t trust anybody.”  
Although the pre-migration and migration phases have a major influence, the actual 
process of re-embeddedness has to happen within the context of the home country. 
Even though the countries to which forced migrants are sent to or return to are 
supposed to be safe, they are still post-conflict countries that are politically and 
economically highly unstable. The setting where returnees are about to make a new 
start and find their own position in society is often one of collapsed infrastructure, 
high unemployment and still existing (political) tensions, where the return of 
migrants is often more of a burden than a positive development. For example in 
Angola, the young and often adolescent returnees are confronted with a major lack 
of food, employment and facilities, which makes it almost impossible to become 
economically embedded (Kauffmann 2006). The economic conditions are in some 
cases even worse than when the migrant left, as in Guinea where it comes as a 
surprise every day whether there will be running water or electricity or how much 
higher the prices will be because of extreme inflation. Ethnic tensions still control 
the daily life of some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An Angolan adolescent 
returnee ousts his frustration: “It is so difficult! I thought Angola had become 
better. I could have stayed illegally in the Netherlands. I had better done that.” 
Another complicating factor is the stigma that many returnees experience from the 
home community, those who remained in the country. In the majority of cases, 
returnees are welcomed with a mix of distrust and misunderstanding, especially in 
post-conflict situations where they might be seen as betrayers. After all, as in 
regularly heard comments: “They have left their own people while they were 
struggling for their lives”; “They were cowards who fled instead of fighting, and 
left their friends and family in misery instead of protecting them.” Young Boris 
(17) from Bosnia and Herzegovina is often reminded by his friends that while he 
was going to school in Germany, they were in the midst of a war and did not have 
enough food. In other contexts, where families and sometimes whole villages have 
collected money for one refugee/migrant, the expectation is that this person will 
find a job in the West and send back enough money for the entire family or 
community. If these refugees return with no money or significant possessions, this 
is seen as either a failure or a stupid choice. Usually, relatives and friends simply 
cannot understand why their only hope of escaping from poverty has returned 
empty-handed. They are considered to have abused the trust of the people who 
gave them money to go abroad. They are the shame of the community. “You are 
insane. How could you go there and return without anything? You left Paradise!” 
was one reaction of a returnee’s relative in Guinea. 
Not being accepted by their closest family and friends has a major impact on 
people’s identity formation. The shame, the feeling of failure and being rejected, 
play an important role here. It also makes returnees try to hide their transnational 
identity. Not being able to construct an individual identity has a major effect on the 
other aspects of embeddedness. It prevents the establishment of social networks, 
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which in their turn could be of use in becoming embedded from an economic point 
of view. These networks are normally of high importance in developing and post-
conflict countries, where institutional structures for the (equal) allocation of assets 
such as employment, housing and social security are weak or non-existent. Not 
having access to these networks can therefore be very problematic in the process of 
re-embedding in all dimensions. Returning refugees, who will have to build their 
lives again from scratch, need these networks to make a start. 
How important social networks really are becomes clear by listening to the various 
stories of returnees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before Senad returned from 
Sweden with his wife and baby, they had sent the money they earned by working 
illegally for his father-in-law. This man used his contacts as a lawyer to find and 
buy a cheap apartment in Sarajevo. In addition, he found his daughter a job as a 
teacher. With a house and an income, the young family now has a stable position to 
build up their lives. A less successful story is that of Suada, who had no place to go 
when she, her partner and her three children returned from Germany. So they spent 
all the money they had on transport and living in hotels, until they finally found a 
place in a refugee camp. Now, seven years later, they still live in a camp.  
Even when the reaction of relatives and friends is not one of rejection as described 
in the Guinean cases, it is still a fact that returnees have very low priority in 
comparison to local people when it comes to housing, employment and social 
services. This is a prevalent attitude that is supported by civilians as well as 
government officials. In the case of Angola, the government is known to be very 
corrupt and to take advantage of the returnees rather than helping them. Returning 
migrants are often forced by the migration police at the airport to hand over their 
belongings. “I wanted to be free … and they pressured me … I had three bags with 
me, now I have two” (Mike). In the other countries, governments are either 
unwilling or unable to help the returnees.  
Because of these difficulties that returnees have to negotiate, many of them are in 
danger of being completely left on their own, with no prospects or opportunities to 
start to rebuild their lives. Although it has to be said that every returnee is also 
relying on their own agency to negotiate these difficulties, with ever-diversifying 
outcomes. Even in the case of Guinea, for example, some of the returnees, although 
in a minority and having no economic means whatsoever, claimed to feel more at 
home and had a greater sense of belonging than they had felt in the Netherlands 
and so preferred their contemporary situation in their home country.  
At this point, NGOs in the country of return could play an important role in 
interfering at micro level, to help returnees in the first phase of their return to get 
things moving. This already happens on a small scale in some countries, mainly 
consisting of financial assistance in kind or in cash such as micro credit 
programmes, temporary housing, and to a lesser extent “human” assistance, such as 
information and psychosocial counselling. Business start-ups and employment 
programmes often consist of a combination of financial and human assistance (Van 
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Houte and De Koning 2008). However, scale and budget limitations prevent this 
type of assistance from making a constructive contribution to re-embeddedness. 
Furthermore, monitoring of assistance hardly ever takes place.  
When carried out on a broader scale, assistance programmes have great potential 
for integration in community development programmes. These programmes would 
have to focus on the returnee within the context of the return society and should 
include the local population as well, in order to promote integration and 
understanding between the two groups while at the same time ensuring equal 
development.  
A special factor of economic embeddedness that is specific to migrants is 
remittances. These flows of money from migrants remaining abroad are very 
important in the economic situation of many migrants. However, this source of 
income is not a very sustainable one. Many families who receive remittances have 
no other form of income. Although the amount of money they receive is often just 
enough to survive, they are not stimulated to try to generate an income. This is 
dangerous, considering the fact that this source of income is very vulnerable to 
change, as happened to Muhammed and his family who fully relied on what his 
sister who lived in Germany sent them. When she was forced to go back as well, 
they were left with nothing.  
When making up the balance at the provisional last stage of the migration cycle, it 
seems that most forcibly returned migrants such as Bosnians, Angolans and 
Guineans have major difficulties in all aspects of becoming embedded. Most 
migrants who have returned voluntarily, and relocated migrants such as the 
Somalis and the Surinamese, do not have problems with becoming embedded from 
an economic point of view. With social and identity aspects, however, the 
Surinamese have problems in being accepted by the home society, while Somali 
returnees, who left the Netherlands because of a lack of embeddedness on this 
dimension and relocated to the UK, feel much more comfortable than before, 
because they are able to express their transnational identity better. Apart from the 
differences between involuntary and voluntary return, a number of other factors 
influence embeddedness. The concluding remarks bring these together.  
6. Conclusion 
Although the caseload from the various studies that were used is relatively small, 
and the contexts of the cases are radically different, it became clear that return to 
any poor or post-conflict country is very problematic. Only a small segment of the 
caseload of (forced) remigration to these kinds of country was considered to be 
well embedded. Trauma, passivity, lack of skills and little prospect of a better life, 
means that the majority do not feel at home in their countries of origin. The 
likelihood of them moving on or moving back to the host country is very high. 
With little or no prospects for the future, the returned refugees will find their way 
back to Western countries to try their luck. This time, however, they will not bother 
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to apply for asylum, but use their knowledge about their former host country to slip 
in illegally. In the situation where there are not many opportunities for migrants 
and no special programmes to support them, the returnees have to rely mostly on 
themselves to find themselves a place in society. As so few of the forced migrants 
were able to construct a livelihood and become embedded again in all dimensions 
of their societies, the relation between forced return and development in these cases 
may be considered to be very weak. 
Through placing more emphasis on how processes of embeddedness take place as 
part and parcel of the migration cycle, we hope to have demonstrated that the 
different dimensions of embeddedness are interrelated: building trust and 
constructing social circles go hand in hand with becoming embedded from an 
economic point of view and in constructing a sense of belonging, which is crucial 
in whether returnees become fully embedded again and the possible contributions 
they can make in their countries of origin. More qualitative research is needed to 
explore this interrelatedness and, while doing so, unravel more of the complex 
social reality that returnees exist in. Constructing some sense of belonging, both in 
the economic as well as the cultural sense, also crucially influences further 
decisions on whether to stay in the country of origin or to move on or back to the 
host country.  
NGOs focused on development in countries of origin could be of great help for 
returnees in becoming embedded again, as in the case of Guinea and Angola where 
they were integrated in regular development projects in community development. 
Governments that are sending back migrants could support this type of NGO via 
Western partner organisations. Although there seems to be great potential in NGO 
assistance to returnees, it does not seem to be coming forward yet. Further research 
is needed to investigate how NGOs can make optimal use of this potential. In 
certain cases migrants are already mobilised for development on their own 
initiative in the diverse ways they organise or send remittances to their home 
countries.  
In general, while involuntary returnees have severe difficulties in becoming re-
embedded, this process is far easier for voluntary returnees, at least from the 
economic point of view.  
The different interrelated dimensions of embedding influence the well-being and 
the feeling of belonging of returnees to their home countries or countries of 
relocation. For all returnees it counts that they are labelled in a special way in 
different discourses after moving. In the receiving countries they have to negotiate 
certain images ascribed to being a migrant, refugee or belonging to certain 
ethnicities and, when they go back, they do not easily fit into their old surroundings 
or identities but have to renegotiate their transnational and new returnee identity. 
This is a difficult and sometimes very painful process; most of the interviewed 
were still going through it.  
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Migration is a circular process. For voluntary and involuntary, returned and 
relocated migrants, all stages of migration influence how migrants return and how 
the re-embedding processes take place. Not only the conditions of return, but also 
the way in which time was spent in the host country and the often complex and 
diverse motivations to migrate in the first place influence the re-embedding process 
after returning or relocating. Using life stories as one of the methodological tools in 
studying processes of embeddedness and re-embeddedness can unravel the way in 
which these factors are of influence. Moreover, this methodology gives insight into 
the way questions of identity are tied in with the economic and social aspects of the 
return process and links them to those aspects that give meaning. Decisions to 
migrate or return are often not made on the basis of economic calculations only; 
instead they are complex and multidimensional. The way in which the experience 
of return and becoming embedded again is valued and given meaning by returnees 
is decisive for its sustainability. Knowledge about these re-embedding processes 
therefore cannot be obtained solely through studying migration patterns as 
objective and largely economic or conflict-driven patterns. For this type of research 
a bottom-up perspective is needed, in which the individual returnee is the focus of 
the study. In any such study, a qualitative part is indispensable.  
Migration and remigration are not only circular processes but are profoundly 
transnational. Giving greater consideration to the circular and transnational aspects 
of these processes within migration policies could be helpful in strengthening the 
relationship with development. As for example the Suriname case shows, where 
people safeguard their Dutch nationality, sometimes moving back and forth, albeit 
living in two countries, in the end makes for a better anticipated and prepared 
return and a smoother process. This holds true for adolescent returnees in 
particular. In the Netherlands, different projects have already started to educate 
adolescent migrants that have to return. But also in the case of adult forced 
migrants, focusing less on the mere fact of their return and more on the possibility 
of returning successfully by already enhancing their chances in the host country 
could help to break through the paradox of restrictive migrant policies and 
migrants’ transnational engagements. Most of the NGOs involved in the research 
are looking for ways to prepare migrants for a better and safer return, but often find 
their hands tied by restrictive measures or lack of funding.  
The somewhat special case of Somali migrants relocating to the UK also makes 
painfully clear the need to consider migration as a transnational phenomenon 
whose policies should not be restricted to a narrow, national perspective of the 
receiving country only. Especially as, after going through the process of obtaining 
permanent permission to stay in the Netherlands and having passed Dutch language 
courses and other integration courses, their leaving was neither anticipated nor 
sought.  
In sum, we hope to have made reasonably clear that both the transnational and 
circular character of migration and return migration, together with the economic, 
social and cultural dimensions of these processes require further exploration by 
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applying mixed embeddedness as an agenda for research. Both qualitative and 
quantitative methods can be integrated in such an agenda, especially when we are 
interested in the quality of return and the impact of return on individual returnees 
and their families. 
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Spaces of Europe – Places of Homeland:  
Greek-Danish Diaspora Life in Narratives of 
Home and Return
ANASTASIA CHRISTOU 
University of Sussex 
This article focuses on first- and second-generation Greek and Greek-
Danish migrants and return migrants, exploring their experiences of 
geographical, social and cultural mobility in forging a sense of self 
and belonging. The analysis of narrative material explores these 
issues in relation to the Greek diaspora community in Denmark, their 
attempts to relocate to their ancestral homeland and their 
transnational relations. Furthermore, the meanings attached to the 
notion of “home” in a transnational context and the multiple 
processes of identification in response to cultural differentiation in 
how participants define belongingness in European, Danish, 
Scandinavian and Hellenic spaces are examined. It is demonstrated 
how “ethnonational homecoming” (re)defines how migrants negotiate 
their sense of self in relation to person-place relations but also 
through movement in social space. Narrative life-story data of 
migrants and return migrants form the empirical basis of this 
discussion. It is important to examine interconnected systems of 
social, historical, cultural and political dynamics in both “home” and 
“host” countries in terms of migrants’ experiential narratives of 
space and the gendered constitution of home-spaces. This approach 
serves to inspect the process of appropriation of space through an 
examination of agency over the salience of ethnocultural signifiers. 
However, cultural ambiguities about identification and belonging may 
also conceal intergenerational tensions about how “Danishness” and 
“Greekness” is expressed through diasporic consciousness. In 
conclusion, the article considers how biographical and narrative 
research may serve to stimulate dialogue about the relationship of 
identities to place, in order to add to migration research on everyday 
life in the diaspora. 
T his article deals with notions of migrancy and focuses on first and second generation migrants and return migrants of Greek and Greek-Danish origin 
and explores the way in which gender and ethnicity intertwine with experiences of 
geographical and social mobility in forging a sense of self and belongingness. In 
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particular, it explores the way in which migration contributes to a redefinition of 
migrants’ biographies of mobility, change and settlement. The aim is to provide a 
reflective exploration of these issues in relation to the Greek diaspora community 
in Denmark and their transnational relations. Furthermore, the meanings attached 
to the notion of “home” in a transnational context and the multiple processes of 
identification in response to cultural differentiation are examined. Female 
participant narrative life-story data forms the empirical basis of this discussion. 
One of the most revealing narratives in life history and biographical research in 
migration studies is that of the “gendered” self, that is, how women and men 
migrants explore their sense of self through their reflective negotiations of their 
awareness of migrant femininities and masculinities in diaspora life and through 
the lens of the ethnos. However, despite the increase in the emergence of literature 
on gender and migration,1 there appears to be a need for more research. Several 
scholars are still hopeful that new interdisciplinary research for migration studies 
will include gender as a central and constitutive element and that the final result 
will be a more thorough and integrative gender framework for migration 
scholarship during the twenty-first century (Curran et al. 2006; Donato et al. 2006). 
The historical and experiential reconstruction of migrancy, settlement and cultural 
differentiation through narrating and the development of an oral history 
biographical approach to research can reveal multiple experiences of “home” and 
the relationships between mobility and gendered subjectivity. I examine through 
the narratives of Greek and Greek-Danish female first- and second-generation 
migrants and return migrants, the subjective gendered perspectives of cultural 
change and how participants2 cope with such changes in their personal, family and 
professional lives. 
1. Emigration, gender and the Greek community in Denmark 
In trying to sketch a profile of Greek migrants in Denmark, during conversations 
with participants there consistently appeared a vague numerical generalisation as to 
how many Greeks reside in the country. The Greek Community of Denmark would 
 
1 For extensive reviews on the gender and migration literature in geography and other disciplines refer 
to Chant (1992), Kofman and England (1997), Boyle and Halfacree (1999), Kofman et al. (2000), 
Momsen (1999), Willis and Yeoh (2000) and Silvey (2004; 2006). 
2 During my ethnographic fieldwork in Denmark between August 2004 and January 2005 I collected 
a total of forty life-story narratives from both first- and second-generation migrants (consisting of 
several participants on a transitional phase temporarily residing in Denmark) and returning migrant 
groups (consisting of participants who at the time were on a transnational homecoming visit to 
Denmark, visiting relatives for the holidays) of varying socio-economic, educational and class 
backgrounds. The participants’ ages ranged from 25 to 85 years and life-story narratives were 
collected from twenty female and twenty male participants. I decided to give “voice” to several 
female participants in order to discuss the themes of gender identity and belongingness in women’s 
migrant lives in response to cultural differentiation and to examine the degree of agency involved 
in women’s diasporic lives and the extent of their transnational relationships in their return 
migratory trajectory. 
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offer a number of nearly 1,000 persons but closer to about 800 dispersed 
throughout the country. Unofficial sources would estimate about 300 to 500 living 
in Copenhagen, the capital, and in some other urban areas such as Århus. The 
Greek Embassy, the governmental authority responsible for official records, had no 
indication as to how many Greeks lived in Denmark at that precise time and gave 
an approximation of 700–1,000 people. In this vague statistical pondering I was 
finally able to access the National Statistics Databank and accessed the numbers for 
2004: hence, the total number of Greeks living in Denmark at the time was 954 
persons. Out of that number, 567 had declared foreign citizenship and 307 had 
declared Danish citizenship. Out of the total number of 954 persons, the total 
number of males was 694 while 260 were females (Danmarks Statistik). 
In terms of a typology of the different waves of Greek migrants to Denmark, from 
my fieldwork I ascertained four distinct categories of migrants based on the 
different reasons that led to their decision to relocate to Denmark. These 
categorisations are as follows: 
Economic migrants: Mainly unskilled workers who left Greece in the 1960s to 
improve their living conditions. Most of them came from the area of Evros, the 
Dodecanese and Crete but also people from the area of Kastoria who were involved 
in the fur business. Only a few still work in the fur business in Denmark as it is 
currently saturated and rapidly declining. Most labour migrants work in restaurants 
and factories and some are bus or taxi drivers. Very few migrated with their 
families and eventually return migrated to Greece. 
Political refugees: During the seven-year military dictatorship in Greece (1967–74) 
many Greeks left the country for fear of arrests due to their political beliefs. 
Denmark, being a liberal and democratic country, offered freedom and support. 
Many Danes contributed and supported the resistance struggle. 
Scientific, professional and student migration: When Greece joined the European 
Union in 1981 many Greeks were able to pursue undergraduate, postgraduate 
studies and professional careers outside the country. The exceptional academic 
standards of Danish universities as well as the abundant state funding available in 
the form of scholarships and other benefits attracted many young Greeks who came 
to take up higher education training. Many pursued careers in the healthcare 
professions and others in teaching and research. All these individuals decided to 
permanently stay in Denmark. 
Personal reasons: A large percentage of Greek migrants in Denmark relocated due 
to their Danish partner. This has occurred mainly with Greek men meeting Danish 
women but there are also cases of Greek women meeting Danish men, both usually 
on an island during a summer vacation. However, the high rate of divorce in these 
cases of mixed marriages is quite striking. Many Greeks did return to Greece after 
their personal relationship disintegrated. 
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2. Narrative, subjectivity, cultural change and agency 
The aim of this section is to briefly address my selection of approaches to the 
theorisation of gender, biography, culture, agency, subjectivity and the self. 
When life narratives become reflective accounts they give us access in 
comprehending relationships with others and how prevailing norms, as well as 
cultural signifiers, shape those relationships. Narratives deepen our understanding 
of how social and cultural spatialities transform through subjective expressions of 
migrant life-story accounts embedded within those specific socio-cultural 
circumstances. Such narratives offer “unique glimpses of the lived interior of 
migration processes” (Benmayor and Skotnes 1994: 14). A storied narrativisation 
of life gives meaning in not only expressing events and experiences of migrancy 
but also allowing social and cultural meanings to emerge and thus the fluid 
depiction of migrant life which “can itself be perceived as a form of movement” 
(Rapport and Dawson 1998: 28). Life-story narratives form a particular 
configuration in which the subject is given voice not only to experiences but also to 
the ambivalence produced by cultural, gender and generational societal conditions. 
In studies that mostly focus on unskilled economic migrants and refugees, it is 
often important to highlight the agency of these individuals in several contexts of 
migrancy in order to avoid presenting them as essentially disempowered. This 
involves an emphasis on their resourcefulness and creative capacity to adapt to 
constraints and develop various forms of survival strategy. Furthermore, it is 
important to situate these experiences within the context of the life course as this 
clearly indicates that certain constraints are not a permanent aspect of migrants’ 
and refugees’ lives, but are often transitory. Migrants’ lives and identities are 
“reinvented” as they occur under transforming conditions but they are also 
undoubtedly transformative. Therefore, agency is an important element in the study 
of gender and migration and one that is linked with the discussion that follows on 
narrative, subjectivity and cultural change. 
It is now clear that gender study is no longer exclusively limited to the analysis of 
families, households, or women’s lives, as the entire migration process is perceived 
as a gendered phenomenon (Boyd and Grieco 2003). Scholars now analyse gender 
in the lives of both female and male migrants, in the politics of migration, in 
diasporas, from state and workplace policies to the capitalist world system at large. 
The study of gender spans across a wide variety of spatial scales, from the local 
and familiar to the national and global, in short explaining migration and its 
interconnection to these domains, to what has been termed “gendered geographies 
of power” (Mahler and Pessar 2001). Hence, migrants themselves often become 
particularly aware of the relational and contextual nature of gender as they attempt 
to fulfil expectations of identity and behaviour that may differ sharply in the 
several places they live (Donato et al. 2006: 6). 
It is important to note that feminist geographers have focused particular attention 
on the ways in which power is manifest in and through the identities of migrant and 
immigrant “communities” (Silvey 2006: 69). In examining the meanings of 
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belonging in migrant communities, gender relations and the portrayal of women as 
transmitters of culture (especially among the second-generation, Christou, 2003) 
and bearers of the nation (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997), we 
realise that such relationships are intrinsic to shaping identities but also to forging 
ruptures with the cultural background. 
The celebratory approach of transgression concepts rests on the various mixtures of 
cultural elements with different origins and “transgression” as such, the hybrid, and 
the ambivalence it is characteristic of and also the very ability to be “at home” in 
different cultural settings (Frello 2006). An exemplification of such an approach 
can be found in Ulf Hannerz’ (1992; 1996) discussion of the cosmopolitan. 
Hannerz defines cosmopolitanism as a certain “metacultural” position, which 
implies a detachment from the culture of origin and a willingness to engage with 
the other – that is, an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent 
cultural experiences. In this case we are able to locate the critical potential of 
transgression in the cosmopolitan, the one characterised by the ability to rise above 
the local perspective, that is, the ability to engage in other cultures and at the same 
time have a reflexive distance with their own cultural background. According to 
Hannerz, some groups are more likely to be cosmopolitans than others. The typical 
cosmopolitans are members of transnational occupational cultures, such as 
diplomats or intellectuals whose “decontextualized knowledge can be quickly and 
shiftingly recontextualized in a series of different settings” (Hannerz 1996: 109). 
Although migrants or refugees cross borders they are, according to Hannerz, not 
the most likely cosmopolitans. Because of their vulnerable situation it is more 
likely that they will seek to avoid the cultural challenges implicated in moving to a 
new place. However, such views have been contested as we can locate the 
cosmopolitan in the working class (Werbner 1999), but also in discussions of the 
various ways in which cosmopolitanism (cosmopolitan democracy, cosmopolitan 
citizenship, discrepant cosmopolitanism, situated or rooted cosmopolitanism) is 
presented as offering the means of new forms of belonging and politics that are 
beyond the confining forms of the nation-state (Yegenoglu 2005). 
In addition to those already mentioned, various other theorists in their critique of 
the cosmopolitan, post-modern elite focus on both class and cultural categories. 
One cannot fail to mention Stuart Hall when thinking of such discussions. Stuart 
Hall, among other theorists on cultural transgression, such as Homi Bhabha and 
Paul Gilroy, inspired mostly by poststructuralist theory, advances a theoretical 
point of view, which implies that identity in general is conceptualised as being 
constituted through – rather than being simply an expression of – difference. 
In Hall’s writings, however, the very migrants and refugees, whose position 
according to Hannerz is too vulnerable for them to be able to form the basis of a 
cosmopolitan outlook, primarily occupy the possibility of occupying a 
transgressive position in relation to conventional cultural categories. One has to be 
sufficiently outside the central unifying cultural categories in order to critically 
examine and question them while interrogating one’s own position. This is 
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precisely what has been referred to as the double consciousness of the exile, of the 
migrant, of the stranger who moves to another place, who has this double way of 
seeing it, from the inside and the outside (Gilroy 1993; Hall 1996). 
It is within such a theoretical framework that the participants are situated in my 
study in order to argue that as active agents they construct their sense of self, place 
and belonging through an intervention into rigid cultural categories and by enacting 
their own performative expressions of cosmopolitanism, both in its intellectual as 
well as its working-class forms. Hence, the study of the (return) migratory 
phenomenon contributes to a redefinition of women’s biographies of mobility, 
change and settlement and this, I argue, is another way to situate cultural diversity 
and cultural change in both home and host countries. In the following section I use 
excerpts from the participants’ narratives to illustrate their agency, a “feminisation” 
of migration and their cosmopolitan subjectivities of life in the diaspora. 
3. Narrating “home”, gendering migrancy and the making of life in the 
diaspora 
The variety of migrants’ life stories in my research was quite diverse, as was the 
degree and extent of their agency. This was particularly apparent in the case of 
female participants. Such degree of diversity ranged from the case of an 85-year-
old woman who migrated with her Greek husband and two sons some forty years 
ago, and although uneducated managed to learn the Danish language and work in a 
factory as an unskilled worker until she received her pension. Much later in life, 
she talks about her courage to divorce her husband after several decades coping 
with an abusive relationship and struggling to raise her children in the midst of her 
husband’s extra-marital affairs, gambling and other substance addictions. 
Undoubtedly the hardest trial in her life was dealing with the death of her younger 
son from an overdose. She repeatedly emphasises that her only source of happiness 
and joy today derives from her active role as a great-grandmother; enjoying the 
excellent relationships she has with her former daughter-in-law, her granddaughter 
and her great-grandson. Her particular agency in overcoming cultural obstacles is 
transformed into her role as “cultural transmitter” for the third and even fourth 
generation in accompanying her descendants on “homecoming” visits to their 
ancestral homeland and teaching them the Greek language, tradition and values. 
She had indicated to me in several conversations that her recurrent attempts at 
return migrating to Greece have posed many challenges to her as she feels that she 
has constructed a “homeplace” in Denmark. Yet, she continues to lead a 
transnational life and considers her life as being in a fluid process of “emotional” 
and “mental” return migrancy. 
On the other hand, we encounter another case, that of a single mother in her early 
40s, professional and highly skilled who is raising her daughter mostly on her own, 
while trying to instil, selectively, Greek values in her child’s everyday life in 
Denmark. We find that even highly skilled, highly educated, multilingual, 
professional women face problems integrating in Denmark but they utilise their 
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own agency to make comfortable spaces of cultural mixing that incorporate 
European, Hellenic and Nordic cultural values. She also makes repeated 
“homecoming” visits to Greece and spends lengthy times with her child in a 
transition stage in preparation for return migration to the homeland. 
Hence, as regards the layers of migrancy in the diaspora, some of the most 
pertinent questions that arise are as follows: How is life in Denmark for these 
women? How does the change impact on their personal, professional and family 
lives? What type and degree of agency do these women have over their state of 
migrancy? On the other hand, for those women who did return migrate, it is 
important to examine their sense of agency in the (re)integration process in the 
(ancestral) homeland. 
Here is a characteristic excerpt from Sophia.3
Our life in Denmark was difficult and easy, pleasant and unpleasant. It was 
difficult in terms of social relations as neither of us spoke the language so I was 
forced to learn the language so at least one person knew Danish. I think that the 
Danish family is very closed and so is the society that manages to disguise that 
very well and appears to be very open but it is very confined. Our first encounters 
were mostly with the professional environment of my husband and my 
interactions with the parents from my daughter’s school who are not Danes. We 
made a conscious choice not to send our children to a Danish school. The reasons 
why we decided our children not to go to a Danish school are very specific and 
despite the fact that we had every intention to integrate, to become part of this 
society, to actively participate in this society, at the end we realised that this was 
neither easy nor exactly as we had expected it to be. … So our encounters were 
mostly with foreigners in the country all these years and with Danes our 
encounters were mostly from my husband’s professional environment. This of 
course didn’t help us in becoming full members of this society like we had in 
other countries we had lived in the past and at the end I’m not sure if it was so 
negative because sometimes it is best to detach yourself for the problems you 
have to become problems of you belonging in a country so in this respect it had 
its positives, on the other hand we managed to accomplish a lot of things in a very 
short time by working I think double than most Danes work. In other respects it is 
a country that helps you but I don’t think it is the land of opportunity like 
America is for example, but on the other hand the system does work, but it is very 
difficult for you to find out how that system works so you can manage to use it to 
your advantage (Sophia, 42 years old). 
One of the first conscious changes in implementing a plan of integration was for 
Sophia to learn the Danish language in order to be able to communicate in her 
everyday interactions but also in order to pursue a professional life. Her husband, 
who is also an academic and researcher, basically refused to learn Danish and uses 
English at university or elsewhere in Denmark. Sophia asserts her awareness of 
having to make efforts in achieving integration, but is also very much alerted to her 
own agency and makes selective choices as to the degree of compromise she is 
willing to making in order to fit into Danish society. For one, the selection of an 
international rather than a Danish school for her children to attend and developing 
 
3 All names used are pseudonyms. 
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social relations more with foreigners than with Danes is one of the areas where she 
projects her autonomous decision-making capacity as more important than a path 
of smooth integration into the country. Moreover, there are certain structural 
obstacles in trying to “go ahead and develop” oneself as a migrant in Danish 
society. One of those obstacles is acquiring the proper information in order to 
integrate and develop your future, which does not always come easily. 
Migration is undoubtedly a multidimensional phenomenon that encapsulates 
cultural components in both public and private spaces. On many occasions it 
involves personal struggles in the family environment. Another participant, Martha, 
reflecting on some of her struggles, points to the impact that migration has had on 
her sense of maintaining solidarity in the family in order to cope with the “exile” of 
“foreign lands”. Although she initially believed that a father figure would be very 
important in giving a sense of stability to her children, decades later she 
reconsiders that position: 
But there isn’t a moment, there isn’t a day, an hour, the time when I say 
sometime, well, now it was my fault as well, it was the parents’ fault, and my 
children used to say to me, “Mom why don’t you get rid of him”, and I would tell 
them, “I did it for you, so you wouldn’t grow up without a father”, well, as if they 
had a father to begin with, but I would tell them, it was for you, for you I keep 
him, I don’t keep him for myself, I didn’t even want to look at him but I was 
thinking to myself, in foreign lands for them to grow up without a father but that 
all was nonsense, ridiculous things, that is why so many years went by like that 
(Martha, 85 years old). 
But migration is also a process of self-searching, self-reflection, transition and 
transformation. Migration is not sole mobility or even stasis for that matter. Even 
when one settles in the country of destination there seems to be internal mobility as 
one thinks about the ancestral homeland and transfers such nostalgic feelings not 
only to the second but even to the third generation. Lydia talks about such feelings 
quite powerfully in the following excerpt: 
I feel like I am a Dane, but meaning what, a Greek-Dane, because I would never 
become a Dane-Dane and Greece is very much alive inside me, it is a part of my 
character, it is a part of my life, every year I go there for my vacation with my 
family, both my Greek and my Danish family, and I have those encounters and 
relations with Greece, I go about four years annually and I feel right at this 
moment that I have my family in Greece … but I said since I am now here and I 
have to try to find ways of being in Greece often without losing the language and 
my relationship and my relations and my inner relationship with the Greek world. 
Which is always strong. Always strong, always, even now. Because the way I see 
it, how do I see it, I see it as every time I come back from Greece from vacation 
and holidays I face a whole week of melancholy, light depression, not 
psychosomatic, no, it is emotional, like I am in a state of sadness, a sadness, 
sadness, one whole week of sadness during which I cannot work, I read Greek 
books, I read Greek newspapers, I take them with me until I get out of this week 
and I say to myself, now it is time to get out of this, it is a conscious decision to 
exit from this sadness and there is no reason for me to be in this sadness because 
in four months I will be back in Greece but it is an internal process, probably that 
is what it is which my children also go through to tell you about the second 
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generation. My daughter has the exact same thing and now my granddaughter has 
it. … There is however a certain pain which you try to soothe but every time you 
have a crisis, personal, social, family, professional, those wounds open up again 
and you tell yourself, “why did I leave my country, my family, my language, my 
homeland, why aren’t I there in order to contribute?” (Lydia, 66 years old). 
Finally, in the last two narratives, Catherine and Alexandra draw on their personal 
family experiences of how one maintains ethnic and cultural bonds with the 
ancestral homeland especially in the case of the second generation. Both women 
talk about a conscious effort to transmit ethnocultural symbols to the next 
generation, for instance in teaching them the language and tradition. 
I have noticed a lot of changes in Greece. A lot. When I go there because I go 
two-three times a year since ’73, I see that Greece is heading backwards, a lot, I 
see it in my family, I see it in my friends, my relatives, I try because when I return 
back I return the same way I was when I left Greece and I think that things should 
remain that way but unfortunately they have changed everything a great deal, 
very much so, extremely so but when I am there I try to be Greek, a Greek like 
them, the price is very high, it costs me a great deal of pain, a lot so because it is 
very difficult to have two faces. I feel Greek inside me, I cannot change my 
ethnicity and culture at all, I try to make it always first but I place it along with 
the Danish one and I feel that a part of my life to be peaceful, but when I do 
something like a prediction of what will happen to me and what I will do, I think 
in Greek, I think that I gain with that and when I am at my job I am a Dane 
because there for eight hours in order to get my money and to have a good time, 
they respect me, I respect them, we are friends but to the point of being friends 
only at work. I don’t invite them and I don’t want them to invite me to their place. 
But inside me I think a lot as a Greek. I taught my children the Greek language 
(Catherine, 56 years old). 
Alexandra emphasises that cultural transmission is a conscious act but above all not 
always necessary for a smooth integration of migrant offspring. She believes that a 
child’s happiness is far more important than the maintenance of one’s ethnic and 
cultural roots while, obviously, depending on the migrant’s origins there are 
degrees of acceptance in the host society: 
Yes, to maintain one’s Greekness, it must happen consciously. I cannot talk about 
everyone in public but in my life it is impossible and I try to maintain my 
Greekness as much as I can, but in reality there is a decrease in all those things in 
my children and I see it coming, as much as I try and I see it from my husband as 
well who comes from a mixed family, his father is of course Greek but he wasn’t 
one of those fathers who was fanatic with his ethnicity and culture … so many 
things that make me wonder what will happen in the third and fourth generation, 
how much Greekness will my grandchildren have. So consciously we try but due 
to reality I see that there is a withdrawal and this kind of withdrawal somebody 
would characterise as small and others as big, meaning how much can somebody 
remain Greek. Yes, I don’t believe that I have to make my children keep their 
Greekness, and who is a Greek, as opposed to their happiness, to their adjustment 
and to their future which I think doesn’t really influence them … It is a very 
subjective issue and it depends on the family and the circumstances as in every 
country. Yes I believe this and the same holds for Greece even, whatever values 
you will give to your child depends on the family and the consciousness of every 
person. They say that values have been named Greek but in Greece there are 
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values that no longer have a name and those are the ones that we have to give our 
children as well as within the area of Greek identity (Alexandra, 43 years old). 
Alexandra’s narrative offers an account of how the first generation perceives its 
role as cultural transmitters. But how does the second generation perceive its 
trajectory? For one thing, why do second-generation Greek-Danes venture on a 
return migratory project? One participant explains that it is a search for roots: 
I think just to find our roots, … but I had to go down and see this country that my 
father left and sees it like a country from the third world, I mean when he left it, it 
was a country from the third world but you still see it as this and I had to go and 
see how it is like, how is my family like … (Natalia, 34 years old). 
During the collection of life stories and narrative biographical data the second 
generation returnees dwelled on their experiences in Greece. They included critical 
as well as positive commentary about “life lived” in Denmark as well as “living 
life” in Greece. However, on a deeper psychic level, the return migratory project is 
also characterised as a self-actualisation process of introspection. It is actually an 
identification project and a reflective experience of belongingness: 
And for me you know it was very good because it was Greece and even now it is 
like a country you go on vacation, I hadn’t lived the regular life in Greece. So I 
went and it was a tremendous experience because I understood then that I belong 
to Denmark rather than Greece. I felt not as a foreigner but when I was in Greece 
I would see the Danish aspects that I have and when I am in Denmark I see the 
Greek side, so I can’t say that I am completely Greek or completely Danish, I see 
that I have both and I try to take the good parts from both the Danish and Greek. 
But what made a big impression on me was that in Greece you live like a robot. 
That’s how I feel, that you don’t have your freedom, you run around here and 
there, it’s difficult, it’s difficult to make new friendships, I see that the Greeks 
keep their friendships from their childhood years, it is very difficult for them to 
make new friendships (Daphne, 27 years old). 
But when they do spend time in the ancestral homeland and they are confronted by 
experiences that stimulate their introspection, how do the participants identify? 
What sense of belongingness do they express? Some of the most characteristic 
responses are the following:  
I am lucky I think because I have two of everything, two idiosyncrasies, two 
cultures, two languages, I am lucky, others have only one language, one culture 
and they don’t know anything else, I feel very lucky (Dina, 30 years old). 
I think it is completely subjective, it depends on where you have lived, with who 
you have lived, who your parents are, if your parents agreed on things or if each 
one had their own opinion, where your siblings are, there are a lot of things in the 
middle, you can’t say something general about identity and belonging (Michaela, 
25 years old). 
It is clear that, as a complex notion, identity in the case of the participants occupies 
a sense of duality; it is always in the making, non-stable, not fixed and constantly 
under negotiation between the “here” and “there”. Yet, instead of deep confusion it 
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appears to offer a sense of harmony and completion of one’s life experiences along 
with a wider sense of one’s surroundings and “place” in the world, a wider context 
than a confined cultural space. However, above all, belonging and identity are 
subjectively mediated notions translated through personal and experiential cultural 
circumstances. 
4. Conclusion: reflecting on women’s words and women’s actions 
I wanted to add something and I don’t know if you can use this or not but it is an 
observation that we make very often, all of us Greeks when we discuss and we 
say that all this searching that we do and all this questioning, what is good, what 
is bad, what is better and this critical position that you automatically develop 
when you have become a citizen of another country and you start to analyse all 
things and you search everything and you try to find the negative aspects and you 
end up seeing everything in a relative manner, if at the end this type of 
questioning makes a person happier and if it is better or not to have come to 
Denmark and then return to Greece but then again what if you hadn’t reached that 
point to have the need to analyse all that. Is it better or not for your happiness, is 
it, in other words to make it simple, is it better or not to question anything and 
perhaps you may be happier in your ignorance or not? It is a good question which 
I haven’t answered yet and I don’t think that it will ever be answered but it is a 
good topic for research for you to investigate in the future and I would like to read 
your work when you complete it, it is the next step, the one thing is that you feel 
you are split, divided, confused and you feel that nobody can tell you that you are 
not and the next thing is if that is good, if it is good for you as a person or if it is 
harmful, does it help you, you could easily say yes because it makes me a better 
person, that is, it is better than being an idiot and to be ignorant but it requires 
some thought (Alexandra, 43 years old). 
Alexandra’s final thoughts on how migrants perceive their state of migrancy upon 
relocation to the ancestral homeland provides a series of questions that characterise 
the lives of migrants. First, is all this critical reflection necessary? If so, is it fruitful 
or potentially harmful? Second, does it provide any avenues towards happiness and 
inner stability or would it be preferable to ignore the psychological, social and 
cultural implications of one’s migration venture? These are all valid and interesting 
questions but fall outside the scope of this article. In examining the life stories of 
Greek female returnees who maintain transnational mobility and their 
narrativisation of home, belonging, self and diaspora life in how they envision their 
roles as mothers, wives, professionals, etc. in between the spaces of Europe and 
those of the ancestral homeland that they mentally, emotionally and physically 
inhabit, we come to realise that what underpins any sense of cultural change is the 
women’s agency and their conscious acts of self-development and self-ascription. 
As Goodson (2006) indicates, today there is greater interest in “life narratives” than 
“grand narratives”, however, he warns of three dangers in life history research: that 
personal life stories may prove to be an individualising device that obscures 
collective circumstances; that life stories are socially scripted, they fulfil particular 
archetypes or follow established scripts, but need to be culturally located; that life 
history data can be too easily decontextualised, and need to be located within a 
broad historical context. As an alternative, Goodson proposes the notion of 
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narrative capital to convey a personal and institutional quality needed for modern 
life. In this sense, we as researchers need to capitalise on the strengths of narratives 
in unveiling the cultural connotations of migrancy but we also need to steer clear 
from the essentialising and dehumanising weakness of such narratives that do not 
historically and politically locate the self in the production of cultural space, 
otherwise those stories will not become dialogic and will remain anchored in 
culturally fabricated monologues. 
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Back from the “Outside”:  
Returnees and Diasporic Imagining  
in Iraqi Kurdistan  
DIANE E. KING 
University of Kentucky 
Iraqi Kurdistan is a “homeland” for a growing diaspora of Kurdish 
people living throughout the West. In this article I argue for return 
migrants’ narratives about life in the West as a constitutive element of 
a Kurdish diasporic imaginary in the homeland itself in addition to in 
the West. The first significant numbers of Kurds to out-migrate were 
mainly young men who fled the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish rebellion 
against the central government in which many of their peers perished. 
Most settled in Europe and the United States. Theirs was probably the 
last generation of Iraqi Kurdish out-migrants to experience a 
thorough rupture from their past that was sustained by Iraq’s ongoing 
political unrest, totalitarianism, and relatively sealed borders. This 
changed dramatically in 1991 when the Kurdish region of Iraq 
became functionally independent from Baghdad. Thousands of 
migrants left Iraqi Kurdistan (now known officially as the Kurdistan 
Region) for the West during the following decade. During the same 
period, Kurds who had migrated to the West in both the present and 
previous decades returned, most on short-term visits. Throngs of 
neighbours, friends and kin peppered each returnee with questions 
and listened raptly to accounts of life in the West, which they referred 
to simply as the “outside”. These encounters instilled those remaining 
“inside” with a new communal consciousness formulated vis-à-vis the 
West. This and accompanying political and technological changes 
have resulted in Iraqi Kurds’ becoming a diasporic people even 
though most have never left “home”. 
“Now people are starting to think more like people on the outside. I think that is 
because so many of us have gone out, and when we return we bring our ideas 
with us. Now when you look around you see many things that come from the 
outside, such as the way people dress. They all have clothes that they brought 
back, or that their relatives sent them.” (Returnee from the United States to 
Dohuk, Iraqi Kurdistan) 
I raqi Kurdistan is a “homeland” for a growing diaspora of Kurdish people living throughout the West, and in turn, Kurds living in the West hold an ongoing, 
International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008: 208-222 
ISSN 1817-4574, www.unesco.org/shs/ijms/vol10/issue2/art6 © UNESCO 
Returnees and Diasporic Imagining in Iraqi Kurdistan 209
 
                                                
important social role for people in the homeland. The Kurds, an ethnic group 
famous for their condition as “stateless” (e.g. Vali 2001) and “without a country” 
(Chaliand 1980) have started to become a diaspora people only during the past few 
decades. It is estimated that over 1 million people whose main ethnic identity is 
Kurdish now live in the West.1 Like other peoples newly in diaspora, many 
Kurdish individuals resident in the West live a transnational lifestyle in the sense 
described by Basch et al. (1994). They travel “home” on visits or in some cases to 
stay for the long term, and maintain interpersonal and material investments in both 
the “homeland” and “host society”. 
In this article, I argue for return migrants’ narratives about life in the West as a 
constitutive element of a Kurdish diasporic imaginary (Axel 2001, 2002)2 under 
construction in the homeland itself in addition to in the West. In becoming part of a 
self-conscious diaspora, Kurdish people in diverse locations have come to see 
themselves contextualised vis-à-vis the West,3 and movement between core and 
periphery communities has become naturalised. Accounts given by people who 
have returned to the homeland from abroad, I argue, are instrumental in the 
formation of this contextualisation and naturalisation. 
For this research, I spent time listening to people in Iraqi Kurdistan newly returned 
from the West talking informally with relatives and friends about their experiences. 
I also carried out informal conversations and interviews with returnees and their 
relatives and friends. My first trip to Iraqi Kurdistan was in 1995, and I have 
returned on average every other year since. My research in the Kurdish homeland 
has centred around Kurdish families that have had some members out-migrate to 
the West. In the case of one group that left Iraqi Kurdistan in a United States 
 
1 The Kurds, a people numbering at least 25 million and the fourth-largest ethno-linguistic group in 
the Middle East, live mainly in a mountainous zone spanning the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
Republic of Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Turkey. Their dispersion across 
several states has led to a diversity of histories, especially during the past century. For example, 
while the United States and its allies provided protective air cover to Iraqi Kurdistan during the 
1990s, they sold materiel to Turkey for use in its scorched-earth campaign against its own Kurdish 
population. The Kurdish population is also diverse in terms of subcategories such as religion, tribe 
and dialect; in exile people generally associate with others from these subcategories, and keep old 
intra-ethnic rivalries and suspicions alive in diasporic cities. This article concerns Kurdish people 
from Iraqi Kurdistan, who number about 4 million. It does not take into account other Kurdish 
diasporic communities, such as the large population of Kurdish “guest workers” from Turkey and 
their descendants in Europe, especially Germany. Neither does it consider Kurdish political 
mobilisation in and through diasporic fields, a topic deserving separate treatment. Wahlbeck (1999) 
covers this and aspects of Kurdish experience in Europe in more depth than any other author.  
2 I use “diasporic imaginary” not exactly in Axel’s specific sense of a metonymic (tortured) body 
standing for a diasporic social body, but I do use it in his general sense, in which he urges that 
studies of diaspora be broadened beyond “homelands” so that “the homeland is only one among 
several very important aspects of the diasporic imaginary” (Axel 2002: 426). The aspect I seek 
most to emphasise here is the way in which non-migrants in the homeland have access to new 
cultural forms through return migrants. 
3 Although some (e.g. Werbner 1997: 12) argue that transnationals are people who “think globally”, I 
disagree. I think Iraqi Kurds have acquired new thinking encompassing the homeland and the new 
migration destinations in the West, but this is binary thinking, not global.  
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Government evacuation in 1996,4 I have had extensive contact with both the 
migrants in the West and the families they left behind in Kurdistan, mainly in the 
small cities of Dohuk and Zakho. To a lesser extent I have also focused on people 
affected by previous migration outflows in the 1970s and 1980s, both their families 
in Kurdistan and the migrants and their descendants in the West. 
History records that Kurdish people have rarely exited their mountain ranges en 
masse. They did so most notably when Salahaddin, founder of the Ayyubid dynasty 
and born to Kurdish parents from Tikrit, ruled the Levant, Egypt and Arabia in the 
name of Islam during the thirteenth century. Perhaps the famous Kurdish saying, 
“Damascus is sweet, but the homeland is sweeter”, dates from this period. 
Whatever its origin, I have heard people invoke this saying with reference to points 
much farther afield, such as London or San Diego, cities with significant Kurdish 
populations. For centuries, however, the saying must have been of limited use, as 
out-migration did not take place again on a major scale until the 1970s. 
The first contemporary wave of out-migration from Iraqi Kurdistan consisted 
mainly of young men who fled the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish rebellion against 
the central Iraqi Government. Many of their peers perished. Fleeing to Iran, some 
were accepted by Western governments as refugees. Most settled in Europe and the 
United States. Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdistan continued to be a place of upheaval and 
suffering as the Kurds clashed with Saddam Hussein’s government. Over 100,000 
Kurds were killed in the “Anfal” campaign carried out by government forces 
against them in the late 1980s. Many more Iraqi Kurds departed for the West 
following these events, some leaving as refugees from Turkey and Iran, often after 
a wait of several years. In 1991, under pressure from the United States and its allies 
as the Gulf War came to a close, the Iraqi Government withdrew its administrative 
and military control from the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Kurdish leaders asserted 
control, ushering in a relatively stable, prosperous period. Various security threats 
remained, including a reassertion of dominance by the Baathist central government 
until its ouster by a US-led coalition in 2003, conflict between the two dominant 
Kurdish parties in the mid-1990s, and threats from violent Islamists and others 
opposed to the US occupation. Overall, however, Iraqi Kurdistan was an 
immeasurably safer place to live after 1991 than before. Not surprisingly, then, 
1991 marked the beginning of Iraqi Kurdistan’s age of return. 
 
4 In 1996 Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein declared all persons associated with the West and Westerners 
to be traitors, a crime punishable by death. Many Iraqi Kurds were employed by the many 
American relief and development agencies working in northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. 
When most of these agencies departed abruptly following an incursion by the Iraqi army into the 
Kurdish area, the US Government responded by evacuating and resettling many of their employees 
and their families in the United States. See Cockburn and Cockburn (1999) for a detailed account 
of these events.  
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1. Contrasting lifestyles 
My trips between Kurdish communities in the West and in the homeland were 
sojourns between worlds of vastly different life experience. Iraqi Kurdistan was a 
largely peasant and post-peasant society. Patrilineages and tribes wielded great 
influence. A large portion of the population, especially older women, was non-
literate. Due to the previous three decades of conflict, there was little industry to 
speak of, and electricity was scarce. Many households were only partially reliant 
on the cash economy, and were again involved in agriculture after years or decades 
away from their villages due to conflict. Of these, a high percentage spent most of 
their time in cities and worked village land, most of which was far from electricity 
and other amenities,5 on a seasonal basis. Many men, but only a very few women, 
worked for wage labour or as petty entrepreneurs, although a high unemployment 
rate persisted. A few men represented an exception, and were in the process of 
becoming rich in the new Kurdish-controlled economy. Since the region where I 
worked was a border zone with Turkey, there was heavy trade despite UN-imposed 
economic sanctions, and the many Western relief and development agencies 
present since the Gulf War also boosted the local economy. 
In short, most people were cash poor but time rich. The activity that most appeared 
to interest and entertain people was “visiting” – spending time at home, in others’ 
homes, or (in the case of men) in coffee-houses conversing with friends and 
relatives. Most people spent a significant amount of time, especially in the evening, 
visiting and/or attending to visitors, or engaging in what Antoun (2005: 5) calls 
“lively after-hours family and friend-oriented public life”. 
Meanwhile, Kurdish migrants to the West were living a markedly different 
lifestyle, their activities dictated by late capitalism and its institutions. Most men 
and some women worked for wages, working on average much longer hours than 
in Kurdistan. Children attended school to a later average age, and a few high-
school graduates were beginning to study at colleges and universities. While people 
told me that they wanted to visit each other as they had in Kurdistan, they did so 
much less frequently, even when living in close proximity to other Kurdish friends 
and family members. When asked to describe how their lifestyle in the West 
differed from their past in Kurdistan, most people first mentioned “work”. “In 
America all we do is work, work, work!” people would say. They also made 
frequent mention that their life in the West was comparatively free from fear. “Life 
in America is very safe,” was a typical comment. 
 
5 In the years leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Government destroyed over 4,000 Iraqi 
Kurdish villages. During the 1990s most of these were rebuilt with Western aid. While most 
families eagerly returned from urban areas to their villages as soon as they were rebuilt, in many 
cases their stay was short-lived. Many of the rebuilt villages lacked adequate water and/or 
sanitation, schools and other desirables. Young people especially preferred the cities and towns, 
and families that had relocated to their historic villages once again ended up spending most or all of 
their time in the city. 
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2. The age of return 
Most Iraqi Kurdish people who migrated to the West prior to 1991 experienced a 
thorough rupture from their homeland due to Iraq’s ongoing political unrest, 
totalitarianism and relatively sealed borders. From their new locations in such 
places as Germany, the Netherlands and the United States, they were afraid to use 
the phone to call home for fear the lines were tapped. Sending letters was also 
risky, since they could be intercepted by government agents, and besides, there was 
very little travel by ordinary individuals between the West and Iraq. In addition, 
families and associates left behind were more likely to remain safe if the 
government did not know the migrant’s status to be alive and well and living in the 
West. So in many instances, those who made it to safety in the West refrained from 
sending word to their families even when the rare chance to do so came along. 
During this period, Iraqi Kurds living in the West were not so much a “diaspora” as 
they were immigrants, and Kurds who lost relatives to the West did not so much 
engage in a “diasporic imaginary” as simply mourn loved ones lost, some to death, 
and others to a far, inaccessible location and new life. 
This state of affairs changed dramatically in 1991 when the Kurdish-dominated 
region of Iraq became largely independent of Baghdad. The new Kurdish 
administration was much more amenable to border-crossings than had been its 
Baathist predecessor. Seemingly overnight, Iraqi Kurdistan was transformed from 
an “out-of-the-way” place to one where cultural flows converged, a “margin” 
(Tsing 1994). Kurds who had migrated to the West returned, their first visits 
marked by joyful, emotionally expressive reunions, a number of which I witnessed. 
Most came on short-term visits lasting no more than a few weeks, although a few 
stayed for the long term, mostly to work in the new government administration or 
with one of the international relief and development agencies, where their language 
skills came in handy. 
While 1991 marked the start of a great inflow of returnees to Iraqi Kurdistan, soon 
another, larger flow of migrants had begun that went in the opposite direction. 
Thousands more migrants left Iraqi Kurdistan for the West during the relatively 
stable years between 1991 and 2003.6 Once established in the West, these migrants, 
too, began to return on short visits. 
By the late 1990s the phenomenon of the returned migrant receiving guests had 
become part of everyday life in Iraqi Kurdistan. The pattern of visiting in which 
local people were already engaged provided an ideal structure for returnees and 
non-migrants to engage in discussions out of which emerged the diasporic 
imaginary – a conceptualisation by people in the homeland of their own experience 
 
6 The massive rates of out-migration from a place that was much more stable and democratic than in 
the past vexed European and Iraqi Kurdish regional government officials alike. Why did migrants 
start leaving after Iraqi Kurdistan entered a period of relative peace and stability, rather than 
before? I have speculated on this elsewhere (King 2005), and attribute it to several factors, 
including a breakdown in the system of patronage and clientage previously tied to the central Iraq 
state.  
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and possibilities vis-à-vis those of migrants, a new sense that the community of 
Iraqi Kurds was not confined to a single place, new moral formulations, fashions 
and a host of other new ideas wrought through contact with diasporan Kurds. 
Especially if returning for the first time after a long absence, the returnee was often 
met at the border by dozens of well-wishers, or sometimes hundreds in the case of 
well-known persons such as members of chiefly families. The traveller returned to 
the household of close kin, usually parents or siblings. From the start, neighbours, 
friends and family members would arrive to sit with the returnee for hours at a time 
in the household’s guest room or garden area (depending on the season). Women 
would prepare tea and meals as throngs of visitors questioned the returnee and 
listened attentively to accounts of life in the West. In some cases this went on for 
weeks. Especially during the early years, there was a clear atmosphere of novelty 
as the migrant was peppered with questions. The West was clearly a desired place 
that local people found extremely attractive, and they seemed never to tire of 
hearing about life there. 
3. A diaspora-in-the-making 
My research visits to Iraqi Kurdistan began in 1995, and on subsequent visits I 
have seen subtle changes in vernacular culture that have come with increasing 
exposure to sojourners, most of them return Kurdish migrants, from the West. For 
example, Kurdish tea is typically consumed with large amounts of sugar, unlike 
most parts of the West, where sugar is optional. When a guest in people’s homes 
during my early visits to Kurdistan, it was rare that someone would volunteer 
knowledge of our possibly different approaches to sugar in tea. But by 2002 this 
had changed, and this arcane bit of knowledge was no longer distinctive and 
confined to returnees, but had entered the general knowledge corpus. Thereafter 
most hosts would announce to all present, “Diane will not have any sugar, because 
she is a Westerner and Westerners don’t like sugar.” 
Such minute vernacular changes, layered on top of each other with the passage of 
migrants and time, constitute a diasporic imaginary in which people have an 
awareness of another way of doing things even though they may continue in their 
own way. Since out-migration and return on a large scale began so recently, Iraqi 
Kurds constitute more a diaspora-in-the-making than a full-fledged diaspora. As 
such, they differ from peoples for whom the state and practice of diaspora are more 
naturalised, such as the Hong Kong Chinese people whose trans-Pacific navigation 
of oceans both physical and cultural has led to a self-characterisation as 
“astronauts” (Ong 1999), or Lebanese, one-third of whom left Mount Lebanon 
around the turn of the twentieth century (Khater 2001) and who now flit back and 
forth between the “homeland” and such diverse locales as Buenos Aires, New York 
and Lagos. Rather, during the period of my research, the condition and practice of 
an Iraqi Kurdish diaspora seemed to have a new, awkward feel to it – like an outfit 
that did not quite fit yet, but that one anticipated growing into. Migrants 
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communicated this newness both in their new locations in the United States, as we 
discussed “home” and their own possible return visits, and in the “homeland”. 
In a reversal of Lavie and Swedenburg’s (1996: 1) model of the West or 
“Eurocentre” as “Here” and the non-West as “Out There”, people referred to Iraqi 
Kurdistan, and sometimes to broader Iraq, as the “inside” and the West as the 
“outside”. The “outside” specifically encompassed Europe beyond Turkey and 
other places to which Kurdish migrants had travelled such as the United States and 
Australia. Turkey, Syria and Iran were merely borderlands, places of transit and 
often of great frustration, as many migrants got stuck there on their way to an 
intended Western destination. I heard only very infrequent mentions of the rest of 
the world, as it seemed to fall into an ambiguous, virtually irrelevant category. 
Cultural hybridity is certainly not new to the Kurds; indeed all Kurds resident in 
the Kurdish homeland, except for the generation growing up in Iraqi Kurdistan 
since 1991, have lived as minorities in plural states (whether or not those states 
recognise themselves as encompassing ethnic plurality). Life in those states has 
engendered cultural and linguistic hybridity with the Turkish, Persian and Arab 
majorities. But the West constitutes a place of much greater cultural difference 
from Kurdish life than the dominant local “others” already influential in the 
Kurdish homeland. Non-migrant Kurdish people engaging in the new diaspora-in-
the-making were thus acquiring a new cultural hybridity, a way of simultaneously 
being Iraqi Kurdish and acquiring a new cultural reference point in the West. In 
part, the vehicles for this were exposure, afforded by the much more open political 
environment after Kurdish leadership assumed control in 1991, to the West’s 
commodities, media and people, who were mainly staff of international aid 
agencies sent to assist in relief and development. 
I argue here, however, that return migrants from the West are the most important 
and influential bearers of culture and agents of the new Iraqi Kurdish diasporic 
consciousness; it is the initial acts of return that initiate an emerging diasporic 
social field or “transnational village” (Levitt 2001). Return migrant numbers have 
probably been smaller than those of the foreign (mainly American and British) 
soldiers on the street, whose numbers have been over 150,000 in Iraq as a whole 
since the latest war began in 2003 (although only a tiny fraction of those have been 
posted to Iraqi Kurdistan). But the foreign soldiers have little more than cursory 
interaction with most local people (with the exception of men serving in the Iraqi 
military, some of whom have had close working relationships with foreign military 
members and contractors). Kurdish returnees from the “outside” simultaneously 
represent a disarming familiarity and a conduit to the knowledge and value systems 
of the West. For the local people I spent time with, sustained, in-person 
representation by one’s beloved kinsperson or friend seemed to carry with it far 
greater and more profound implications for diasporic imagining in the Kurdish 
diaspora’s “inside” than foreign soldiers or other influences such as satellite 
television and the internet. 
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4. Narrating the diasporic imaginary 
When Kurdish returnees from the West sat with the guests who had come to greet 
and listen to them, the narratives they selected about the “outside” formed a 
discernable corpus. Returnees repeatedly selected the themes of sexuality, 
technology, governance and individuality as social arenas worthy of comment. 
Many narrators of experience in the West seemed to walk a careful line, describing 
what for Kurds are malign and morally reprehensible features of Westernness, 
while simultaneously seeming at pains to reassure their hearers that they had not 
capitulated. Returnees strived to show that they still upheld the values of their natal 
culture, but that they had also acquired and encountered enviable new values, status 
and possessions. To their hearers, they were agents who selectively navigated and 
manipulated the desired, bounteous West. 
Narrations of the “outside” were clearly animated by desire for the West and its 
products, many of its ideals, and contact with its people. Upon learning I was an 
American, people often blurted out statements of affection for the United States. 
Especially in the early years, I heard gushes of “I love America!” on a regular basis 
and from a wide swathe of people. People sometimes displayed shyness around me, 
indicating that they saw me as occupying a high-status social role. Some were more 
open with local people who were seen with me than they were with me. In 2005, 
for example, a local friend told me in an exasperated tone about an encounter with 
a stranger who had observed her with me, and who had continually interrupted her 
efforts to concentrate on her e-mail during a session in a local web café. “He loves 
Americans!” she told me. “He kept saying things like, ‘I just want to be around 
them, to know them. They are the best!’ I told him, ‘They are human beings like 
us!’, but he did not want to hear that!” 
4.1 Sexuality and gender 
In visiting sessions with kin and friends just after their arrival, returnees turned 
early to the topic of sexuality when narrating their time in the West. Most whom I 
heard comment on the subject, both male and female, emphasised to family 
members and friends that Western culture was sexually chaotic and unrestrained, 
especially in terms of women’s sexual licence (as opposed to men’s, on which I 
heard much less comment). This was not news to local people, since they had long 
believed so themselves. But it seemed that returnees felt a special burden to 
highlight this, both for its shock value and also to reassure those listening that he or 
she continued to agree with local conventions despite having spent time elsewhere. 
One returnee, a man in his early thirties who had been in the United States for two 
years and had just returned for a two-week visit, talked about his new life before a 
rapt audience of family and friends (as well as this anthropologist) sitting in the 
garden of his mother’s Zakho home. The mood was jovial; his audience was 
spellbound. Early on, the theme turned to tales of Western sexual permissiveness. 
“Anyone can have a relationship with anyone!” he exclaimed. “I met a woman with 
five children, and each of them had a different father!” The listeners expressed a 
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combination of dismay and shock. “And if that’s not bad enough,” he added, “she 
was proud of it!” The conversation continued for some time as people discussed 
this “animal” behaviour and then went on to decry the moral chaos of the West. 
(Eventually the group turned to me for comment. I said that I had never knowingly 
met a woman with five children fathered by five different men. But my attempt to 
temper the story a bit fell flat. The man’s account was simply too intriguing to 
dismiss.) 
But on another occasion, I was sitting with a returnee and a local man who had not 
been “out”, discussing the differences between mainstream American and Kurdish 
culture. The non-migrant spoke candidly: “I heard that in America, a wife can 
prevent her husband from going out at night, and that if he has a [sexual] 
relationship with someone else, she will not hesitate to divorce him.” The returnee 
agreed that he had indeed noted this in the West. “That’s awful!” said the local man 
with a grin. “Here, life is better for men. The only thing a Kurdish man gains when 
he goes to the West is that there, his wife takes his name, whereas here she does 
not. Everything else is worse for men there, because women have so much power.” 
Return migrants brought with them new ideas about social roles, and I noticed 
these gradually circulating around the community. Most noticeably, there were 
subtle changes in gender conventions. 
A debate about men and children, especially babies, could be heard in casual 
discussions among kin and friends. If a young father held and cuddled his baby, 
what effect did that have on his reputation? “Traditional” men rarely did this, or at 
least were rarely seen doing it. People said, in essence, that this would severely 
detract from a man’s perceived masculinity. At the very worst, it would show that a 
man “feared his wife”, that she could dominate him to such a degree that he would 
be induced to hold his baby. Being cowed by his wife was a state in which no man 
wanted to be found, especially by his male peers. But a few men had started to hold 
and otherwise show more attention to their infants and young children, and this was 
a topic of discussion in several households I visited. One young father and his wife 
explained to me with pride that because they were a “modern” family, he 
frequently held his baby son and did parenting-related tasks around the house. 
Indeed, on my visits to this home I noticed him doing just that. But in other 
households, I heard people speaking critically about this new trend, saying that 
these men’s attention to their young did not come from the heart, but from a 
shallow, vain desire to imitate the trend-setting West. The men were caught in a 
dilemma: should they follow the new ways or the old? It was a trade-off. Many 
men, it seemed, were waiting for others to go first, before they would follow the 
“modern”, “Western” path. 
Women’s dress and freedom of movement was another arena in which changes 
were taking place that could be linked directly to return migration. On a crossing of 
the Harbur / Ibrahim Khalil border between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan in 2005, 
during a long wait in the intense summer heat for my passport to be processed, I 
Returnees and Diasporic Imagining in Iraqi Kurdistan 217
 
people-watched. The crowd of perhaps a hundred people clearly had two 
constituencies: locals, mostly Turkish and Iraqi Kurds crossing for business 
purposes, and people with Kurdish and Western cultural hybridity who had 
travelled from Western countries. There were a number of children in the crowd, 
some of whom appeared to be travelling only with their siblings and mothers. A 
few years previously it would have been unthinkable for mothers with young 
children to travel alone to Kurdistan, and to wear pants while doing so, but there 
they were. I also noticed dramatic changes in dress. The returnees were dressed in 
the Western fashions of the moment, some of the older children exaggeratedly so, 
with, for example, flashy athletic shoes and baggy shorts. The hybrid members of 
this crowd, this concentrated display of returnee aesthetic influence, would soon be 
dispersing throughout Iraqi Kurdistan and unabashedly promoting a new way of 
seeing and being seen. Once finally past the border and among a cross-section of 
the population in the local market, I observed that a noticeably greater percentage 
of girls and women (although still far fewer than half) could be seen on the streets 
and in the marketplace wearing pants, as well as more revealing blouses, thick 
make-up and higher-heeled shoes. Many retained the headscarf despite making 
these changes. 
4.2 Technology and material wealth 
Satellite television, the presence of Western relief and development agencies in 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and other factors new since the withdrawal of central government 
power in 1991 had made people well aware that the West possessed an abundance 
of technological and material resources. Returnees corroborated. In the early years, 
before such items were well known and began to be common in Kurdistan as well, 
they spoke of microwave ovens and the ubiquity of computers. They told of 
supermarket shelves stocked with numerous varieties of the same product, although 
the much higher prices in the West also found frequent mention. Pomegranates 
were one item that I heard returnees exclaiming about on several occasions. In 
Kurdistan they are a favourite fruit, and when in season are integral to the after-
dinner fruit-consuming ritual that is shared with important guests. A whole bag 
costs no more than a few dollars. But in the United States, migrants found the 
pomegranate to be not only much less common, but exorbitantly expensive, 
sometimes as much as US$2.00 for a single fruit! Local people who heard this 
price quoted repeatedly could still scarcely believe it. This led to general discussion 
about how one needed significantly greater amounts of money in the West to live a 
similar material lifestyle. Multiple times I heard people make a contrast such as: 
“In Kurdistan, one works and ten eat. In America, almost everyone must work to 
eat!” Returnees noted that in the West, people’s lives centre around their work 
rather than social relationships with kin and friends. Most reported never having 
worked so hard in their lives, which left them little time for engaging in socialising. 
While recounting this feature of Western life most agreed that “life is better in 
Kurdistan”. 
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In later years, I observed a marked increase in consumption in Iraqi Kurdistan, as 
increasing numbers of people entered the middle class.7 But people still seemed to 
regard the ability to produce, rather than simply consume, as a signifier of a 
“superior” society. One returnee spoke disparagingly of Iraqi Kurdistan and the 
wider region: “Believe me, no one in the Middle East will ever build a car. We can 
only buy cars; we don’t know how to make them.” A family member of a returnee 
noted proudly that he was “working hard there” in America. But his mother, 
referring to his and his cousins’ employment as factory labourers, retorted with, 
“What are they doing there? Building airplanes? No, they are not!” She further 
explained that she regarded their host society as technologically sophisticated, but 
their role in it contrastingly low-class and unsophisticated. Ironically, several 
members of the returnee’s family were working for a Boeing subsidiary. They 
actually were building airplanes. But she was unimpressed with their roles as mere 
assembly-line workers. 
My own returns to Iraqi Kurdistan have been occasions for noticing the many 
infrastructural changes taking place there. For example, in 1995 there was no 
municipally supplied electricity (although there had been prior to the 1991 Gulf 
War). By 1997 the electricity was back on, although it was (and remains) scarce, 
coming on usually for only a few hours per day. By 2001, there were public 
internet cafes in every city, and many urban households had a home computer. At 
the start of the war in 2003, many Kurdish families went to their mountain villages, 
where they felt safer than in the cities on or near the plains. A few families brought 
the internet with them as well, in the form of a satellite receiver, a benzene-
powered generator and a computer. One photograph of such a set-up beside a tent 
made the rounds by e-mail. A construction boom has been under way since 
approximately 2004, prompted largely by the war taking place elsewhere in Iraq. 
The boom was preceded by, and in many ways was only possible due to, 
significant technological progress in the preceding years. 
4.3 Governance and economics 
I have argued elsewhere (King 2005) that Kurdish migrants to the West had 
expectations of patronage roles by Western governments. When discussing 
household economics in the West, people were quick to bring up the subject of 
taxes. Some local people had never heard of taxes, and found the very concept 
shocking when it was explained by a returnee. “Shouldn’t the government give to 
people, not the other way around?” was the typical incredulous reply to the news. I 
listened to a woman in her fifties who had just returned from the West tell a 
roomful of listeners: “For every US$400 pay check that my son earns in his job, the 
government takes US$80.” Everyone in the room gasped in disbelief and pity. In 
this instance and a number of similar ones, when this topic came up people turned 
to me for an explanation and a discussion would ensue as to how governments 
 
7 At the same time, as a result of the US-led ouster of the Baath government and ensuing insurgency, 
many refuge-seekers from elsewhere in Iraq, most of them non-Kurds, fled the horrific violence 
there, only to struggle in poverty and vulnerability in Kurdistan. 
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acquire revenue. Taxes stood in sharp contrast to the deeply embedded local idea 
that tribute should flow from low-status persons to high-status. (This perhaps 
additionally explained the apparent lack of discomfort with receiving government 
assistance displayed by many Kurdish immigrants I knew in the West despite the 
stigma it held for many Westerners.) In my attempts to assist returnees in 
explaining Western democracies and their tax structures to their non-migrant 
family members and friends, I think I did little to change people’s opinion that a 
government should be a provider and patron – a giver, never a taker. 
On the other hand, returnees spoke of “human rights” in two ways. Some described 
Western governments as respectful of all human beings without regard to their 
racial or ethnic identity or religion. Many people who had not been to the West 
especially regarded Western countries as treating everyone equally, and spoke 
longingly of this as an ideal that should be universal. Some returnees further 
confirmed this impression with their own accounts. Others had a darker outlook, 
acknowledging that such an ideal existed, but arguing that the West fell short of it. 
Everyone, whether an idealiser or a more jaded observer of the West, seemed to 
agree that in Iraq, including in Iraqi Kurdistan, “human rights” failed to live up to 
their ideal. 
Returnee influences gave rise to new thinking about governance, and in the past 
decade I have noticed a marked increase in complaints about corruption in and by 
the two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Complaints from returnees (without political roles) 
were contextualised within their experiences abroad. Many told of comparatively 
impartial dealings with government authorities in the West compared with those in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. But paradoxically, a disproportionate number of the political 
figures who were the brunt of the complaints were returnees. For example, many if 
not all of the years since its creation as a governing entity in the early 1990s, the 
KDP politburo has been comprised mainly of dual passport-holders. As one person 
put it in 1998, “Now our Kurdish leaders are very much like the internationals here 
who come and go. They have foreign passports. When things get difficult, they 
leave. Like always, we Kurds are controlled by people who come from the outside, 
but now they are not outsiders, they are us.”8
4.4 Remittances 
Much could be said about the economic role of remittances in Iraqi Kurdish life, a 
role that has steadily grown with time and as the fortunes of those in the West 
increase. Here, it seems appropriate to mention their symbolic role in building the 
diasporic imaginary, a role that included the creation, or at least nurture, of new 
material wants. Migrants did not need to physically return to transmit culture. 
 
8 The issue of who comprises the governing class in Iraqi Kurdistan (not to mention in any governing 
entity) is a much larger topic than it is practical to address here. Political elites have always had 
access to colonial centres to a degree unattainable by the masses, and the current situation of 
political elites holding Western passports is in some ways simply its latest configuration.  
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Many promoted a more materialistic lifestyle than they had known at home through 
photographs, videos and gifts they sent home. When I returned to Iraqi Kurdistan 
in 1997 after a year of working among Iraqi Kurdish refugees and asylees in the 
United States, I couriered small packets of gifts and money for a total of twenty-
four families. Distributing these in Zakho and Dohuk during the first days of that 
field stint provided a window into the start of a diasporic flow of remittances to the 
homeland. For many families, my trip was their first chance to send something 
home after having left the previous year. The typical packet went to parents and 
contained US$200, some pictures and a few souvenirs such as key chains. In many 
of the pictures, migrants posed in front of symbols of wealth such as boats and 
large buildings. 
One family sent pictures of themselves sitting on expensive furniture in what was 
clearly an American furniture store. When I handed this and other items to their 
relative in Dohuk, he nodded approvingly. “This is their new house,” he said, 
pointing to the picture taken in the furniture store. I knew that their home in the 
United States was a cramped apartment. “No,” I said, “That is a store, not their 
house.” It was possible to see price tags on the furniture if one looked closely at the 
picture, and I pointed this out as evidence. But the man insisted. “No, this is not a 
store. I know this is their house.” I was up against a fantasy that was too powerful 
to break in one small encounter. But this fantasy had a real parallel in the 
homeland. During the late 1990s I observed one household after another making 
significant upgrades to their furniture. Although floor cushions remain popular for 
informal visiting, many households now usher their guests into a more formal room 
with elaborate furniture that they could have only dreamed of owning back in the 
early 1990s. 
5. Conclusion 
The returns to Iraqi Kurdistan and the encounters with local people that they 
engendered took place in a homeland in which people had very little exposure to 
things Western prior to 1991. These were not encounters between fully 
cosmopolitanised, hybridised people for whom border- and culture-crossing was an 
ingrained way of life, but between people just beginning to explore a new hybridity 
constructed in the cultural space created by blending “inside” and “outside”. Visits 
with returnees from the “outside” instilled those remaining “inside” with a new 
consciousness formulated vis-à-vis the West and a backdrop against which to see 
themselves. Returnee narratives enabled non-migrants to rank order various aspects 
of life in Kurdistan, to consider what kind of lifestyle they wanted and valued, and 
to ask new questions of themselves that they had never before asked. At least in the 
early decades of the diaspora-making process, return migrants and the narratives 
they tell are a potent vehicle of hybridisation. Returnees are “insiders” who have 
sojourned to the “outside” and reported back as only insiders can. In many a 
Kurdish household that hosted a returnee, the guest room was lively and populated, 
while the television sat unnoticed as the returnee told spellbinding tales about 
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“outside” life. These tales enable and encourage a rich and textured diasporic 
imaginary even in people who have never left “home”. 
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In this paper we attempt to understand the transformation of the 
relationships between Japanese-Brazilian migrants, returnees and 
families left behind in Brazil, by considering these changes from a 
transnational perspective. The following main issues are developed: 
first, the function of the families left behind and their role in creating 
favourable conditions for the readaptation of returnee migrants; 
second, the role of local communities and institutions in promoting 
returnee migrants’ readaptation to their homeland. The dynamics of 
migration involve families as a whole and replacement among the 
members who feed the migratory stream over time. This extensive 
migratory movement has created social imbalances and a vacuum in 
both sending and receiving countries. Old home-country institutions, 
national government and international financial organisations 
become interconnected as a consequence of the dislocation driven by 
migrants attracted by the peripheral labour market in the receiving 
country. We argue that the effect of this institutional framework needs 
to be examined by an analysis of the real forces and motivations that 
drive individuals to transnational migration between two very distant 
countries, giving an evolving character to the migrants and the 
population left behind.  
 M igratory movements tend to be based on specific pre-existing socio-economic structures and the historical past of the countries involved, and 
are usually triggered by new events or enforced by active migratory policies. Once 
a migration movement starts, the combination of pre-existing social structures and 
new networks perpetuates the link between both the sending and the receiving 
society. One example of this is the movement of Japanese-Brazilians to Japan. 
Historically, this movement has been supported by the existence of a large 
Japanese contingent who began migrating to Brazil from 1908 to the mid-
1970s.This group constitutes the most populous Japanese community abroad and 
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includes second and subsequent generations estimated at more than 1 million 
people. Some eighty years after this first migration to Brazil, Japanese-Brazilians 
began their “return” to Japan, becoming the third-largest foreign community in the 
country. At present, 312,979 Japanese-Brazilians and their families are living in 
Japan (Japan Immigration Association 2007).  
The migration of Brazilians to Japan increased rapidly in the 1990s when the 
Japanese Government put the revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act into effect, which permitted second and third generations of 
Japanese descendants to live and work in Japan. Since then, the number of 
Japanese Latin Americans, particularly Brazilians and Peruvians, has grown 
dramatically, supplying the peripheral labour market in the manufacturing sector, 
particularly in the automobile, electronic and food-processing industries. Some 
authors regard the revision of the law to be the result of structural labour shortages 
and pressure emanating from organised economic associations. The introduction of 
the Japanese descendants (nikkeijin) and trainees (ginno jisshu sei) was a response 
to these pressures. At the same time, the Japanese Government maintained its 
restrictive discourse concerning the introduction of unskilled foreign workers 
(Mori 1994). Kajita emphasises the decisive role of the link between the debates 
within the Ministry of Justice on the residence status of third-generation Koreans 
who were born in Japan and the legal status of Japanese descendants abroad 
regarding the enforcement of their visas (Kajita et al. 2005). These legal measures, 
combined with the absence of a clear migratory policy, gave rise to migratory 
systems between Brazil and Japan in which labour brokers and subcontractor 
networks have played a central role (Tanno 1999; Higuchi and Tanno 2003; Urano 
2004; Kajita et al. 2005).  
Despite its temporary character in the early stages, the formation of huge ethnic 
communities in the host country has resulted in a consistent flow of persons, goods 
and financial resources between Brazil and Japan. Ethnic businesses, international 
phone services, ethnic newspapers and bank services have been established in both 
countries, thus boosting the movement of the migrants in transnational spaces. As 
observed by Faist (2000: 13), “once the number of network connections reaches a 
certain level, international movements become self-perpetuating because they 
create the social structure necessary to sustain them”. 
In this paper we attempt to understand the transformation of the relationships 
between Japanese-Brazilian migrants, returnees and families who were left behind 
in Brazil, by considering those changes from a transnational perspective. These 
perspectives also bring new challenges for researchers: “This localization of the 
global, or of the non-national, in national territories, undermines the key duality 
running through many of the methods and conceptual frameworks prevalent in the 
social sciences – that the national and the non-national are two mutually exclusive 
conditions” (Sassen 2001: 187).  
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The formation of the left-behind population is analysed as a dynamic process in 
which, on the one hand, some returnees will remain in the home country in the late 
migration stages, but the younger members of the left-behind population in the 
early stages of this process, on the other hand, constitute the new migratory waves. 
The family members who are left behind are replaced according to factors such as 
the life cycle, the level of stress caused by migration, job opportunities 
subordinated to the peripheral labour market, and the maintenance of an economic 
base in the homeland.  
We develop the following main issues: first, the function of the families left behind 
and their role in creating favourable conditions for the readaptation of returnee 
migrants; second, the role of local communities and institutions in promoting 
returnee migrants’ readaptation to their homeland. The dynamics of migration 
involve families as a whole and replacement among the members who feed the 
migratory stream over time. This extensive migratory movement has created social 
imbalances and a vacuum in both sending and receiving countries. Old home-
country institutions, national government institutions and international financial 
organisations become interconnected as a consequence of the dislocation driven by 
migrants attracted by the peripheral labour market in the receiving country. We 
argue that the effect of this institutional framework needs to be examined by an 
analysis of the real forces and motivations that drive individuals to transnational 
migration between two very distant countries, giving an evolving character to the 
migrants and the population left behind.  
1. Puzzling strategies in transnational social spaces  
The need to develop a better understanding of the current formation of 
transnational social spaces in different countries around the world is undeniable. 
The ability to link empirical evidence makes it possible to develop an in-depth 
comprehension of migrant behaviour that would otherwise be incomprehensible 
and is an exciting step forward. As pointed out by Levitt (2003: 179), “Both the 
migrant and non-migrant who live within transnational social fields are exposed to 
a set of social expectations, cultural values and patterns of human interaction 
shaped by at least two, if not more, social economic and political systems. They 
have access to social and institutional resources that imbue them with the potential 
to remain active in two worlds”. This also means that the set of social expectations 
and cultural values may reflect the institutional framework of those countries or 
local communities and is subject to change with the advent of the migratory 
process. In virtue of the changing nature of these processes, generalisations need to 
be made with caution. For example, some authors have contested the validity of 
transnational social spaces. According to Dahinden, cultural, socio-economic or 
political constraints can be a barrier to possibilities for action, thus affecting the 
social impact of transnational ties. She feels that transnational social spaces 
“… must be refined and used in a more nuanced manner that allows for the careful 
analysis of the precise content and function of transnational ties and associated 
social fields” (Dahinden 2005: 204).  
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In this paper we use another concept that has been a useful tool in understanding 
migrant behaviour: household strategy. Also, in this case, we attempt to keep in 
mind its relative validity, giving priority to what emerges from the data collected. 
For example, are household strategies really strategies as such, or just a result of 
retrospective rationalisation operated by researchers? To what extent is 
intentionality central to evaluating and validating strategies? If we assume 
migration to be a process that changes over time, it is natural that migrants’ plans 
change over time, and sometimes it is difficult to identify and understand their 
behaviour systematically. However, it is also true that a set of coordinated 
behaviours can provide advantages and/or disadvantages in areas of life such as 
finding employment and opening a business. In the event of the unexpected, 
migrants tend to adjust their behaviour to a new set of social conditions. This 
implies that migrants begin to develop a different mindset. As such, it is reasonable 
to assume that household strategy needs to be considered as an evolving face of 
migrant behaviour: it is the product of a combination of planned action, the advent 
of unexpected events, environmental change, the development of new perceptions 
on people’s lives, and tactics that are necessarily adjusted to changes in their social 
context in both receiving and sending countries.  
Also to conceptualise life strategy, which is more individual and, in some senses, 
limited in range, is not an easy task. In his critical review, Crow (1989) points out 
that the term “strategy” is not uniformly used due to the fact that some researchers 
adopt it as a practical term. In general, “strategy” applies to a set of actions that are 
in some sense rational and take place in predictable social situations. In this way, 
the use of the term “strategy” implies conscious, rational decisions involving a 
long-term perspective. There has been an important debate about the concept of 
“strategy”, revolving around the relationship between the term itself and agency, or 
the relationship between strategy and rationality. Our intention is not to discuss the 
theory of household strategy, but use it as a tool to explain the manner in which 
families have responded to the changes in their social environment and to test how 
useful it is in the attempt to identify patterns assumed by migrant families to 
achieve their goals. For example, sometimes, to attain certain goals, the migrant 
family strategically chooses which member(s) of the family are the right one(s) to 
migrate. In her research on Haitian migrant women, Buchanan (1979) describes 
how families tend to select their members who seem to have the best chance of 
obtaining the proper visa to work in New York. Few Haitian families have the 
money to leave their country altogether. Consequently, they choose one of the 
family members and assist him or her to raise the funds. Generally those selected 
are women because they are able to obtain work visas more easily than men.  
It goes without saying that the reason for our focus on households is not to give 
priority to the atomised units approach. On the contrary, we feel that our focus is 
justified because it gives us the chance to observe the intersection between 
individuals and broader spheres. As observed by Boyd (1989) households are 
stances which do the mediation between individuals and the larger structural 
setting, components in the relationship between structured conditions and 
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migration. “Migration of individual members or the entire household unit 
represents a strategy at the household level to achieve a fit between resources such 
as land and the alternatives for generating monetary and non-monetary income. 
Migration can be an important strategy for generating income in the form of 
remittances” (Boyd 1989: 645). Household strategies are useful to envisage a 
broader framework, and are not limited to the individual level. As Tacoli observed, 
all these household strategy perspectives are useful tools to explore the migratory 
process as a complex combination of political, economic and complex decision-
making processes. “Migration is thus a socially embedded process where the 
domestic unit acts as an important mediator between individuals and the labour 
market” (Tacoli 1999: 662). 
In making use of household strategies as a category of analysis, it is important to 
think about the exogenous factors that impose restrictions or promote migration, 
such as immigration policies and labour market conditions. But it is also true that 
migrants try to plan migratory processes to overcome these limitations. Households 
take into account immigration policies and labour market restrictions on entry, then 
build up complex migration and labour market strategies. For example, when 
women have a better chance of finding employment in given occupational niches, 
they go first, becoming frontrunners. Migrating in a second stage, their partners can 
benefit from women’s career entry experience to achieve their own career 
progression (Raghuram 2004: 315)  
In our analysis, the challenge is to find an equilibrium between the various factors 
we have taken into consideration: the role of individuals, adopting as a premise the 
social nature of their decisions; and the role of household strategies, keeping in 
mind a plurality of possibilities. This plurality of possibilities can be summed up as 
follows: first, household strategies and migratory processes can be seen as 
affirmative, intentional and planned sets of action with concrete achievements, as 
described by Willis and Yeoh (2000), for which any given family member 
organises their economic, physical and social maintenance. The decisions taken for 
families are made based on knowledge of the opportunities available to them and 
are made to respond to broader social and economic changes. Second, household 
strategies must be seen as a gradual process with nuanced characteristics. 
Sometimes it is difficult to identify migratory processes as the result of clear 
strategies, but they are also a consequence of changing sets of conditions and 
actions in which individuals and families reinvent their behaviour and courses of 
action according to changes in the life environment and “reset” their minds. Third, 
institutional conditions that influence migratory processes can restrict the 
possibilities of migration and professional progression, but often migrants can 
overcome those difficulties through complex household strategies.  
Considering the case of Brazilian families, at the beginning of their migration, the 
family men (either married or single) migrated by themselves and, after a short 
period, many brought their families to Japan to join them (Watanabe and Ishii 
1995). One can suppose that these families considered it better to migrate together 
228 Edson Urano and Lucia Yamamoto 
 
in order to minimise risk to the family unit. However, to describe how migrant 
families make the decision regarding who migrates, we need to consider factors 
such as the family life cycle, the purpose of migration, the minimisation of stress 
caused by the migration process itself, job opportunities, the possibility of 
obtaining visas, etc. Although a great number of Brazilian families have migrated 
together or have brought their families to Japan to join them, others have chosen to 
leave members, such as younger children, in the home country. The combination of 
factors described above contributes to the migration decision in a complex manner, 
sometimes involving multiple social ties maintained beyond the frontiers of one 
country.  
2. Study locations 
In 1908, Japanese workers and their families migrated to São Paulo (Brazil) in 
response to the shortage of labour on coffee plantations. After some years of living 
on the plantations, many of these migrants bought plots of land in the new 
agricultural frontiers, which included the region in the north of Paraná state (Nihon 
Imin Hachijunenshi Hensan Iinkai 1996). By the end of the 1920s, the Japanese 
Government’s colonisation agency (Brazilian Colonization Association), with 
funds from the Japanese Government and emigration companies founded with 
private Japanese capital, mediated the process of acquisition of the lands to 
encourage migrant settlement in Brazil. Land was purchased in Assaí, Uraí and 
Londrina, which are located in north Paraná (Handa 1980; de Carvalho 2003). In 
these ethnic Japanese communities, a mutual support system was organised in the 
form of several types of Japanese ethnic associations (nihonjinkai). Nowadays, 
although the importance of the associations has been weakened, their function as a 
socialisation space has been maintained.  
Our interviews were conducted in this region. We chose the towns of Guaíra, 
Maringá, Londrina, Cia Norte and Campo Mourão, all with significant Japanese 
descendant populations. Since the movement of Japanese-Brazilians back to Japan 
started, this same region has experienced the formation of remarkable migratory 
streams.  
3. Data collected 
This research is based on fourteen case studies (see Table 1), including migrant 
worker returnees, family members who never had migratory experience and 
interviews conducted with leaders of ethnic associations, an ethnic newspaper 
journalist, a psychologist, a governmental organisation consultant and local 
politicians. Data was collected over two periods; from July to August 2000 and 
from May to June 2004. Although at first we did not plan to conduct follow-up 
interviews, we had the opportunity to meet these families on two occasions and 
follow their social and geographical mobility during the four years since the first 
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interviews. All the interviews were conducted in Brazil, either in respondents’ 
homes or at their work places. 
Table 1: Information on the families studied before the migration process 
Name, marital status Householder’s occupation Family structure 
1. Akio Tsuji, married Farmer Akio and his wife 
2. Paulo Kumano, married  Auto mechanic employee Paulo, his wife and one son 
3. Misako Ueda, married Auto mechanic employee 
(husband) and food 
shopkeeper (wife) 
Misako, her husband, two 
sons and one daughter 
4. Masao Yasuda, married Auto mechanic employee Masao, his wife and 
daughter 
5. Sergio Matsuda, married Bicycle shopkeeper Sergio, his wife and two 
daughters 
6. Mario Ishiyama, single, 
watch store employee 
Farmer Parents, Mario, one brother 
7. Yoshio Abe, married  Auto mechanic owner Yoshio, his wife and three 
sons 
8. Marina Katayama, single, 
unemployed 
9. Emerson Katayama, 
single, high-school student 
10. Rivaldo Katayama, 
single, university student 
Farmers  
(Katayama family) 
Parents, Marina, Emerson, 
Rivaldo and youngest 
brother 
11. Antonio Morita, single 
high-school student 
Shopkeeper Parents, Antonio, sister and 
younger brother 
12. Celso Tanaka, single, 
high-school student 
Watch store owner Parents, Celso, four sisters 
and one brother 
13. Milton Nihei, single, 
supermarket employee 
Farmer Parents, Milton, a twin 
sister, younger brother and 
sister 
14. Daniel Sato, single, 
elementary student 
Auto mechanic employee Parents, Daniel, elder 
brother and younger brother 
4. Who migrates and who stays 
In describing the process by which migrant families make the decision as to who 
migrates, we need to consider such factors as the resource levels of families, their 
life cycles, the purpose of migration, the age and sex structure of the families, job 
opportunities and the possibility of obtaining visas. Although a great number of 
Brazilian families have migrated together or called on their remaining family 
members to join them later, others have chosen to leave members such as younger 
children in the home country. The combination of factors described above makes 
the migration decision a complex one, sometimes involving multiple social ties 
maintained beyond the frontiers of one country.  
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An analysis of the relationship between the aims of migration, the family life cycle 
and who in the family is the first to migrate makes it possible to ascertain how the 
decision-making takes place. For our purposes, we classified the family life cycle 
into four periods: the first is when the couple does not have a child, the second is 
when the family is composed of the parents and child or children between birth and 
14 years old (school-age children), the third category is a family with parents and 
single adult sons or daughters of working age, and the last comprises families with 
single adult sons or daughters who have become financially independent.  
Based on these classifications, we found some patterns in the families’ geographic 
mobility (see Table 2). For instance, when the family does not have a child, the 
couple tends to migrate together. The Tsuji family is an example. They went to 
Japan planning to save money to expand the family’s agricultural business. Some 
years later the couple returned to Brazil and began cultivating the land again. With 
the aim of saving money for investing in agricultural equipment, the husband 
migrated again, but as his wife had fallen ill while in Brazil, he went alone.  
Table 2: Family members who first moved to Japan 
Families 1990 1991 1992 1997 
1. Tsuji  Couple   
2. Kumano  Father   
3. Ueda  Elder son 
 
   
4. Yasuda   Father  
5. Matsuda    Parents 
6. Ishiyama  Two sons   
7. Abe Father    
8. Katayama  Eldest son   
9. Morita Elder son 
 
   
10. Tanaka Sisters    
11. Nihei Father and 
daughter 
   
12. Sato  Father    
In cases in which the family migrants have school-age children, we found two 
patterns: in one, the father migrates alone in the first phase of migration, and in the 
other, the parents leave their children behind. In the former case, which includes 
the Kumano, Yasuda, Abe and Sato families, the fathers tend to leave their families 
in order to save money to invest in the family business in Brazil. For those families, 
a short-term migration project makes it possible to accomplish their goals. 
Although they attain their goals, the migratory movement does not finish. 
Typically, new objectives appear and migration is restructured, with a new chain of 
migration beginning to evolve with other family members. In the three cases, the 
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second phase of family migration becomes possible when the eldest son and 
daughter are old enough to work abroad. An example is the Matsuda family, with 
both parents migrating together despite having two school-age daughters. They 
preferred to leave their daughters with relatives and provide for their education in 
Brazil. Four years later, the husband returned to Brazil with the goal of starting a 
restaurant while his wife remained in Japan.  
Although the families plan to reside in the receiving country for quite a long period, 
their plans are based on the assumption of returning to their homeland. 
Consequently, they live in Japan as if they were “temporary citizens”. We can 
compare these families with the Japanese families who migrated to Brazil at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In his research on them, Maeyama (1996) 
points out that in the first period of the migration those Japanese families saw 
themselves as “visitors” who would leave the host country as soon as possible. 
However, most of them never returned home. 
The next group, families with a child of working age, includes the Ueda, Katayama 
and Nihei families. In these cases the father, mother and children of working age 
migrate together. In one case, the son moved alone, but migration is a familial 
enterprise. After the families attain their goals, the single adult son/daughter begins 
a new migration movement, the purpose of which is a new development set apart 
from the original goals of the family.  
In the case of families with independent, single adult children, such as the Ishiyama, 
Morita and Tanaka families, things are a little different from the above-mentioned 
cases. They plan their migration to Japan as a way to gain valuable experience 
abroad, or save a sum of money to purchase a house or invest in a new business or 
individual project. In the cases in which the single daughters move abroad, they 
tend to be supported by their families. For example, the father of the Tanaka family 
stated that before approving his two daughters’ travel plans to Japan, he talked to 
the Japanese company hiring them to ensure that it assumed responsibility for their 
security. The person responsible for recruiting guaranteed the two daughters’ safety 
for as long as they remained employed with the company. After migration, both 
daughters married Japanese co-workers and settled down in Japan. Therefore, it 
seems more likely that single sons/daughters migration to Japan is more an attempt 
to have them acquire financial independence than to provide for their families. 
5. Family members left behind help with the readaptation of returnees 
from Japan 
Embroiled in transnational dynamics, an ambiguous process of settlement is under 
way, with the formation of a second generation of migrants, as shown in the 
preceding section. This is also clearly indicated, for example, by the growing 
number of Japanese-Brazilians who obtain permanent visas in relation to the 
growth in the number of re-entry visas issued. Sometimes, the returnees obtain a 
re-entry visa without any plans for going back to Japan. However, when confronted 
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with their weak social ties and links with the labour market in the homeland, they 
feel “impelled” to go back to Japan. The loss of social relations occasioned by 
migration has been pointed out by a recent study on this population (SEBRAE 
2004), and this factor no doubt plays a role. These cases reveal how different 
pressures with the global economy as backdrop are mirrored in the individual 
stance. Employment on the periphery of the labour market, as migrants tend to be 
subjected to unstable jobs, has consequences both for the disintegration of families 
in the host country and the people who are left behind.  
Our analysis verified that family members do play a key role as social buffers for 
the readaptation of the returnee migrant. The following cases illustrate this well.  
Case study 1: Paulo Kumano, a former migrant interviewed in Campo Mourão, 
worked in his father’s garage before going to Japan. His father did not go to Japan 
but chose to continue with his business. Married with one child, Paulo decided to 
migrate alone with the goal of obtaining capital to buy a house in order to start his 
own garage. Paulo went to Japan in 1991 and stayed for one year and four months, 
working in the construction of sewer pipes and in an electronics factory. His wife, 
who stayed in Brazil, invested the money sent by him in buying a phone line, a 
house and a car. When he returned to Brazil, he invested in his father’s garage and 
bought his uncle’s share of the family business; the uncle subsequently went to 
Japan. Paulo said he probably could earn more returning to Japan than by 
managing his business. However, he remained with his family and once again 
became active in the social and economic activities in his local community.  
This case study shows that family members who stay behind have a function of 
reference, acting as anchors for the readaptation of returnees and providing a base 
for reinsertion into the local community.  
In other cases, the head of household pioneered the migration in order to save 
money and support the migration of other family members. A long-term connection 
between the two countries is established through family links and strategies. The 
replacement of family members in the migratory process shows the 
intergenerational dynamic that determines who stays in the homeland and who will 
be the next to migrate. The next case is an example of kinship groups that create 
long-term commitments and transnational ties among family members. Reciprocity 
and solidarity among family ties were enforced and the fact that some members 
remain in Japan as factory workers has made possible investment in new 
businesses in Brazil.  
Case study 2: The head of the Nihei family, who is Milton’s father, and his eldest 
daughter migrated to Japan in 1990 with the objective of saving money in a short 
time to buy a house and/or to start a business in their Brazilian home town, 
Maringá. Although the original purposes of purchasing a car, a house and 
improving living standards were attained, the migratory movement did not finish. 
New goals were established and migration was restructured. A new chain migration 
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started involving other family members. The next to migrate was the Niheis’ 
youngest daughter, in 1993, and after the father’s return, his two sons went to 
Japan in 1994. In the early period when the Niheis’ sons went to Japan, the 
youngest daughter who was living there assisted them financially. Today, the 
brothers continue their jobs as factory workers in an auto parts factory. The sister, 
now married, and her husband started a print shop in the small town of Guaíra, 
Paraná. The Nihei brothers supported her in purchasing printing machines, etc. In 
future, the brothers expect that, with the anticipated expansion of the print shop, 
they will be able to work there too.  
Sometimes recurrent patterns of separation of family members happen in order to 
make the migration and the achievement of economic goals possible, as shown by 
the next case.  
Case study 3: In 2000, we interviewed Misako Ueda for the first time. Misako, 
former food shopkeeper, and her husband, former auto mechanic employee, were 
running a snack bar, opened with capital saved through their jobs in Japan. From 
1992 to 1995, she went to Japan twice and worked in a glass factory, a hospital and 
as a domestic helper. They have three children, and at that time, a 14-year-old son 
and an 11-year-old daughter were living in Brazil. Their elder son was the pioneer 
of the family: he went to Japan in 1990 and is still living there. In 1995, the 
younger son went. In the second interview, in 2004, Misako’s daughter had 
married. The daughter had gone to Japan in 2004, leaving her child of pre-school 
age with Misako. The daughter and her husband are planning to start a garage with 
the money saved in Japan. Not one of the children had graduated from high school.  
This third case study reveals that a second and perhaps third generation of 
transnational factory workers is in the process of being formed. 
6. Second generation: child returnees and those left behind 
Research concerning Brazilian children back from Japan has focused on the 
psychological stress they experience. As described in magazine and newspaper 
articles, the returnee children forget both their experience in Japan and the 
Japanese language like someone who has amnesia. The adaptation process to the 
new environment is not easy for them. Some of them left Brazil when they were 
babies, others were born in Japan. Besides the difficulty of adjusting to Japanese 
society, when they go back to Brazil the children experience further difficulties 
adapting to Brazilian society. Many of them have little or no Portuguese language 
skills (Vitória 1997; Takata 2002). Therefore, to deal with these linguistic and 
adaptation problems, some measures have being taken by Brazilian private schools, 
ethnic schools and groups of volunteer psychologists, members of the Projeto 
Sociedade das Crianças (Children’s Society Project).  
Children who were left in the home country by their fathers, mothers, or both, 
indicate other influences of migration on family life. As Nakagawa describes in her 
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study, some Brazilian children express their feeling of abandonment through 
disruptive behaviour, rebelling against their parents, a marked decline in academic 
achievement and sometimes through being reserved or withdrawn. The children 
suffer from problems caused by parental absence and have difficulties dealing with 
these (Nakagawa 2001). Migrant parents sometimes do not realise how important 
they are to their children and that their absence may result in serious damage to the 
children’s psychosocial development. 
Children’s education is a sensitive issue because an effective educational process 
presupposes continuity over time and the support of the familial environment and 
the cultural context of each country. The occurrence of migration has enormous 
consequences on all these factors, each of which is fundamental to education. With 
the aim of preserving educational continuity, some children stay in the home 
country with one of their parents or relatives. However, when the familial 
environment changes with migration, it could have irreparable consequences for 
the children. 
Case study 4: Daniel Sato is an example of a child who was left behind by his 
father, who migrated to Japan when Daniel was 11 years old and had been living 
there for seven years. During this period, his father returned to Brazil on two 
occasions. When his father left home, Daniel missed him very much. However, 
with time he has grown accustomed to his father’s absence. Daniel said, “I don’t 
know why, but soon after my father left us, I had little incentive to study and my 
school performance dropped. But now, I want to conclude my high school degree 
and take the entrance exam to medical college.” When he was 16, his father 
thought of bringing the family to Japan but Daniel refused to accompany him. “I 
have heard from my friends that in Japan the public places are clean, everyone 
works hard and the jobs for foreigners are very tough. I would like to visit Japan, 
but only visit. My friends who have returned from there have changed. I think their 
behaviour has changed. They became more reserved … .” In August 2000, 
Daniel’s elder brother, who failed his university entrance examination, went to 
Japan to work. “My brother wants to save money,” Daniel said. “I don’t want to 
work there. If I become a doctor, I can support my family and they don’t have to 
work there.” In an interview with Daniel’s family friend, she said that after his 
father left the family, the sons had had some problems in school. Some members of 
the ethnic association’s youth club counselled them about their changed attitude to 
their studies. She believes that support from friends played an important role, 
encouraging Daniel to think more seriously about his future. 
The consequences of migration for the children left behind present a difficult issue 
for the parents. Yoshio Abe, living in Londrina, Paraná, feels proud of his eldest 
son who is studying in the graduate school at Tokyo University. However, Yoshio 
has a serious problem with the youngest son. He was 8 years old when Yoshio 
went to Japan, in 1990. According to him, the son gradually lost interest in 
studying and finally dropped out of secondary school in his second year. Yoshio 
expressed a huge sense of guilt about what had happened to his son. After 
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evaluating the economic gains that migration gave him against the negative aspects, 
he observed, reluctantly, “I don’t know whether to say it was good or bad. I just 
don’t know”. 
7. Japanese-Brazilian migration to Japan and the dilemma of ethnic 
associations in Brazil 
According to the Inter-American Development Bank, in 2002, US$4.6 billion were 
sent home by Brazilians living abroad. Of this total amount, US$2.5 billion a year 
was sent by Brazilians in Japan through three major Brazilian banks with branch 
offices in Japan. These remittances are the highest amounts per worker sent to 
Latin America and the Caribbean from any country (IDB 2004; 2003). If on the 
one hand the economic effects of migration on the local community have been 
remarkable, firing up the real estate market and boosting consumption in general, 
on the other hand the functions of the local community have declined as they have 
lost their members to migration (Nihon Imin Hachijunenshi Hensan Iinkai 1996).  
The ethnic associations of the Japanese community, nihonjinkai (Japanese 
Associations), are not effective actors in the migratory process. Historically 
contextualised in the efforts of the Japanese to settle in Brazil and with activities 
directed at the preservation of their cultural backgrounds through sports and 
seasonal festivals, Japanese schools, traditional dance and music, the migratory 
phenomenon back to Japan was, at first, considered a dishonour not only by these 
institutions but also by members of the ethnic community (Mori 1995). There were, 
somehow, inherent ethical and ideological conflicts involved. It should be noted 
that the migratory stream to Japan has contributed to the erosion of the base of 
these associations. Schools are losing Japanese language teachers and students, and 
festivals are losing their participants.  
Nihonjinkai did not have the institutional framework to face the pressures and 
changes imposed by the new social dynamics. Japanese-Brazilian migration 
aggravated the sense of there being anachronisms involving the old institutions of 
the local ethnic community, which had already become apparent due to 
transformations in the social life of the Japanese-Brazilians over time.  
The leader of the West Paraná Japanese Associations League has observed that 
while there were 400 participants in the league’s table tennis championship a few 
years earlier, only 45 people took part in 2004. Five years ago, there were around 
3,000 families associated with the West League, which includes ten towns in the 
region such as Guaíra, Umuarama and Assis. In 2004, this had dwindled to just 
1,300 families. According to him, former associates who return to their home 
towns after being in Japan do not re-establish their links with the associations. In 
fact, he claims that they have very weak links with friends and the local community 
and return obsessed by money. If they face financial and familial difficulties, they 
return to Japan. This movement seems to be contributing to internal migration as 
well, with many of the returnees moving from rural towns to regional core cities 
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such as Maringá and Londrina. He is concerned that, in ten years, these 
associations will not able to survive. 
Considering the strong influence of returnees on the economic conditions of their 
families, in addition to the irrefutable reality that considerable contingents of the 
local community are moving to Japan, traditional associations are trying to adapt in 
such a way as to incorporate the migration problem, and new organisations have 
sprung up in direct response to it. As indicated above, these associations have not 
played an active role in the migratory process. This function has been carried out 
by travel agencies and promoters of the ethnic community which form the 
brokerage structure for the subcontractors and factories of Japan. However, the 
Cultural and Sport Association of Maringá (ACEMA), one of the most important 
Japanese associations of Paraná state, is trying to mobilise itself to deal with the 
decrease in membership. ACEMA created a department to support Japanese-
Brazilian migrants in partnership with the Brazilian government service for the 
support of micro and small enterprises (SEBRAE). ACEMA, in the past, had 2,500 
families affiliated to it; today the number has dropped to just 800. 
SEBRAE too is developing a project to improve the entrepreneurship of the 
Japanese-Brazilian migrants in partnership with another association, the Brazilian 
Association of Dekasegis (ABD), located in the capital of Paraná state, Curitiba. 
The interesting point is that the ABD is a new type of association specifically 
created in 1997 with the purpose of giving support to migrants and returnees such 
as the provision of orientation courses dealing with daily life in Japan or 
consultation services for investments in Brazil.  
The first step of the joint SEBRAE-ABD initiative was the development of a 
survey to be carried out in both countries to establish a portrait of Japanese-
Brazilian migrants. In a partnership that includes the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the objective is to develop the technical formation of the returnee migrant as 
an entrepreneur and offer the opportunity of financial partnership. The SEBRAE 
consultant interviewed in Maringá is also director of the department with the task 
of supporting Japanese-Brazilian returnees at ACEMA. The intention is to create 
theme-based discussion groups on topics such as franchising, craftwork and 
children’s education as a way to mobilise migrants and their families. According to 
the SEBRAE consultant, there is a strong need to take the social environment of 
the Japanese-Brazilian returnees into consideration if the business or investment is 
to be successful. He pointed out that weakened families tend to have problems 
developing new businesses. There is a vacuum in participation by generation strata, 
mainly on the part of young people, and the associations consider this to be a 
serious problem. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper is an ambitious attempt to elaborate on a comprehensive framework by 
linking the puzzling parts of the migratory process in the expectation that it will 
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provide some new elements for further discussion on the migration of Brazilians to 
Japan. The family members who are left behind are replaced according to factors 
such as life cycle, stress caused by the migration, job opportunities and the 
maintenance of an economic basis in the homeland. The dynamics of migration 
involve families as a whole and replacement practices among the members who 
feed migratory streams over time. 
The main problem addressed here is how institutions and families can deal with the 
changes imposed by the forces of globalisation in order to preserve their role and 
maintain cohesion in society. The circular movement of migrants in transnational 
contexts seems to have, on the one hand, a detrimental effect on the disintegration 
of the social institutions of the local ethnic community. On the other, it also seems 
to have a positive influence in bringing new social dynamism to them. Sometimes, 
existing ideologies inside ethnic associations are in conflict with the new cultural, 
social and economic waves created by the migratory streams. Frequently, these 
associations are unprepared to face the changes that migration generates. However, 
the strong influence of the transnational movements at local community level calls 
for changes in the existing institutions.  
The migratory system has been constructed through a combination of historical 
background, economic dynamics on a global scale, legal measures in the host 
country, the structure of the brokerage system and interconnections among families. 
This drastic movement has brought about social imbalances and vacuums in both 
countries. Old ethnic institutions, other new ones, national government institutions 
and international financial organisations are likely to become interconnected as a 
consequence of the dislocation resulting from migrants moving to the attractive 
peripheral labour market of Japan. The efficacy of these institutional combinations 
will be determined by a deeper understanding of the real forces and motivations 
that impel these people to a pendulum-like movement between two very distant 
countries, imbuing the population left behind with mutant characteristics. 
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Similar Procedures, Divergent Function: 
Citizenship Tests in the United States, Canada,  
Netherlands and United Kingdom 
MARIO PEUCKER 
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Countries with entirely different policies and traditions of integration 
and naturalisation have introduced citizenship tests as a core element 
of their naturalisation procedures. Contrary to prevailing findings 
these developments do not necessarily indicate a growing 
resemblance between country-specific understandings of integration 
and citizenship. Comparative analysis of the naturalisation 
procedures in the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom illustrates that similar citizenship tests can serve 
entirely different purposes. They can strive to ensure the new citizens’ 
loyalty to the country or to promote their integration, but can also 
make citizenship less accessible. Citizenship tests per se constitute an 
abstract political tool whose functions can only be understood within 
a specific political framework. Although their immediate impact seems 
generally overrated in the political discourse, they can play a forceful 
indirect role in the integration process – as an encouraging invitation 
or a deterring hurdle. 
 A s citizenship laws are deeply rooted in the national history and tradition of state-building, they tend to be a fairly stable policy field. Contrary to this 
general continuity of citizenship policies, the past few years have seen a profound 
and remarkably rapid change of naturalisation provisions in immigration countries 
all over the world (Bauböck 2006). One feature that many of these national 
amendments have in common is the introduction of citizenship tests as an 
additional requirement in the naturalisation procedure. Whereas such tests have 
been in place in some classical immigration countries such as the United States and 
Canada for many years, governments in other countries have only recently passed 
legislation to install similar test procedures, such as in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia. These legal changes appear striking 
not only due to the suddenness of their emergence – they also raise the question of 
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why countries with divergent national traditions and policies in the domain of 
integration and naturalisation opt for the introduction of this political tool. The 
previous issue of the IJMS provided in-depth analyses of these developments from 
different thematic perspectives in several European countries. This paper pursues 
the insights gained through these examinations and presents another – more 
comparative – approach to the issues of citizenship tests. 
The general tendency towards citizenship tests allows two essentially opposing 
interpretations. First, the introduction of similar testing schemes indicates a 
growing resemblance in the national concepts of integration and naturalisation. 
Second, these new tests only appear to be a similar political means; closer 
examination reveals fundamental differences in the functions they fulfil in specific 
national contexts. Thus the application of similar testing schemes does not 
automatically imply a similar political understanding of citizenship and integration. 
Applying a cross-national approach, this paper argues in favour of the second 
explanation – and goes one step further: citizenship tests per se constitute an 
abstract political instrument whose functions can only be understood within a 
specific political framework, “embedded within a larger institutional and policy 
environment” (Bloemraad 2006: 675). Consequently, to grasp their actual 
functions, one must primarily analyse the nation-specific citizenship and 
integration policies, the current political and public debate on integration in which 
the amended naturalisation procedures are embedded and the procedural details of 
such testing schemes. The paper elaborates on the naturalisation procedures in the 
United States, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in order to 
illustrate that the explicit purpose, the implicit functions and the (unintended or 
intended) consequences of citizenship tests depend greatly on the national context. 
Additionally, it shows that citizenship tests are hardly suitable for achieving their 
officially ascribed purpose. As such they represent fairly weak political 
instruments. Nevertheless, they often have a forceful indirect impact on the 
integration process. 
1. Citizenship tests in countries with different naturalisation and 
integration strategies 
Every industrial country that has experienced large-scale immigration has 
developed more or less explicit nation-specific policies and strategies for the 
incorporation of immigrants into the socio-political community.1 These integration 
and naturalisation policies are strongly affected by, among other factors, the 
country’s history (e.g. immigration, colonial past), institutional configurations, 
traditions of state-building and conceptualisation of national identity (Bauböck 
 
1 The EFFNATIS (Effectiveness of national integration strategies towards second generation migrant 
youth in a comparative European perspective) EC research project analysed the differences 
between national modes of integration and their effectiveness in several European countries (see 
Heckmann and Schnapper 2003a). 
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2006: 3; Bloemraad 2006: 674). Accordingly, countries differ strongly in their 
national integration modes and policies as well as in their citizenship regimes. 
Based on the general distinction between ethnic (ethnos) and civic (demos) 
concepts of nationhood (Brubaker 1992), a classification has been developed which 
distinguishes three ideal-typical citizenship regimes, each of them being associated 
with particular integration policies and a specific understanding of naturalisation 
(Zappalà and Castles 2000).  
Differential exclusion (Castles 1995) and collectivistic-ethnic type (Greenfeld 
1999): In countries such as Austria and Switzerland the integration policies mainly 
aim at the incorporation of immigrants in certain social fields, primarily the labour 
and housing market and the education system. Simultaneously, barriers have been 
established in the access to full political participation (i.e. citizenship) due to the 
self-conceptualisation as a national entity based on ethnic bonds (ethnos).2
Assimilation (Castles) or collectivistic-civic type (Greenfeld): Other countries – 
France used to be the archetypical example – expect immigrants “to give up their 
distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable 
from the majority population” (Castles 1995: 297). Ethnic traditions and practices 
are largely banned from public spaces. The nation is not defined by ethnic 
boundaries but based on the concept of a political unity (demos). To become a 
citizen in these countries is usually relatively easy and promoted by the state. 
Pluralism (Castles) or individualistic-civic type (Greenfeld): Many classic 
immigration countries, such as the US and Canada and since the 1970s Australia, 
have responded to immigration with some form of multiculturalism policies. There 
is a general acceptance in these countries that immigrants and ethnic groups will 
remain linguistically and culturally distinguishable from the majority population. 
Pluralism implies that immigrants shall be granted equal rights in all spheres of 
society, including full political rights. Hence citizenship is seen as a – or even the – 
core political instrument within the integration policies.  
As many Western countries have recently experienced some fundamental changes 
of their integration and citizenship policies, this strict archetypical categorisation of 
nationalism and citizenship regimes has lost a lot of its explanatory power. Sue 
Wright correctly points out in the IJMS 10 (1): “These old categories of 
nationalism are now very blurred and no longer useful. What is coming is, 
however, not yet clear” (Wright 2008: 7). Despite the fact that many (partially 
 
2 It is noteworthy that Germany, which used to be the most-quoted example of this collectivistic-
ethnic type of citizenship regime, has amended its legislation significantly by implementing strong 
ius soli components with the introduction of the new Citizenship Law in 2000 (Brubaker 2001). 
However, parts of the conservative political camp continue to disapprove of such strong elements 
of ius soli and advocate a partial revocation of these liberal naturalisation provisions, introduced in 
2000. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recently expressed concerns 
about Germany’s restrictive naturalisation practices and called upon it to “facilitate acquisition of 
German citizenship by long-term residents and persons born in Germany” (CERD 2008: 5).  
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superficial) convergences have occurred recently regarding political and legal 
provisions on immigration, integration and naturalisation, Western countries 
continue to differ significantly in terms of their political modes of integration (see 
Heckmann and Schnapper 2003b: 253), concepts of nationhood and citizenship 
(see, for example, Koopmans et al. 2005) as well societal self-conceptualisation. A 
still significant dividing line – albeit not always easy to draw – runs between 
societies that consider themselves as not only de facto multicultural but as officially 
multicultural (see Joppke and Morawska 2003: 10) and societies that define 
themselves as ethnically rather “closed”. These divergent national self-definitions 
and policy philosophies also translate into different laws and bureaucratic 
procedures – with the consequence that cross-national variations perpetuate 
(Bloemraad 2006: 675). Against this background it appears striking that similar 
citizenship tests have become an integral element of the naturalisation provisions in 
various countries. 
1.1 Return of assimilation?   
One might be inclined to interpret the increasing popularity of citizenship tests in 
different countries as an indicator of an assimilationist turn in national integration 
and naturalisation policies. Such an understanding is in line with the hypothesis 
that originally very divergent national integration policies are growing increasingly 
similar. At first glance, the recent and almost simultaneous amendments to national 
citizenship laws and, more specifically, the introduction of citizenship tests, seem 
to support this hypothesis. It is no longer considered sufficient that would-be 
citizens display a certain level of proficiency in the respective language, comply 
with the rule of law and accept the constitutional values – they now also need to 
demonstrate knowledge of their new home country’s history, culture, society and 
political system. 
A closer look reveals some inconsistencies in this interpretation and suggests a 
more complex reading. Although the acquisition of citizenship has undoubtedly 
become a more demanding venture, citizenship tests have only increased the 
requirements concerning the applicant’s knowledge of the new home country – not 
concerning the adoption of values. Would-be citizens are not required to abandon 
their ethnic or cultural values, norms and lifestyle and hence assimilate into the 
mainstream culture of the receiving society in order to pass these tests. What also 
raises doubts about the hypothesis that citizenship tests necessarily indicate a 
general shift in national policies towards assimilation is that the two countries 
which have been applying these testing schemes for many years – the US and 
Canada – have clearly non-assimilative, pluralistic integration and naturalisation 
policies in place. France, on the other hand, where “assimilation into the French 
community”3 has been explicitly and legally required, has not yet implemented 
formal written citizenship tests. 
 
3 The Code Civil (Art. 21-24) in France defines assimilation as a prerequisite for naturalisation: 
“Nobody may be naturalised unless he proves his assimilation into the French community, and 
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2. An overview on citizenship tests and their functions in selected 
countries  
The following snapshot analysis of citizenship tests as a naturalisation requirement 
in selected countries not only illustrates that the assimilation hypothesis is not 
defendable, but also highlights that citizenship tests fulfil entirely different 
functions – despite their partially strong resemblance in terms of structure, testing 
procedure and content.  
2.1 Citizenship tests in the US and Canada: loyalty and commitment 
The US and Canada define themselves as immigration countries and multicultural 
societies. The important contribution of immigration to the countries’ economic, 
cultural and social prosperity is (and has been) generally acknowledged. Both 
countries traditionally follow a pluralistic integration policy. The naturalisation 
rates are very high (more than 700,000 per year in the US; approx. 150,000 per 
year in Canada), the minimum requirement regarding the duration of permanent 
residence is low, and citizenship tests have been in place for many years. 
In the US,4 applicants must have been lawfully admitted to the country for 
permanent residence and physically present for at least five years prior to filing 
with no single absence for more than one year and for at least thirty months out of 
the previous five years. A “good moral character” is a prerequisite for 
naturalisation, i.e. the criminal record must not exceed certain conviction limits. 
Applicants must show attachment to the US Constitution and a favourable 
disposition towards their new country. This is displayed by taking the mandatory 
oath of allegiance with which the applicant swears to support the Constitution, to 
obey the laws and to renounce any foreign allegiance. 
The would-be citizen must be able to understand, read, write and speak English and 
demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of US history and 
principles of government, assessed by the civic test introduced in the late 1980s. 
An English test is carried out as an informal element of the naturalisation interview 
conducted by the immigration officer: usually the applicant has to read some 
sample sentences and write a sentence dictated by the officer. The civic test, which 
only takes a couple of minutes, consists of ten questions on US history, national 
symbols, and basic political issues such as political parties, voting procedures and 
the Constitution. The questions have to be answered either in written form 
(multiple-choice) or orally within the naturalisation interview. The pass mark is 
60 per cent. Those who fail the first test are allowed to repeat it within sixty to 
ninety days. If they fail again, the application is turned down. The applicant may 
then request a hearing with an immigration officer and file a petition for a new 
 
especially owing to a sufficient knowledge of the French language, according to his conditions and 
of the rights and duties conferred by French nationality.” The assimilation criterion, “rights and 
duties conferred by French nationality”, was added to the Code Civil with the 2003 Amendment 
(Law No. 2003-1119). 
4 Requirements are laid down in the US Immigration and Nationality Act. 
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review of the denied application in the District Court. The costs for processing a 
naturalisation application (including the test) are US$330 (€230). 
The US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) is mandated by the 
Homeland Security Act (2002) to promote instructions on citizenship rights and 
responsibilities and to provide immigrants with the respective information. 
Although preparatory classes are not provided by the USCIS itself, it offers a broad 
range of support measures and tools to assist applicants in preparing for the civic 
test and for the application procedure in general. The official handbook Guide to 
Naturalization contains all relevant information on the naturalisation procedures, 
including a list of institutions that offer preparatory courses for the civic and the 
language test or other forms of assistance in the process (adult education classes; 
community-based organisations; immigration attorneys). The USCIS also provides 
comprehensive information on its website and offers individual assistance through 
a free-of-charge telephone helpline and information counters at local USCIS 
offices. Comprehensive study material has been released, such as the Civic Flash 
Cards, booklets and an exhaustive list of civic tests questions (including answers) 
in several languages. These materials are designed to assist autodidactic learners as 
well as adult education instructors. For the latter, the USCIS has also developed 
curriculum and lesson planning tools and supplementary learning materials that can 
be used in language courses and citizenship classes to prepare immigrant students 
for the tests.  
Since the late 1990s the civic test has come under scrutiny. Various studies have 
identified two main shortcomings: first, the adoption and administration of the test 
does not seem sufficiently harmonised across the country. Second, the test displays 
weaknesses in appropriately assessing the applicant’s meaningful knowledge and 
understanding of US history and government. To overcome these shortcomings the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now USCIS) launched a test 
redesign project in 2000, which was concluded in 2008.5 Apart from improving the 
level of nationwide harmonisation, the language tests seem to require only minor 
changes (e.g. more civics-based vocabulary). The redesigning of the civic test will 
be more significant: responding to the criticism that the former test was not always 
suitable for ensuring the applicant’s “meaningful knowledge”, the revised test 
items “will focus less on redundant and trivial questions based on rote 
memorization and will focus on concepts, such as the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship”.6 The 142 questions (all publicly accessible on the USCIS website) 
that had been developed were analysed in the 2007 pilot programme. The main 
thematic areas are the principles of American democracy, system of government, 
rule of law, rights and responsibilities, and history and geography.   
 
5 In February 2007 a pilot programme started in ten cities in order to analyse the revised testing 
procedure. 
6 Press release of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (22 January 2007). Some examples of 
trivial questions are about the colours of the US flag or the name of the USCIS form used for a 
naturalisation application.  
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The naturalisation procedures and requirements in Canada7 resemble those in the 
United States. Applicants must have been permanent residents in Canada for a 
minimum of two years and have lived in the country for at least three of the four 
years prior to filing their application. A criminal record that exceeds a certain limit 
(e.g. sentenced to more than one year in prison or any indictable crime in the past 
three years) or a current imprisonment excludes the person from eligibility to apply 
for naturalisation. Naturalisation ceremonies and the obligatory oath of citizenship 
are “legally and symbolically important” components of the naturalisation process.  
Would-be citizens must prove that they are able to speak and understand basic 
English or French and demonstrate “an adequate knowledge” of Canada and their 
rights and responsibilities as Canadian citizens. Applicants who are between 18 and 
54 years old must pass a citizenship test (in written form since 1994) that takes 
about 30 minutes and consists of twenty questions chosen from a pool of 120 
items. Twelve of these twenty questions have to be answered correctly (i.e. pass 
mark: 60 per cent). It is a Canadian peculiarity that test questions on voting rights 
and procedures must be answered correctly. 
The citizenship test covers the following topics: 
- Aboriginal peoples; 
- National history; 
- Confederation and (federal) government; 
- Rights and responsibilities; 
- Languages; 
- National symbols; 
- Geography and economy; 
- Federal elections and voting procedures; 
- Basic information about the region in which the applicant lives. 
The would-be citizen can count on the state’s assistance in the naturalisation 
application process and the preparation for the citizenship test. The Canadian state 
does not provide preparatory courses itself, but supports courses that are conducted 
by education institutions, schools, libraries and settlement agencies and 
organisations. Furthermore, the government offers a detailed information website 
and a comprehensive brochure on the application process (How to Become a 
Canadian Citizen) as well as the study booklet, A Look at Canada (online and print 
version, see PWGSC 2006), which serves as the main self-learning tool to prepare 
for the citizenship test. The booklet is sent to every applicant free of charge after 
filing an application. It contains all required information and a list of citizenship 
test topics and questions. Moreover, an information call centre for citizenship 
issues has been set up. If necessary, a citizenship officer will be assigned to provide 
 
7 The requirements are laid down in the Canadian Citizenship Act (1947); the language and 
citizenship test requirement was introduced with the 1977 Amendment to the Canadian Citizenship 
Act. Information presented here stems from the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website 
(www.cic.gc.ca). 
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personalised counselling. The application fees (including the costs for the test) 
amount to C$200 (€130); C$100 are reimbursed if the application is denied. 
In the US and Canada, citizenship constitutes the common bond that is supposed to 
hold an ethnically diverse society and political community together; the act of 
naturalisation is hence of the highest importance for the integration policies and 
processes of the two countries.8 It mainly aims to strengthen the new citizens’ full 
commitment and loyalty to society. Although immigrants are urged to identify with 
the new country, its people and basic values, cultural assimilation is not required. 
USCIS deputy director Jonathan Scharfen described the meaning of citizenship at a 
naturalisation ceremony in Washington in April 2007 as follows: “Both native born 
and naturalized citizens are bound together by a common civic identity that 
transcends cultural and ethnic differences uniting us all as Americans” (USCIS 
2007a). 
Embedded in such an ethnically pluralistic, “officially multicultural” context 
(Joppke and Morawska 2003: 10), citizenship tests are neither designed to convey a 
message of assimilation nor perceived as a tool of assimilation by immigrants 
themselves. The civic tests officially aim at enabling new citizens to fully 
participate – also in a political sense – in the community and to become a 
committed member of society. As basic language skills, knowledge of the national 
history and political system and awareness of rights and duties are regarded as 
indispensable prerequisites for full participation, would-be citizens are expected to 
acquire this knowledge both for themselves and for the benefit of society. The new 
citizens’ loyalty and commitment to the country cannot be tested directly; hence 
the civic test can only check whether the applicants show the required knowledge. 
Implicitly this naturalisation requirement also seeks to ensure that applicants are 
committed enough to invest time and effort in studying for the test. 
A sense of belonging and bonds of loyalty cannot be imposed on new citizens by 
the state. As a consequence, the naturalisation policies of both countries strive to 
encourage and invite immigrants to become citizens. This political strategy of 
encouragement is not only reflected by the comprehensive structure of assistance 
provided by the state within the naturalisation process, it is also underscored by 
various procedural details in the application process, such as relatively low 
application fees and the general acceptance of multiple citizenship – provided the 
would-be citizen has undivided loyalty to US society (see Bloemraad 2006: 672). 
Besides the application procedure itself, various political statements or events 
indicate that acquiring citizenship might be a demanding process, but is 
nonetheless desired and encouraged by the state. For instance, Canada’s 
Citizenship Week, which takes place once a year in October, promotes the value of 
citizenship and encourages immigrants to apply. In the US, the current reviewing 
process of the civic and language test indicates that no obstacles shall be 
 
8 In the US, granting citizenship is officially considered the “most important immigration benefit that 
[the government] can grant” (USCIS website). 
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established. The USCIS stresses that the new civic test format does not aim to “toss 
up roadblocks” (Shawn Saucier, USCIS spokesman), but to “encourage civic 
learning and patriotism among prospective citizens and help to encourage 
applicants to learn and identify with the basic values that we all share as 
Americans” (USCIS 2007b). 
2.2 Citizenship tests in the Netherlands: integration check with higher 
hurdles 
The following analysis of the Dutch naturalisation procedure and requirements 
illustrates that citizenship tests can also be designed to deter (certain groups of) 
immigrants from applying for citizenship and create new practical and motivational 
hurdles. 
In the Netherlands9 applicants must have lived permanently and lawfully in the 
country for the past five years without having been sentenced to prison, community 
service order or a larger financial penalty for the past four years. In general 
applicants are required to renounce their old nationality. Since October 2006, all 
would-be citizens older than 16 have been obliged to attend an official 
naturalisation ceremony; they are not considered Dutch citizens unless they 
participate in such a ceremony within one year after their application was 
approved. Article 8 of the Dutch Nationality Act requires that applicants are 
sufficiently integrated into Dutch society.10 Until 2003 this rather vague integration 
condition had been checked by a municipal civil servant during an informal 
interview in which applicants had to show their command of Dutch and basic 
knowledge of society and the political system. This informal oral testing procedure 
was altered with the reform of the Nationality Act, which entered into force on 
1 April 2003. Since then, applicants have had to pass formal tests11 which assess 
their language proficiency (i.e. listening, reading, speaking and writing skills) and 
their knowledge of Dutch society, the political system and constitutional order. 
Both tests have to be undertaken electronically, which requires some basic 
computer skills (De Groot 2006: 23). The language test takes three hours and 
consists of more than 100 tasks and questions while the citizenship test takes about 
45 minutes and contains forty multiple-choice questions. It encompasses questions 
on, among other topics, the Dutch political system, employment, income and tax 
issues, residence, health care and transport system and emphasises everyday life 
issues (e.g. supermarket, weather forecast). The pass mark of the citizenship test is 
 
9 The information on the Netherlands stems primarily from the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation 
website (www.ind.nl). 
10 With the introduction of the Dutch Nationality Act in late 1984, second-generation immigrants 
gained the right to opt for citizenship and first-generation immigrants were given the chance to 
naturalise relatively easily; no serious requirements were installed apart from a Dutch language test 
which “hardly anyone ever failed” (Joppke 2007: 11) – until the introduction of the amendment to 
the Nationality Act in 2003. 
11 Certain groups of foreigners are exempted from taking the naturalisation tests, for example, those 
who can demonstrate (e.g. by a diploma) that their proficiency in Dutch is good enough.  
Citizenship Tests in the US, Canada, Netherlands and UK 249
 
                                                
70 per cent, i.e. twenty-eight out of forty questions have to be answered correctly. 
Only applicants who pass this test can take the language test. 
Those who can prove that they face serious physical or mental problems can be 
exempted from taking certain parts of the test; they are then referred to a special 
Testing Centre in Amsterdam where they undertake those test components that 
they can cope with. Illiterate people have to provide evidence that they have tried 
to learn Dutch in a training institute. If so, they are examined at the same 
Amsterdam-based centre (extra cost of €200). If they are assessed as capable of 
learning Dutch within five years, they will have to take the test again once they 
have acquired the required level of Dutch proficiency. The citizenship test costs 
€92; the language test is €168. The additional administrative fee for processing a 
naturalisation application ranges from €234 to €351. 
According to the Dutch authorities, about one-third of the applicants fail when first 
taking the tests.12 Those who pass can still be considered as “not sufficiently 
integrated” with the consequence of not being entitled to file an application for 
citizenship (e.g. if the applicant lives in polygamy). Those who fail the language or 
citizenship test have to wait six months before being allowed to repeat it. If an 
applicant fails three times, no further applications will be accepted. The assistance 
for would-be citizens concerning the application procedure, in particular 
concerning the preparation for the citizenship test, is very weak. Official study 
books do not exist, and the official naturalisation brochure is not sufficiently 
detailed to serve as a learning and preparatory tool. The availability of information 
about the content of both test components is “extremely poor” (De Groot 2006: 
25). Besides a few sample questions (available on the government website) the 
citizenship test questions are not publicly accessible.13 The fact that the test 
questions are changed every six months adds to the would-be citizens’ difficulties 
in preparing for the test. The Netherlands Government has failed so far to install a 
comprehensive support structure to facilitate the application procedure 
(e.g. information centres, hotlines); and official educational programmes to assist 
future applicants in acquiring the knowledge required are not in place.14
In April 2007, the naturalisation testing scheme was replaced by the integration 
examination (Van Oers 2008: 47). These new testing procedures are comprised of 
two elements: a practical test, which assesses the applicant’s proficiency in Dutch 
 
12 In 2003 about half the applicants failed the tests (Van Oers et al. 2006: 392). 
13 The lack of learning opportunities (e.g. no handbooks, no publicly available test questions) has 
been justified by a government official claiming that “one cannot study to be Dutch, one has to feel 
Dutch” (Van Oers et al. 2006: 415). 
14 In 1998 the Netherlands Government implemented a nationwide integration programme (including 
language and societal orientation courses) which most newcomers are obliged to attend (Wet 
Inburgering Nieuwkomers, in force since 30 September 1998). These mandatory integration 
courses, which immigrants attend shortly after arrival, are not enough to compensate for the lack of 
support structure in preparing for the citizenship test. 
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in real-life situations;15 and a “central examination” which encompasses the 
following three sub-tests: 
- Computer-based test on Dutch society and politics; 
- Oral examination by telephone, where questions are asked and assignments 
are given; 
- Computer-based “Electronic Practical Examination”, in which the 
applicant has to answer questions on practical issues in the Netherlands 
(e.g. how to register a new-born baby). 
Whereas the costs for taking the integration examination have fallen compared 
with the fees for the citizenship test (before April 2007), the new testing scheme 
consisting of the various assignments appears to be as challenging and demanding 
as the previous naturalisation test (Van Oers 2008: 54) – if not more so. 
Which aims did the government pursue with the implementation of these new 
testing schemes? The Nationality Act requires that the applicant is sufficiently 
integrated into Dutch society, which is demonstrated by a certain level of Dutch 
language skills and knowledge of society. Due to a lack of common guidelines 
before 2003 on how to assess these integration conditions, the previously applied 
oral testing procedure differed largely in terms of content and level of difficulty 
depending on the individual region or city. To meet these inconsistencies, the 
government decided to harmonise the testing procedure throughout the country by 
introducing the same written mandatory citizenship test (De Groot 2006: 23), 
which would, according to the proponents of these amendments, lead to more 
equality and fairness in the implementation of the tests (Van Oers 2008: 52).  
After the introduction of this more harmonised testing scheme in 2004, the number 
of applications dropped drastically by two-thirds, from 37,000 (2002) to 19,300 
(2004). Despite a slight upward development in the following years, the 2006 
figures remained about 50 per cent below the level of 2002. The findings of a 
qualitative survey, conducted among seventy-eight immigrants and naturalisation 
experts in 2006, suggest that in particular “elderly people, those with limited or no 
education and women in disadvantaged positions” (Van Oers 2008: 51) tend to 
renounce their intention to apply for Dutch citizenship. It was not the shift from an 
oral testing procedure to a written test that had such a tremendous effect, but rather 
the combination of increased requirements and a lack of assistance and 
encouragement. The newly introduced tests are clearly more demanding and more 
difficult to pass than the former oral testing procedure, the application fees are 
relatively high, and the prospects of passing the citizenship test are difficult to 
assess. These factors contribute not only to building up practical obstacles but also 
 
15 The practical examination can be taken by presenting a portfolio of thirty pieces of evidence that 
demonstrate that the applicant is fluent in Dutch in a range of real-life situations (Van Oers 2008: 
47); alternatively or in combination with this portfolio, applicants can pass the practical 
examination by successfully taking part in several role plays that simulate real-life situations 
(“assessment”).  
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to increasing emotional or motivational barriers by signalling to immigrants that 
they are not welcome as new citizens. This deterring message is reflected by the 
partially suspicious, mistrustful tone in which the new naturalisation provisions are 
being presented (e.g. provisions for mentally challenged or illiterate applicants). 
The discouraging signals are further reinforced by the public and political debate 
on integration and immigrants generally dominated by immigrant-sceptical 
attitudes and a problem-focused discourse on integration and the failure of former 
multicultural policies. In such a political setting, citizenship tests function as a 
mechanism to built new hurdles and deter immigrants from applying for 
citizenship. 
2.3 Citizenship test in the United Kingdom: a tool to foster integration 
In the early years of this decade, the UK experienced manifest signs of integration 
and social cohesion problems, the most obvious being the riots in northern English 
cities in the summer of 2001. These incidents triggered off a nationwide public and 
political debate on the “right integration strategy”, which soon led to specific legal 
amendments. The most significant changes occurred with the introduction of the 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) which is of relevance for the 
naturalisation procedure in two respects: firstly, naturalisation ceremonies with a 
mandatory citizenship oath were introduced as a compulsory part of the procedure 
(January 2004); secondly, formal naturalisation tests became obligatory (November 
2005). 
Applicants for citizenship must have lived in the UK lawfully and most of the time 
for at least five years.16 They have to be of “good character”, i.e. must not have 
been convicted of a serious crime, and “stay closely connected with the United 
Kingdom”. Furthermore, a pledge and an oath or affirmation of allegiance is 
mandatory. Since January 2004 adult would-be citizens have been required to make 
this oath at an official citizenship ceremony. The applicant needs to have a 
sufficient level of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic, which is “good enough … to 
deal with everyday situations” (the level depends on their age and physical and 
mental conditions), and a “sufficient knowledge about life in the United Kingdom”. 
Both knowledge requirements must be proven17 by either passing the newly 
introduced written citizenship test Life in the UK or by successfully completing an 
(usually publicly funded and free of charge) ESOL course (English for Speakers of 
Other Languages) with a citizenship syllabus. There is no specific requirement 
concerning the language skill level of this ESOL course. If an applicant passes the 
citizenship test, it is assumed that their language skills are sufficient; hence an extra 
language test is redundant. If an applicant’s English skills are below the level 
which is deemed necessary to prepare for and pass the Life in the UK test (ESOL 
 
16 Information and quotes stem – unless otherwise indicated – from the UK Home Office website 
(www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk).    
17 It is worth mentioning that immigrants who seek “indefinite leave to remain”, i.e. apply for 
permanent settlement status in the UK, also have to pass the citizenship test or complete a pertinent 
ESOL course. 
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Entry Three), an ESOL course is recommended; at the end of this course the 
applicant has to pass an examination which assesses speaking, listening, reading 
and writing skill, but not explicitly knowledge of life in the UK.  
The computer-based Life in the UK test consists of twenty-four multiple-choice 
questions chosen from a pool of 200, all based on information given in several 
chapters of the learning handbook Life in the United Kingdom. A Journey to 
Citizenship (Home Office 2004). The applicant has 45 minutes to complete the test. 
The test concentrates on the political structures, traditions and practical, everyday 
life issues; history topics do not occur among the 200 possible questions. The test 
covers the following topics, including a few region-specific questions: 
- A changing society (migration in the UK; changing role of women; 
children; family and young people); 
- UK today. A profile (population; nations and regions of the UK, religion; 
customs and traditions); 
- How the United Kingdom is governed (British Constitution, the UK in 
Europe and the world); 
- Everyday needs (housing; services in and for the home; money and credit; 
health; education; leisure; travel and transport); 
- Employment (looking for work; equal rights and discrimination; at the 
workplace; working for yourself; childcare and children at work).18 
About three-quarters of the questions have to be answered correctly; however, the 
pass mark is handled flexibly. About 70 per cent of the applicants have passed the 
test during the first nine months after its introduction (ABNI 2007: 30). The 
administrative fee for taking the test is £34 (€43); the additional costs for the 
application have drastically risen from £260 (€330) to £655 (€820).19
The UK Government provides comprehensive assistance for applicants. Besides 
the UK Home Office website, which offers detailed information on citizenship and 
the application procedure (including a large section of FAQs), a telephone help line 
for personal assistance as well as a specific website on the Life in the UK test has 
been set up. The latter website contains detailed, practical and easily accessible 
information about the testing procedure, ranging from the selection of the test 
centre and where to order the preparation material to the use of a computer mouse. 
At the Life in the UK test venue applicants can ask for technical assistance. 
The core preparation tool for the test is the handbook Life in the United Kingdom. 
A Journey to Citizenship. It is based on the recommendations of the Life in the 
United Kingdom Advisory Group (established in September 2002), commissioned 
by the government “to look at the content, conduct and implementation of 
 
18 The handbook contains four further chapters which applicants are not tested on: The making of the 
United Kingdom (History, Chapter 1); Knowing the law (Chapter 7); Sources of help and 
information (Chapter 8); Building better communities (Chapter 9).  
19 £80 (€100) is refunded if the application is unsuccessful.  
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programmes of study for potential citizens” (ABNI 2006: 4). It was originally 
published in December 2004; a revised version, which is more user-friendly and 
accessible to learners of lower English proficiency (around ESOL Level Three), 
was released in March 2007.20 To make the preparation for the test more effective, 
the revised handbook also contains a glossary and advice on key areas to 
concentrate on, which help to check whether the learner has understood the content 
of each section. It can be purchased online or in bookstores for £10 (Home Office 
2004). 
Why did the UK Government rethink its citizenship policy and amend the 
naturalisation requirements so deliberately? In the aftermath of the northern 
English riots in 2001 integration, social cohesion and citizenship issues received a 
great deal of public and political attention. The rising debate was dominated by 
critical voices that accused the long-standing British multicultural policy of being 
too indifferent, too laissez-faire. Although the positive attitude towards cultural 
pluralism and diversity was not fundamentally questioned, British integration 
policy shifted rapidly towards greater inclusiveness and emphasis on the 
connecting bond of a commonly used language, shared key values and the sense of 
belonging to the British community. This civic integration policy, on the one hand, 
urged the state to play a more active role in supporting immigrants and, on the 
other, called upon immigrants to make greater efforts to participate in society, live 
up to their civil responsibilities and contribute to social cohesion. Within the 
framework of this policy change, naturalisation received more attention as a means 
to “strengthen active participation in the democratic process and a sense of 
belonging to a wider [British] community” (Home Office 2001: 29). This is also 
reflected in the official mandate of the Life in the UK Advisory Group to develop 
new approaches “to raise the status of becoming a British citizen and to offer more 
help to that end” (Home Office 2003: 3). 
The Advisory Group presented two main recommendations to enhance the 
significance of British citizenship. First, the mandatory oath of allegiance should 
be taken at a public citizenship ceremony to underscore that becoming a citizen is 
not an ordinary bureaucratic act, but a meaningful life event. Second, would-be 
citizens should be required to pass the citizenship test Life in the UK and, by doing 
so, demonstrate their language skills and knowledge of the UK. This is justified as 
follows: “The more we all know about each other, the less likely are serious 
problems to arise and the more we can help each other. The new requirements are 
to be seen not as a new hurdle but as a much needed entitlement.” (Home Office 
2003: 8). The citizenship test contributes – on a symbolic level – to emphasising 
the significance of becoming a British citizen as “citizenship is more esteemed and 
valued when it is earned, not given” (Home Office 2003: 3–4). On a practical level, 
the test aims to ensure that future citizens speak English sufficiently21 and display a 
 
20 Since the introduction of the revised handbook, the pass rate has further increased to almost 80 per 
cent (ABNI 2007: 30). 
21 The previous language requirements have been described as “undefined …, often perfunctory and 
sometimes uselessly minimal” (Home Office 2003: 4). 
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basic knowledge of life in the UK – two requirements regarded as decisive 
conditions for active participation in public life and successful integration in 
general. Integration is conceptualised in a comprehensive sense, encompassing not 
only structural, social and cultural dimensions but also identificational aspects such 
as feelings of belonging and loyalty to the political community. Hence, in the long 
run, effective integration contributes to strengthening social cohesion and 
promoting good race relations and community cohesion.  
2.4 Similar content, different functions – a snapshot comparison 
The following comparison between the citizenship test in the UK and the one used 
in the Netherlands highlights selected aspects of the naturalisation procedures in 
both countries. This comparative approach supports the starting-point hypothesis 
that citizenship tests may appear to be very similar political instruments, but fulfil 
entirely different functions depending on the national context. 
At first glance, the Life in the UK test and the Dutch “societal orientation” test (or 
since April 2007 the “central” integration examination) bear strong resemblances: 
the questions cover similar topics ranging from politics (e.g. government, 
constitution) to employment and other everyday life issues (e.g. transport, 
housing). The official reason for the introduction of these language and citizenship 
tests – ensuring would-be citizens’ language skills and knowledge of their new 
home country – are partly congruent, and the administrative naturalisation fees are 
relatively high in both countries, especially in the UK. Beyond these similarities, 
however, the differences between the Dutch and the British understanding of 
naturalisation are striking, and the functions of the citizenship tests in both 
countries could hardly diverge more. The fundamental differences lie in the 
answers to two interrelated questions:  
(a) Is naturalisation being promoted by the state as a desirable step or are 
immigrants discouraged from becoming new citizens? 
(b) Is naturalisation regarded as the reward for a successful integration process 
or “rather as a good beginning” (UK Advisory Group) to this process? 
(a) In the UK, immigrants are strongly encouraged by the government to take up 
British citizenship. The new Dutch naturalisation policy, however, bears a rather 
sceptical and deterring undertone. This is reflected in the general political and 
societal framework in which the respective amendments are embedded, as well as 
in the practical implementation of the citizenship testing schemes and the 
assistance structure provided by the government.  
In both countries, the traditionally multicultural policy has undergone deliberate 
changes and has recently been replaced by a civic integration approach. The 
conservative, centre-right government in the Netherlands has been following a 
more restrictive immigration and integration policy, which partially conveys a 
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message of mistrust towards immigrants.22 The British Labour Government 
introduced proactive immigration provisions, less immigrant-sceptical than those in 
the Netherlands,23 and increased its efforts to foster integration and promote racial 
equality.24 The introduction of citizenship tests represents a political measure 
incorporated into these divergent, but internally consistent, readjustment processes 
in the national integration policies of both countries. It is not surprising that in the 
Netherlands the new naturalisation requirements have often been interpreted by 
immigrants as an additional deterrent – as the Dutch naturalisation statistics 
suggest. In contrast, empirical research indicates that in the British context similar 
testing procedures are generally not perceived to be an “unfair barrier to applying 
successfully for citizenship” (Levesley 2008: 36).25
In the UK various statements issued by government officials and other public 
opinion leaders have stressed that naturalisation is regarded as a desirable step and 
emphasised the importance of encouraging immigrants to apply for citizenship. 
The Home Office, for example, asked the Advisory Group to “recommend 
measures to encourage more of those long settled to apply for citizenship” 
(Levesley 2008: 31). In its recently published report, the Advisory Group goes one 
step further: “We believe … that those permanently resident in this 
country … have a civic obligation not merely to act as citizens as should we all, but 
also that they should apply to become naturalised citizens, unless there are good 
reasons to the contrary … . There can be no compulsion, but those eligible should 
be encouraged and supported to take up British citizenship” (Levesley 2008: 10). 
Such explicit statements on encouraging immigrants to apply for citizenship are 
lacking in the Netherlands. 
Such political statements can have an important, but usually rather symbolic, 
impact on the public perception of citizenship and immigrants’ willingness to 
become new citizens – for effective policy-making they must, however, be 
accompanied by tangible political measures. A look at the assistance offered to 
would-be citizens in preparing for the test and the application procedure in general 
is very insightful. Whereas the UK Government has established a broad range of 
practical tools to support the applicant in preparing for the citizenship test, the 
 
22 The Netherlands Government recently tightened immigration provisions: persons seeking to 
immigrate within the legal framework of family reunification are required to pass a language test 
and “Dutch culture” examination prior to entering the country. If they fail, no visa will be granted. 
23 For example, the UK Government permitted labour migrants from the new EU accession states to 
access the British labour market immediately after the EU enlargement in May 2004 – a political 
step which otherwise only Ireland and Sweden made. Currently the government is planning to 
implement a more selective points system to steer immigration – similar to the one in place in 
Canada. 
24 See, for example, the Macpherson Report (1999) on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, which led to 
the development and implementation of various sustainable programmes (e.g. race equality 
schemes and policies). 
25 Tom Levesley (EdComs) analysed “experiences and perceptions” regarding British citizenship and 
the naturalisation procedures through expert interviews with stakeholders and in-depth interviews 
with eighty-one (prospective) citizens (Levesley 2008). 
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Netherlands Government does not provide any assistance beyond basic information 
on the naturalisation procedure and requirements. 
Numerous procedural details also indicate that the UK Government wants 
immigrants to become British citizens whereas the Netherlands Government 
established naturalisation provisions shaped by an immigrant-sceptical tone, which 
rather build new deterrent barriers in the access to citizenship. Some examples: 
immigrants in the UK can sit the citizenship test as often as they want until they 
pass it. In the Netherlands applicants who fail the test three times are not entitled to 
try again. On the Life in the UK website one can find, besides comprehensive 
information on the citizenship test, encouraging statements on the testing procedure 
by people who have taken the test, such as “I’ve never used a computer before, but 
found it quite easy” or “The test wasn’t as hard to use or as stressful as I expected”. 
It is also noteworthy how the UK Home Office explains on its website why 
questions on British history have not been incorporated into the Life in the UK test 
after its latest review: “it would be unfair for migrants to have to answer questions 
that many British people would have difficulties with”. These details also mirror 
the envisaged character of the British test: demanding, but fair and accessible. 
Whereas in the UK the language requirements are handled flexibly, the 
Netherlands has significantly increased the required level of language proficiency 
while simultaneously introducing citizenship tests – a political step “geared 
towards failing as many applicants as possible” (Joppke 2007: 14). As a 
consequence of the tightened provisions about half the applicants failed the test in 
2003, the year of its introduction (Van Oers et al. 2006: 392), and the number of 
applicants dropped even more drastically by two-thirds. 
(b) The second fundamental difference between the British and Dutch 
naturalisation policies is related to the function of naturalisation within the 
integration process. In the Dutch context, citizenship tests are officially designed to 
ensure that the applicant is integrated. “Naturalisation has come to be regarded as 
crowning the successful process of integration” (Thränhardt 2006: 13). The Dutch 
immigration minister’s statement on citizenship being the “first prize” (Rita 
Verdonk; quoted in Kuper 2006) illustrates this notion of naturalisation as the final 
step in the integration process (Van Oers 2008: 45). Although the UK Advisory 
Group’s recommendation that “citizenship should be earned, not given” seems to 
point to a similar “first prize” understanding of citizenship, the British 
conceptualisation of the relation between naturalisation and integration is in strong 
contrast to that in the Netherlands. In the UK, obtaining citizenship is regarded as 
an integration tool. Policy-makers have explicitly stressed that “becoming 
naturalised should not be seen as the end of a process but rather as a good 
beginning” (Home Office 2003: 13). The UK Advisory Group recommended that 
every applicant should be given a “local information pack” during the 
naturalisation ceremony as a memento that “will encourage new citizens to pursue 
new studies for occupational and self-improvement. Such studies … should not end 
with the formal requirements for naturalisation” (Home Office 2003: 31). 
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3. Can citizenship tests fulfil their official purpose?  
Given that the core functions of citizenship tests mainly derive from the political 
framework in which they are embedded, a gap seems to emerge between the 
complex, officially ascribed purposes and the actual impact of these tests. This gap 
occurs in all national contexts. 
Citizenship tests in the United States and Canada are designed to strengthen the 
prospective citizens’ commitment and loyalty to their new country. Is it realistic to 
expect that this objective can be achieved through a language and civic test? And if 
not, how can citizenship tests contribute to this objective? Since commitment and 
allegiance cannot be checked directly, the assumed preconditions for these 
complex objectives, i.e. the applicant’s knowledge and understanding of history, 
society and political system, will be tested instead. The more accurately the test 
evaluates an applicant’s meaningful understanding, the more likely it is that the 
new citizen has acquired the necessary prerequisites to actively participate in the 
community. Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated and elaborate test design 
cannot guarantee that the acquired knowledge will lead to any form of participation 
in society. A deeper understanding and meaningful knowledge of the society in 
question might enable and encourage new citizens to become committed and active 
members of it, but commitment and loyalty remain a matter of individual choice. 
Here the impact of citizenship tests reaches its boundaries, and the gap between the 
possible impact of this political tool and its official intended purpose becomes 
apparent. 
Do citizenship tests constitute a suitable tool to check the applicant’s level of 
integration, as they are supposed to do in the Dutch context? The assessment of 
integration is a challenging task that requires a clear definition of integration and 
specific, objective criteria. The criteria applied within the framework of the Dutch 
naturalisation procedure are language proficiency and knowledge of the political 
system, constitutional order and everyday life issues of the society. The criterion of 
language skills is commonly accepted as one valid indicator of integration 
(although the required level of proficiency is disputable); the format and content of 
the citizenship test, however, have been met with criticism (see Bauböck 2006; 
Van Oers et al. 2006; Joppke 2007). The test is based on the assumption that 
someone who is integrated must be able to answer these questions – without 
preparation, but solely by having lived several years in the Netherlands. Some test 
items appear very specific26 or “have nothing to do with any basic knowledge 
necessary for living in the Netherlands or the basic values reflected in the 
constitutional order of the country” (De Groot 2006: 23).27 A more fundamental 
concern, however, is whether the level of integration can be assessed at all through 
 
26 For example, the question: “How much money are you allowed to receive per month tax-free for 
work as a volunteer?”  
27 The applicant is shown a picture of a man in a post office and asked: “What does this man need at 
the post office? A passport, an ID card or a bank card?”; or the applicant is played a voice shouting 
“Bananas, bananas for sale”, followed by the questions: “Where are you? Supermarket, flower shop 
or market place?” 
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such a ready-to-go instrument. Applicants who reject Dutch constitutional values 
and the rule of law (and are thus not “sufficiently integrated”) might pass the test, 
whereas those applicants who are not familiar with certain activities (e.g. opening a 
bank account, grocery shopping, working as a volunteer), but fully acknowledge 
the constitutional values, may fail it. Questions on the political system tend to 
challenge less-educated applicants who might also be well integrated. Hence there 
seems to be a “danger that difficult tests will make it harder for immigrants without 
secondary or university education to become citizens” (Bauböck 2006: 5). These 
shortcomings indicate that the Dutch citizenship test cannot be considered a proper 
tool to single out applicants who are not sufficiently integrated – but rather a 
contribution to creating new inequality in terms of the immigrants’ level of formal 
education (Van Oers 2008: 54, 56–57). 
In the UK, citizenship courses were introduced to foster applicants’ and future 
citizens’ integration and sense of belonging to a broader British community as well 
as to generally enhance the significance of British citizenship. To prepare for the 
Life in the UK examination applicants usually study the official handbook that 
contains all test-relevant topics. The information presented in this book is 
undoubtedly useful and can contribute to the immigrant’s understanding of British 
society and, as a consequence, foster integration – and in the long run successful 
integration is a positive catalyst for feelings of commitment and a sense of 
belonging. This “educational and empowering function” is deemed as “vital for 
inclusion and participation in the new country”, as Kiwan pointed out in the IJMS 
10 (1) (Kiwan 2008: 71). It is, however, also feasible that the information acquired 
for the test will have no further impact on integration – applicants could simply 
read the handbook, learn the information by heart and reproduce this information 
by ticking the correct boxes of the multiple-choice test. 
The objective of enhancing the status of becoming a British citizen by setting up 
knowledge requirements is of an entirely different quality to all other objectives 
mentioned previously: It does not directly refer to an intended impact on the 
applicant, but to the (symbolic) meaning of naturalisation and citizenship itself. 
The UK Government has achieved this goal to some extent. By making the 
acquisition of citizenship more demanding (in conjunction with introducing 
mandatory naturalisation ceremonies), the significance of becoming a British 
citizen has increased – at least in an abstract, symbolic sense. Whether the 
individual applicant values the newly acquired citizenship more than before the 
introduction of these tests remains an open question. The principle of “what is 
earned is more esteemed than what is given” might sound reasonable and may be 
true, but there is no guarantee of a generally greater appreciation of citizenship.  
4. Instead of a conclusion: citizenship tests per se are abstract but 
potentially forceful tools 
The immediate impact of citizenship tests appears weak and overrated in the 
political discourse. Their officially ascribed function can hardly be fulfilled – at 
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least not directly. Nevertheless, these naturalisation testing procedures can play a 
forceful role within the integration process. By preparing for the test applicants 
acquire relevant information about the society of their new country. This can 
initiate ongoing interest in the country’s political system, history and society which 
might lead to further learning processes, stimulate commitment and engagement in 
the community and contribute to the development of feelings of belonging and 
loyalty. This is a long process that cannot be imposed upon the individual and can 
only be promoted indirectly. Citizenship tests have the potential to be one piece in 
this complex puzzle. Their introduction can have a positive, encouraging impact – 
provided that they are accompanied by other integration support measures and 
embedded in a political and societal climate of inclusiveness, openness and equal 
opportunities.  
If the adoption of such tests within the framework of the naturalisation procedure – 
intentionally or not – generally discourages immigrants from applying for 
citizenship and is perceived as a deterrent or even discriminatory instrument, their 
potential to have a positive impact on the integration process is at risk. Instead of 
commitment and loyalty, a sense of non-belonging and exclusion among 
immigrants may be promoted. Instead of strengthening integration, the introduction 
of such test features could incite immigrants to withdraw from the host society and 
search for recognition and emotional support in their own ethnic communities. In 
this sense, citizenship tests per se constitute only an abstract political tool. In a 
specific political framework, however, they obtain their specific functions and thus 
turn into a meaningful and often forceful element of the national integration 
policies – either as an encouraging invitation or as a deterring hurdle. 
References 
ABNI. 2006. Progress Towards Integration. 
2005/6 Annual Report of the Advisory 
Board on Naturalisation and Integration. 
London: Advisory Board on Naturalisation 
and Integration. 
––––. 2007. Second Annual Report of the 
Advisory Board on Naturalisation and 
Integration. London: Advisory Board on 
Naturalisation and Integration 
BAUBÖCK, R. 2006. “Who are the citizens of 
Europe?” http://eurozine.com/pdf/2006-12-
23-baubock-en.pdf 
BLOEMRAAD, I. 2006. “Becoming a citizen in 
the United States and Canada: structured 
mobilization and immigrant political 
incorporation”. Social Forces 85 (2): 667–
95. 
BRUBAKER, R. 1992. Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press.  
––––. 2001. “The return of assimilation? 
Changing perspectives on immigration and 
its sequels in France, Germany, and the 
United States”. Ethnic and Racial Studies 
24 (4): 531–48. 
CASTLES, S. 1995. “How nation-states 
respond to immigration and ethnic 
diversity”. New Community 21 (3): 293–
308.  
260 Mario Peucker 
 
CERD. 2008. Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. Germany (73rd session, 28 
July–15 August 2008). 
DE GROOT, G.-R. 2006. “Reflections on 
integration and access to 
nationality/citizenship through 
naturalisation. a comparative perspective”. 
In: S. Carrera, ed., The Nexus Between 
Immigration, Integration and Citizenship in 
the EU (collected papers presented at the 
CHALLENGE seminar held in Brussels on 
25 January 2006): 21–27. 
GREENFELD, L. 1999. “Is nation unavoidable? 
Is nation unavoidable today?” In: H. P. 
Kriesi et al., eds., Nation and National 
Identity, 37–54. Chur, Switzerland: 
Rüegger. 
HECKMANN, F. and SCHNAPPER, D. 2003a. 
The Integration of Immigrants in European 
Societies. National Differences and Trends 
of Convergence. Stuttgart, Germany: 
Lucius & Lucius.  
––––. 2003b. “Conclusion”. In: Heckmann 
and Schnapper, eds., op. cit. 
HOME OFFICE. 2001. Secure Borders, Safe 
Haven. Integration with Diversity in 
Modern Britain (presented to Parliament in 
February 2002). London: TSO. 
––––. 2003. The New and the Old. Report of 
the Life in the United Kingdom Advisory 
Group. London: TSO. 
––––. 2004. Life in the United Kingdom: A 
Journey to Citizenship. 1st edn. Published 
on behalf of the Life in the UK Advisory 
Group. London: TSO. 2nd rev. edn. 2007. 
http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk/ 
JOPPKE, C. 2007. “Comparative citizenship: a 
restrictive turn to Europe?” Paper presented 
at the international conference 
“Demography and Human Rights” in 
Ramat Gan (Israel) on 14 January 2007 
www.rg-
law.ac.il/workshops/2007/articles/joppke.p
df 
JOPPKE, C. and MORAWSKA, E. 2003. Towards 
Assimilation and Citizenship. Immigrants 
in Liberal Nation-States. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
KIWAN, D. 2008. “A journey to citizenship in 
the United Kingdom”. International 
Journal on Multicultural Societies 10 (1): 
60–75. 
KOOPMANS, R., STATHAM, P., GIUGNI, M. and 
PASSY, F. 2005. Contested Citizenship: 
Immigration and Cultural Diversity in 
Europe. Minneapolis/London: University 
of Minnesota Press. 
KUPER, S. 2006. “Gone Dutch”. Financial 
Times 26 August. 
LEVESLEY, T. 2008. British Citizenship: 
Experiences and Perceptions. An EdComs 
report for the Lord Goldsmith Review 
secretariat. London: EdComs. 
PWGSC. 2006. A Look at Canada. Gatineau, 
Quebec: Public Works and Government 
Services Canada.  
THRÄNHARDT, D. 2006. Multiple Citizenship 
and Naturalization: An Evaluation of 
German and Dutch Policies. University of 
Münster, Germany. http://egora.uni-
muenster.de/pol/personen/thraenhardt/bind
ata/19.12.2006_Multiple_Citizenship_and_
Naturalization.pdf 
USCIS. 2007a. Press release 17 April. 
Washington DC: U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. 
www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/Archives
Natz041707.pdf 
––––. 2007b. Press release 22 January. 
Washington DC: U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services. 
www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/natztestfs
.pdf 
VAN OERS, R. 2008. “From liberal to 
restrictive citizenship policies: the case of 
the Netherlands”. International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies 10 (1): 40–59. 
VAN OERS, R., DE HART, B. and 
GROENENDIJK, K. 2006. “Netherlands”. In: 
R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk 
and H. Waldrauch, eds., Acquisition and 
Loss of Nationality (Vol. 2). Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press. 
WRIGHT, S. 2008. “Citizenship tests in 
Europe – Editorial Introduction”. 
International Journal on Multicultural 
Societies 10 (1): 1–9. 
Citizenship Tests in the US, Canada, Netherlands and UK 261
 
ZAPPALÀ, G. and CASTLES, S. 2000. 
“Citizenship and immigration in Australia”. 
In: T. A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer, 
eds., From Migrants to Citizens: 
Membership in a Changing World, 32–81. 
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
About the author 
Mario Peucker works as a researcher at the European Forum for Migration Studies, 
a research institute at the University of Bamberg (Germany). Since 2005 he has 
been project coordinator of the German National Focal Point within the European 
Information Network RAXEN (Racism and Xenophobia Information Network; 
coordinated by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights); and since 
2004 a member of the European Network of Excellence International Immigration, 
Integration and Social Cohesions in Europe (IMISCOE). His publications and main 
fields of research are ethnic discrimination, exclusion and integration processes and 
policies in Europe. He holds a university degree in educational sciences, sociology 
and psychology. E-mail: mario.peucker@uni-bamberg.de 
 
OPEN FORUM 
Cultural Perspectives on Digital Inclusion 
MARCELO EL KHOURI BUZATO 
State University of Campinas 
This paper addresses the concept of digital inclusion as put forward 
by multiculturalism in contrast with alternative views of inclusion 
informed by hybridity theory, with a view to achieving a theoretical 
engagement between digital inclusion theory and the homogenisation-
proliferation of difference dialectics that characterises globalisation. 
Whereas more conservative, essentialist forms of multiculturalism 
generate a political strategy that operates on a conception of culture 
that contemporary cultural theory itself disavows, certain views of 
hybridity are hardly compatible with the conventional political 
connotations of inclusion. This incommensurability between cultural 
theory and cultural politics calls for a reassessment of the very notion 
of inclusion, and provides a new set of questions regarding the role of 
new information and communication technologies in relation to 
cultural difference and social inequalities. 
D igital inclusion is a fairly recent term for the fairly traditional notion that certain media and/or technologies (from writing to electricity, from railways 
to the internet, and so on) can be applied purposefully and effectively to social 
development. The qualifier “digital” has come into play in this traditional issue to 
foreground the fact that, in recent years, a broad range of senses of development 
(economic growth, democratic governance, better educational standards, and so on) 
have become associated with the new information and communication technologies 
(ICT). ICT are thus viewed as “keys for growth, jobs, investment and innovation”, 
and it is believed that “a stronger ICT sector together with a wider and efficient use 
of ICT throughout all sectors of the economy is a clear opportunity to foster 
competitiveness, sustainable development and social inclusiveness” (Reding 2006: 
2). As to how institutions and governments think that ICT can be applied to social 
development, we might take for example the US-based Institute for the Study of 
Digital Inclusion’s mission statement: “to promote the use of effective and 
affordable technology among all communities with the goal of enhancing 
individual lives, globally” (ISDI 2002).  
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Although these views on digital inclusion are not unproblematic, they represent a 
considerable advance in relation to previous reductionist frames of analysis based 
on the notion of a digital divide, viewed by many an analyst as the revival of the 
now discredited Great Literacy Divide put forward by Western historians and 
psychologists in the 1960s. By turning to concepts such as sociotechnical networks 
and community informatics on the one hand, and to contemporary European 
sociological debate on social inclusion (Stewart 2000) on the other, authors such as 
Mark Warschauer (2003) have disturbed the digital divide mantra, and put forward 
a notion of digital inclusion as a process situated at the intersection between ICT – 
viewed as a technical infrastructure that mediates access to socially relevant 
knowledge, and social inclusion – viewed as a political objective towards which 
such infrastructure should be geared.  
In binary, reductionist notions of (digital/social) inclusion, life opportunities is the 
key term, often applied more emphatically to economic categories, while factors 
such as cultural identity and cultural practice are ruled out. Those deemed 
“included” or “excluded” in such analyses are sometimes seen as inhabiting 
watertight spaces supposedly maintained by pre-existing, natural forces of history, 
biology, geographical location or “the market”, forces which, allegedly, can only 
be overcome by means of an increase in income and consumption.  
However, dichotomic, reductionist models of digital inclusion (those that divide the 
diverse population of the world between haves and have-nots, connected and 
disconnected, and so on), have been seriously questioned by recent works. 
Warschauer (2003), for example, takes on Stewart’s (2000, 9) notion of social 
inclusion as “a matter not only of an adequate share in resources but equally of 
participation in the determination of both individual and collective life chances”. 
This particular way of conceiving inclusion is reflected in the author’s findings 
which point to a series of gate-keeping mechanisms based on gender, age, 
ethnicity, physical aptitude, educational background and so on.  
Oriented by a similar perspective in their survey of ICT access in Rio de Janeiro’s 
favelas (shanty towns), Sorj and Guedes (2005) show that digital exclusion is 
manifest in cultural factors that lead to differentiated forms of access. The authors 
found out, for example, that Afro-Brazilian males living in favelas have better 
opportunities of access to the internet and to digital literacies at work than their 
wives and daughters – even when more educated – because women in those 
communities are most often employed in domestic and janitorial services for which 
access to ICT is considered pointless. 
Along with gender and age, ethnicity and national origin are also frequently cited 
as independent stratifiers of ICT access, a fact often referred to as a “cultural 
problem” in official discourses. In order to clarify such misconception, Rojas et al. 
(2004) carried out a study in Austin (United States) to investigate the belief that 
Hispanic immigrants had low techno-disposition. By interviewing immigrants from 
different social classes and generations living in the region, the authors found out 
264 Marcelo El Khouri Buzato
 
                                                     
that the techno-dispositions varied considerably on an individual basis, and that 
differences in access were connected to discrepancies in the various forms of 
capital, in the Bourdieuan sense,1 held by their subjects. One of the most significant 
findings in that study was that, contrary to popular belief, access to ICT did not 
necessarily change people’s cultural capital, but, on the contrary, significantly 
higher levels of cultural capital – including knowledge of the English language – 
triggered the need for information that favoured a positive disposition towards ICT.  
Some interesting qualitative studies have also been carried out recently that attempt 
to investigate the effects and conditions of ICT access across micro-contexts. In a 
year-long study carried out in Melbourne (Australia), for example, Snyder et al. 
(2002) investigated computer-mediated literacy practices of children in four 
disadvantaged families from different cultural backgrounds that had gained access 
to subsidised computers and internet connections at home. The authors wished to 
find out if and how the new (digital) literacies in those families affected (positively 
or negatively) the children’s performance at school. After a year of periodic visits 
to the families’ homes, observations of school practices, and interviews with the 
children’s teachers and parents, the authors concluded that school success or failure 
was not directly correlated with ICT access at home, but with the ways in which 
the families’ norms, values and lifestyles incorporated literacy practices, both 
digital and traditional, which were (in)compatible with established schooling 
principles and norms. 
I believe that these and similar studies point to the need for a theory of digital 
inclusion to be grounded on critical views of the socio-cultural dynamics taking 
place in late modernity, and, consequently of what should be meant by “inclusion” 
in a broader sense. Such an understanding is however far from consensual, not only 
because it could be based on contradictory theoretical models, but also because the 
very object that these theories and ideologies seek to describe – society, that is – is 
increasingly characterised by a new (dis)order, crushed between the simultaneously 
culturally homogenising and socially excluding pressures of transnational 
capitalism, and the ever-increasing flows of people, cultural objects, commodities 
and technologies that force us to realise that “each of us belongs not to one but to 
several ethical communities, whose demands are often conflicting” (Gray 2000: 
24). 
1 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1986) uses the word “capital” to designate any kind of resource, 
material and/or symbolic, that allows its owner to appropriate the “profits” derived from participation 
in a certain social arena. “Cultural capital”, in this sense, refers to familiarity with cultural codes, 
including the linguistic code, and with certain cultural dispositions of the upper classes. “Social 
capital”, on the other hand, describes the network of social relationships maintained by individuals, 
including mutual recognition with other social agents, which provides one with “credit”, in the 
various senses of the word, within a community. 
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1. Extending the metaphors 
In order to synthesise the findings of his research and to consolidate his model of 
digital inclusion, Warschauer (2003) employs the metaphor of a “virtual circle” 
where pre-existing social resources contribute to an effective use of ICT to access, 
adapt and create knowledge which, in turn, will help to strengthen and amplify the 
pre-existing community resources. The circle metaphor, however, is also fairly 
recurrent in analyses of digital exclusion, i.e. the process by which those who do 
not own or do not know how to use ICT are supposedly kept from participating in 
the so-called information society. For example, Martins (2006), a researcher in 
charge of advising the Brazilian Government on the adoption of technical standards 
regarding the digital television (DTV) switchover, warns policy-makers about a 
potential new turn in the “vicious circle” of technological innovation to be caused 
by the failure of certain groups of Brazilians to comply with the new consumption 
demand and to participate in the new meaning-making and knowledge-sharing 
practices related to DTV.  
The circle metaphor can, thus, inform substantially different views of inclusion. It 
can serve the notion that the included are consumers, and that inclusion and 
exclusion are statuses determined chiefly by people’s purchasing power and ability 
to keep up with the mainstream. It can also help to portray the included as active 
users2 of technology whose economic status is but one of the several social and 
cultural factors intersecting in the inclusion/exclusion processes. Such contrast 
suggests that there is more to defining digital inclusion than locating it at the 
intersection between social inequities and access to technology. In other words, 
defining digital inclusion in terms of social inclusion is not simply stating the 
obvious because the very notion of society beneath social inclusion can be 
controversial. Thus, even though the virtuous/vicious circle model is an advance in 
relation to the digital divide framework, a new advance is necessary in the sense of 
problematising the notions of society and social inclusion.  
One way to start such problematisation is to extend the circle metaphor in 
directions not usually explored in the literature. For example, along with the idea of 
iteration that most authors seek to utilise, the circle metaphor also implies 
delimitation (to a trajectory), that is, it translates into an understanding of society as 
a set of predetermined cultural, social, economic, semiotic, occupational, cognitive, 
etc. trajectories in which individuals and groups are regularly inserted, or from 
which they can periodically be ejected. It also entails the assumption that the 
system reproduces itself autonomously, and that it cannot be reconfigured, stopped, 
or derailed. Such a conception of society and social processes is hardly compatible 
with a view of inclusion as transformation and reconfiguration which is, in the end, 
what one expects ICT to promote in a world marked by growing injustice and 
exclusion. 
2 I wish to acknowledge Ilana Snyder for this distinction between “users” and “consumers”.  
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Apart from extending the meanings of usual metaphors in order to shed light on the 
assumptions behind them, I also seek to contribute to the problematisation of 
digital inclusion by surveying the controversies between two overlapping 
constructs that support contemporary views of inclusion: multiculturalism and 
hybridity. In doing so, I do not intend to construct any prescriptive framework, but 
only to probe further into the usefulness of such notions as inclusion and exclusion 
for a critical and transformative theory of ICT in relation to the contemporary 
socio-cultural dilemmas. First, however, it is necessary that I define more precisely 
what “culture” and “multicultural” should mean to the reader who ventures beyond 
this point.  
2. Culture as a dynamic process  
Following Pennycook (1995: 47), I want to avoid both “the Marxist view that 
reduces culture to a reflection of socioeconomic relations” and “the liberal pluralist 
view … that takes cultures to be sets of stable beliefs, values and behaviour” so as 
to adopt “a sense of culture as a process by which people make sense of their lives, 
a process always involved in struggles over meaning and representation”. To a 
certain extent, such a view of culture renders the term “multiculturalism” either 
redundant or meaningless. First because, strictly speaking, all societies and/or 
cultures are multicultural, that is, whatever the scale or trait of stratification taken 
(nation, village, hemisphere, gender, age, ethnicity, first language, etc.), a culture 
will always remain heterogeneous from the point of view of another scale or trait. 
Second, and more important, because as contemporary cultural theory has it, 
cultural identities are not essences preconditioned or definitely fixed by some 
natural objective factor, but are actively produced and/or performed by means of 
representations of Self and Other within power structures.  
Multiculturalism, therefore, is addressed here chiefly as a political doctrine. It 
refers to certain strategies and worldviews adopted by a few liberal Western states 
in order to handle the tensions, conflicts and social inequities related primarily, but 
not exclusively, to immigration, decolonisation and diasporic movements in 
national societies, or in communitarian multinational arrangements (Hall 2003). It 
is obviously within the interest field of a theory of digital inclusion not only to 
observe how this political vision translates into practical changes in the access 
rates, gate-keeping mechanisms, and appropriation processes pointed out by 
Warschauer (2003), Rojas et al. (2004) and Snyder et al. (2002), but it is perhaps 
just as important to propose alternatives to alleged inadequacies of certain 
multiculturalist discourses to handle the dynamics of culture and identity in the 
contemporary world.  
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3. Liberal multiculturalism: inclusion as classification and 
crystallisation of difference 
Broadly speaking, multiculturalism, seen as a set of political processes and 
strategies, attempts to understand and minimise social inequalities by relating them 
to cultural differences that are historically connected to the unequal distribution of 
wealth and political power in societies (bearing in mind that all societies are in 
principle culturally heterogeneous). In different countries, and diverse historical 
settings, however, multiculturalism may take on quite different meanings, or, as 
Hall (2003: 52) puts it, there are not only different multicultural societies, but also 
different multiculturalisms, founded on different political and philosophical 
grounds, and on different interpretations of the concept, as it gets assimilated into 
various discursive settings.  
It can be said that, even though all forms of multiculturalism are in principle 
concerned with the recognition of heterogeneity, the attitude towards such 
heterogeneity varies significantly across contexts. In its most conservative, 
anachronistic variety, multiculturalism has often taken the form of cultural 
repression or coercive assimilation of cultural minorities (from disabled people to 
immigrants to indigenous peoples) in favour of a supposedly homogeneous 
collective identity on which a cohesive, stable social arrangement, such as the 
modern nation-state, could be grounded. The presupposition of such idealised, but 
unavailable, homogeneity in the formation of nation-states under the sign of ethno-
nationalism has, in many cases, turned into forms of apartheid and/or ethnic 
cleansing (Habermas, 2002).  
As opposed to such conservative versions, multiculturalism can also take on critical 
or revolutionary forms, that is, it can be powerfully articulated with social 
movements of resistance and/or insurgence against power/oppression and privilege 
hierarchies based on cultural difference. To say so, however, is not necessarily to 
associate critical multiculturalism with orthodox left-wing political thinking, as 
many a leftist thinker will criticise multiculturalism on the grounds that, in 
privileging culture and identity, it disregards economic and material matters (Hall 
2003: 53–4). 
Apparently detached from an overt political stance – although necessarily 
meaningful politically – are other contemporary versions of multiculturalism noted 
by social critiques. Gómez-Peña (2000: 12), for example, points to a new 
“benevolent form of multiculturalism” associated with the mercantilisation of 
cultural difference that “artificially softens the otherwise sharp edges of cultural 
difference, fetishising them in such a way as to render them desirable”. This form 
of corporate multiculturalism, adopted, according to the author, by the 
transnational corporations and global media networks, is, in Gómez-Peña’s words, 
“devoid of ‘real’ people of color, true artists, outcasts, and revolutionaries. The 
very diversity it claims to celebrate merely performs the passive roles of glossy 
images and exotic background, played out by nameless backup actors and 
dancers”. Fish (1997: 378), on the other hand, puts forward the notion of “boutique 
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multiculturalism” to describe an emerging attitude of superficial respect for and 
even celebration of cultures other than one’s own, an attitude, however, that “will 
always stop short of approving other cultures at a point where some value at those 
cultures’ centre generates an act that offends against the canons of civilized 
decency”. 
Multiculturalism is, in short, itself a politically disputed notion far from 
representing a unified doctrine. To make matters even more complex, 
multiculturalism is dynamically connected to the several reconfigurations of power 
and political relations brought about by contemporary social phenomena, from 
post-colonialism to civil rights movements to globalisation. To reconcile such 
diverse interpretations of multiculturalism is probably beyond the scope of this 
paper. I therefore focus on a specific form of multiculturalism which provides the 
basis for the notion of digital inclusion as an intersection between ICT and social 
inclusion: liberal multiculturalism.  
Liberal multiculturalism may be defined as a political doctrine, associated with 
liberal ideology, which recognises the cultural heterogeneity of national societies 
and seeks to promote a peaceful and productive relation between different cultural 
groups. To do so, it prescribes a universal individual citizenship bound to a defined 
territory and promoted by a culturally neutral state that is supposed to equalise life 
chances for all (Hall 2003). From the practical point of view, liberal 
multiculturalism translates into policies that reinforce cultural (linguistic, religious, 
sexual, educational, etc.) rights and promote positive discrimination (or affirmative 
action) in education, health care, and employment for ethnic, gender or other so-
called minorities. While positive discrimination aims to remediate social inequities 
caused by a history of unfair economic exchanges among cultural groups, the 
recognition of difference, and of the right to be different, is seen as an effective 
strategy to avoid social conflict and to maintain a negotiated cohesion in the nation. 
Liberal multiculturalism is, however, paradoxical: it emphasises difference to 
promote equality, it recognises fragmentation for the sake of cohesion, and it 
weakens the idea of a homogenised nation while at the same time being promoted 
by the state in the name of national interests. To a certain extent, the 
multiculturalist paradox can be thought of as deriving from cultural essentialism, 
i.e. the belief that humans are born with supposedly natural and fixed 
characteristics traceable to their cultural origin. In practice, such essentialist views 
provide the basis for what Vale de Almeida (2002: 70) calls two basic de facto 
models of multiculturalisms: the nationalist/fundamentalist model, which 
prescribes “linguistic and religious unity, a distinction between national citizens 
and foreigners based on blood kinship, temporary immigration with expirable work 
visas, but no possibility of permanent residency, familial regrouping or 
citizenship”,3 and the essentialist model4 in which citizenship is shared among co-
3 “... unicidade linguística e religiosa, a distinção entre nacionais e estrangeiros com base no direito de 
sangue, a imigração temporária com visto de trabalho caducável mas sem possibilidade de 
residência, reagrupa-mento familiar ou exercício de cidadania”. 
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existing cultural groups, but cultural differences are accentuated to the point that 
cultural entrenchment and stigmatisation become bigger problems than the one that 
multiculturalist policy intended to solve.  
As in all paradoxes, essentialist multiculturalism can only be “solved” by the 
realisation that the premises it puts together (in this case, essentialised difference 
and social equity) are not all really true or cannot be true together. In other words, 
multiculturalism is only viable where difference is not opposed to equality, but to 
standardisation, and equality is not opposed to difference, but to inequity (Candau 
2002). According to Vale de Almeida, this “ideal multiculturalism” can only be 
achieved through some form of cosmopolitan citizenship5 which, in the end, would 
render the very notion of multiculturalism unnecessary.  
In the absence of such cosmopolitan citizenship, certain digital inclusion initiatives 
around the world are being inspired by essentialist multiculturalism, as for example 
when governments subsidise the purchase of computers and internet access by 
ethnic minorities or promote ICT-based cultural revitalisation. Although such 
initiatives can be seen as an advance in relation to previous 
assimilationist/segregationist stances, the fact remains that essentialist 
multiculturalism also poses serious threats and limitations to the social 
transformations that are expected to be achieved with the help of ICT. It appeals to 
tolerance for the different, but does not question the fixation of difference. It relies 
on the premise that differences are crystallised attributes and, by doing so, 
automatically creates yet another set of dichotomies between the normal and the 
different, the tolerant and the tolerated. It aims at inclusion by producing seclusion 
within a static, ethnocentrically defined cultural grid and thus avoids the real 
problem: the fact that everybody is already included in one big system of unfair 
exchanges of symbolic, economic and technical power, a circle set in motion across 
scales ranging from the classroom or the family to the nation or the global market.  
4. Multiculturalism and the new global (dis)order 
Apart from its own internal contradictions, liberal multiculturalism, as well as any 
other ideology of social inclusion, must respond to the growing tension between 
two antagonistic forces that characterise the contemporary socio-historical macro-
context: on the one hand, the homogenising/standardising force – which critical 
observers refer to as the McDonaldization of the world – driven by global 
capitalism, for which ICT play a role as significant as the one played by press 
4 Essentialism is the philosophical view that all entities of a class of objects share certain invariant 
characteristics that distinguish such class from others. Such a view has provided the basis for 
essentialist theories of culture and identity according to which gender and race, for example, are 
fixed traits or essences not subject to variations among individuals or over time.  
5 In contemporary socio-cultural analyses, “cosmopolitan citizenship” often refers to a new 
(proposed) understanding of citizenship as something neither bound to a national territory, nor to a 
unified cultural identity. The term can be found in the literature both with and without attachment 
to the idea of a world government. 
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technologies in the formation of nation-states (Anderson 1983); on the other, the 
proliferation of demands for recognition of difference and the right to be local that 
the very homogenising pressure of globalisation seems to continuously fuel. 
According to Hall (2003), the co-presence of these forces generates a social 
dynamics in which the vertical axis of cultural, economic and technological power 
is always compensated by lateral connections that have to be considered, by a 
worldview comprised of many different localities which the globalising forces have 
to deal with.  
Because of its paradoxical nature, liberal multiculturalism can be seen as serving 
both axes, but none of them fully. On the one hand, it proposes that the tension 
should be handled through the expansion of a classificatory worldview in which 
places, individuals and cultures get to be stabilised and re-accommodated from a 
global perspective, that is, that they can be “glocalised”. On the other hand, it 
foregrounds the historical mechanisms through which heterogeneous worldviews 
were either silenced or erased by nation-states so that the “imagined communities” 
(Anderson 1983) represented by modern nations could emerge, and thus helps to 
justify separatist aspirations and cultural entrenchment ideologies worldwide.  
For many an observer, the current tension between homogeneity and difference, 
and/or globality and locality, simply reproduces the power struggles that 
characterised the emergence of nation-state ideology, with two important twists: 
first, the scale of the struggle is now global and, second, the process is not driven 
by the state but by transnational capital, to which states are now increasingly 
subjected. As far as we consider this analogy valid, however, multiculturalism 
constitutes a new variable that tends to make inclusion this time a very different 
matter: whereas in the previous order inclusion meant silencing cultural 
differences, in the new (dis)order it is about celebrating, and often reinventing, 
essentialised differences that can be traded off for better life-chances. 
Hence, instead of fearing an alleged cultural homogenisation of the world, those 
concerned with inclusion as transformation should probably be more concerned 
with how differences are being discursively/politically produced by means of such 
ideologies as multiculturalism and such technological infrastructures as ICT, and 
with finding alternative views to what we might refer to as “inclusion”. One such 
view is hybridity,6 as put forward by contemporary cultural theory, to which I now 
turn. 
5. Hybridity: inclusion as “border crossing” 
In many post-industrial societies of the liberal West, the tension between 
homogenising global forces and struggles for the recognition of difference has 
6 Both “hybridity” and “hybridism” are used to refer to the concept and body of knowledge to which I 
now turn. I have decided to use “hybridity” following the majority of the bibliographical sources 
produced in English that are cited here.  
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produced disjunctive political solutions, that is, a compromise between 
universalised political obligations – such as obedience to the constitution – and 
particularised, pre-defined cultural rights. By means of such disjunction, certain 
Western states try to accommodate the post-national, post-colonial and post-
modern clamour for the recognition of difference within the ideals of universal 
citizenship and cultural neutrality of the state, which are foundational of liberalism.  
As post-structural cultural theory7 has it, however, cultural identities do not pre-
exist cultural subjects, nor are they rationally stabilised by cultural groups. Cultural 
identities, are, in fact, continuously produced and/or performed by means of 
heterogeneous practices and discourses that incorporate cultural material from the 
Other. In other words, cultural identities can not be fixed a priori, nor do they 
result from rational disjunctions, but are constantly re-performed and renewed by 
hybridity.  
Hybridity is not to be taken here as the interbreeding of different species usually 
resulting in sterile offspring, or mongrelisation, as the word is normally interpreted 
in the life sciences, but “the interrelated phenomena of biological, linguistic, 
cultural, spiritual, and political mixing produced through some sort of border 
crossing” (Friedman 2002: 14). In sharp contrast with previous ethnocentric and 
puristic views that deemed hybrid subjects and/or cultures unnatural, inferior or 
even outrageous – the very etymological roots of the word can be traced back to 
the Latin word hubris, an outrage on nature – hybridity is currently theorised as the 
cultural output of globalisation and the key to the post-modern subject. 
Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the idea of fusion or mixture in the various 
discourses about hybridity, the concept currently serves at least three different (not 
mutually exclusive) models, or traditions, of cultural analysis, according to 
Friedman (2002), of which we must be aware.  
In the fusion hybridity model, two or more elements (cultures, identities, languages, 
etc.) seen as originally pure and discrete are mixed to create an entirely new form. 
This new form, then, is supposed to represent a total rupture with the original units. 
In terms of inclusion, this model is probably best illustrated by the crucible or 
melting-pot metaphor, which says that differences can be melted away in the 
production of a new essential uniqueness. A second model, interplay hybridity, 
postulates an ongoing process of action and reaction between different cultures in a 
syncretist context within which, in spite of the contact and mutual contaminations, 
each form remains recognisably distinct. Finally, there is always already hybridity, 
the third model, which posits a radical refusal of purity both in the original, pre-
fusion form and in the resulting, post-fusion one. This tradition sees hybridity as 
7 An eclectic school of thought that attempts to break up with earlier (structuralist) approaches to the 
study of socio-cultural phenomena. While structuralism relies on the existence of underlying 
invariant (deep) structures inherent in cultures and cultural products, post-structuralism holds that 
no universal system of rules can explain “reality”, that “reality” itself does not exist independent or 
beyond language and ideology, and that meaning does not pre-exist its realisation just as no 
individual subject is pre-defined by some transhistorical essence.  
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the always operating blending of always already mixed forms, or, in simpler terms, 
it presupposes that traces of other cultures have always existed in every culture, 
and that such traces cannot be connected to either a definite origin or an ultimate 
end point. 
Friedman (2002: 4) exemplifies these three modes of hybridity by referring to how 
jazz music can be conceived: “as an instance of fusion hybridity” says the author, 
“jazz is an entirely new and distinct musical form born of the mixing of West 
African and Anglo-European musical practices. As interplay hybridity, jazz 
combines elements of West African and Anglo-European musics, easily 
identifiable to a trained ear. As always already hybridity, jazz mixes musics which 
are themselves the products of continual musical syncretism within West Africa, 
the United States, Europe and Britain, along with influences from other continents. 
Rooted in the US, jazz has nonetheless taken many cultural forms within these 
boundaries and has continued its syncretist development as it travels worldwide.” 
Although hybridity, unlike multiculturalism, is not instantiated in the form of an 
official political doctrine, it can shed light on the issue of cultural difference in 
ways than inform political stances. According to Friedman (2002: 14), whatever 
mode is considered, the cultural work of hybridity tends to be theorised in two 
ways: it is either seen as “an entirely routine, inevitable, and ordinary part of all 
cultural formations as they emerge, change, and travel through time and across 
space”, or as “transgressive, a creative force that disrupts, denaturalises, and 
potentially dismantles hegemonic cultural formations”. We are thus faced not with 
one but with three alternatives to the multiculturalist rhetoric of 
inclusion/exclusion, should we try to interpret hybridity politically. 
Fusion hybridity might very well provide support for either the political 
demonisation of the Other, or the overvaluation of the Other as superior. 
Demonisation because contact with the Other should contaminate allegedly pure, 
traditional cultures, thus instilling inequity in the idyllic cultural formations of the 
local. Overvaluation because contact with the superior Other, taken as pure, should 
gradually improve the local, should “include” the inferior in the superior ways of 
the Other. For the sake of illustration, fusion hybridity ideology, in its “improving 
the inferior” version, has been very influential in the Brazilian politics of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As Skidmore (1992: 6) explains: “When 
the doctrines of scientific racism struck Brazil, especially after 1870 … the 
Brazilian elite offered an ingenious response. They turned on its head the basic 
assumption of the white supremacists. They accepted the doctrine of innate white 
superiority, but they then argued that in Brazil the white was prevailing through 
miscegenation. Instead of ‘mongrelizing’ the race, racial mixing was ‘whitening’ 
Brazil. Miscegenation, far from a menace, was Brazil’s salvation.” 
As anachronistic as these views may sound, they can still be seen at work in current 
discourses of digital inclusion/exclusion, for example, when public opinion 
reproaches the purchase of a satellite dish, or an internet-ready computer, by an 
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indigenous community, for fear of “cultural loss”,8 or, conversely, when politicians 
sell the idea that access to ICT-based content “may not get the children out of the 
favela, but will certainly get the favela out of the children”. 
Interplay hybridity, on the other hand, cannot be said to support idolisation or 
demonisation of the Other because it does not support the idea of cultural “loss” or 
cultural “improvement”. Instead, it relates the interaction between different 
cultures (or interculturality) that, ultimately, makes cultures change over time and 
adapt to new objective conditions. Language is perhaps the most obvious example. 
As language philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin (1988: 156) puts it, languages evolve 
historically by means of hybridisation, that is “a mixing of various ‘languages’ co-
existing within the boundaries of a single dialect, a single national language, a 
single branch, a single group of different branches or different groups of such 
branches, in the historical as well as paleontological past of languages”.9  
Political action inspired in interplay hybridity would, thus, theoretically trust the 
natural forces of assimilation and transformation of elements borrowed from other 
cultures, or perhaps try to strengthen them, as a form of inclusion that resists 
cultural subordination. In fact, some theoretical voices of interplay hybridity would 
be particularly useful in the construction of such approach to digital inclusion. 
García Canclini (2005), for example, comes to mind immediately, as he 
problematises the notion of connection, both in technological and sociological 
terms, based on the premise that we are moving from a multicultural world to an 
intercultural one.  
“Differences and inequities,” he says (2005: 92), “are no longer fractures to be 
overcome, as modern humanism, with its well-known naïveté, had it. The relative 
globalised unification of the markets does not feel disturbed by the existence of the 
different and the unequal, which is evidenced by the weakening of those words and 
their replacement by ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’. What does the preponderance of 
such vocabulary mean? Society, formerly conceived in terms of strata or levels, or 
of distinctions according to national or ethnic identities, is now conceived through 
the network metaphor. The included are those who are connected; the others are the 
excluded, the ones whose links are broken as they get unemployed, homeless, 
disconnected.”10  
8 I place the term inside quotation marks to signal its inconsistency with the notion of culture as a 
process through which people make sense of their lives, instead of a set of stable values and beliefs 
that could eventually be lost. 
9 “... mistura das diversas linguagens que coexistem no seio de um mesmo dialeto, de uma mesma 
língua nacional, de uma mesma ramificação, de um mesmo grupo de ramificações ou de vários, 
tanto no passado histórico das línguas, como no seu passado paleontológico ...” 
10 “As diferenças e desigualdades deixam de ser fraturas a superar, como queria, com a ingenuidade 
que conhecemos, o humanismo moderno. A relativa unificação globalizada dos mercados não se 
sente perturbada pela existência de diferentes e desiguais: uma prova é o enfraquecimento desses 
termos e a sua substituição por esses outros, inclusão ou exclusão. O que significa o predomínio 
deste vocabulário? A sociedade, antes concebida em termos de estratos e níveis, ou distinguido-se 
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Thus, while the circle metaphor serves a worldview that is compatible with liberal 
multiculturalism, García Canclini (2005: 17) uses the network metaphor to clarify 
the need for other assumptions about culture and society to subsidise inclusion, on 
the grounds that we have moved from a multicultural world to an intercultural one. 
To shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism, or to replace inclusion with 
connection, though, is not as simple a solution for the difference-inequality 
paradox as it might sound at first as, like all others, the network metaphor also 
embodies assumptions about culture and society that we might want to question.  
It is true that while the circle and the crucible emphasise centredness and 
containment, the network entails flow and decentredness, and that while the circle 
suggests iteration, the network proposes a form of interaction that does not result in 
the melting away of differences. We should, notwithstanding, extend this 
metaphor, as I have previously done with the circle, to understand that every 
network is comprised of other networks, some of which we may not be aware of, or 
might only consider when our immediate, preferred connections fail. Consequently, 
the network metaphor does not really rid us of the problem of power, that is, of the 
fact that (economic, political or technical) power is ultimately responsible for 
turning differences into inequalities. It simply transmutes centredness and 
hierarchy into polycentredness and regulation of flow.  
Nevertheless, interculturalism (or interplay hybridity) may provide a powerful 
counter-discourse against conservative multiculturalism in that it does not sentence 
the marginal/subaltern groups to entrenchment in traditional, imaginarily 
homogeneous, cultural pigeon-holes. It certainly responds more adequately to the 
fact that the world is allegedly becoming a contact zone where the diasporic 
experience need not entail geographical relocation – the fact that we live at a time 
when “our neighbourhood, our town, our nation are identification sceneries”11 
where we “appropriate other repertoires available in the world, which we encounter 
as we shop for imported goods in the supermarket, or turn on the TV, or move 
between countries as tourists or migrants”12 (García Canclini 2005: 44).  
Still, the global-society-as-network metaphor tends to downplay the existence of 
power-nodes regulating the flow of exchanges, and the ways through which such 
regulation selects the differences that matter for the perpetuation of some cultural 
nodes and switches off those that are potentially disruptive or unprofitable. 
Globalisation and the expansion of the ICT infrastructure are in fact not as 
pervasive as transnational media and Western politicians like to announce, but very 
unevenly distributed around the globe and within national communities. Neither is 
segundo identidades étnicas ou nacionais, agora é pensada com a metáfora da rede. Os incluídos 
são os que estão conectados; os outros são os excluídos, os que vêem rompidos seus vínculos ao 
ficar sem trabalho, sem casa, sem conexão.” 
11 “... nosso bairro, nossa cidade, nossa nação são cenários de identificação …” 
12 “... apropriamo-nos de outros repertórios disponíveis no mundo, que nos chegam quando 
compramos produtos importados no supermercado, quando ligamos a televisão ou passamos de um 
país para o outro como turistas ou migrantes”. 
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the loosening of the bonds between culture and territory equally true to all contexts, 
for there remain countless stigmatised localities in the world where access to 
electricity and telephone networks, let alone internet connections, has yet to come. 
Always already hybridity, on the other hand, potentially dismantles cultural 
hierarchies as well as centre-periphery or node-based configurations of power and 
culture, but it does so on basically on one condition: that we get rid of the idea of 
inclusion/exclusion and embrace the notion that cultures and identities are always 
open and heterogeneous, and so we are all always already included and excluded at 
the same time. From this particular perspective, fighting inequalities based on 
differences is neither a matter of entrenchment and trade-off, nor of appropriation 
and interplay, but a matter of destabilising and subverting the works of power in 
the assignment of sameness and otherness by means of whichever practices, 
discourses and technologies there are. 
This subversive, destabilising potential of hybridity is more often and more 
incisively addressed by post-colonialism, a critical perspective that gained 
momentum through the analysis of literary works, but which is now also central in 
a broad range of discussions about globalisation, racism, diasporic movements and 
multiculturalism (Hall 2003). Post-colonial critique approaches hybridity from the 
point of view of representation, drawing on language/discourse theories, such as 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s dialogism and Jacques Derrida’s deconstructionism, to question 
cultural essentialism, that is, to show that cultural identities, like meanings, are 
dialogically produced by means of institutional and representational systems.  
Bakhtin did not see language as an abstract system of normative forms, but as an 
always evolving process that is realised through verbal interaction among social 
subjects, or dialogue. For him, the most fundamental unit of language is the 
utterance, that is, the performance of language by a defined subject within a 
specific historical and socio-cultural context, and every utterance stands in a 
dialogic relationship to previous or presupposed ones. Bakhtin (1988: 156) referred 
to hybridisation not only as a natural fact of languages which allow them to evolve 
and survive through history, but also to conceive ambiguity as a property of 
language that can consciously be activated by speaker/writer. In this case, 
hybridisation is “a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single 
utterance, an encounter, within the arena of an utterance, between two different 
linguistic consciousnesses, separated from one another by an epoch, by social 
differentiation or by both”.13 That kind of hybridisation, therefore, does not 
reconcile (or melt) two different points of view into a single one, but establishes a 
dissonance or mutual contestation that keeps the meaning of the utterance 
indefinitely open. Such conception is instrumental in the way Homi Bhabha 
(1994), one of the most prominent post-colonial theorists, shows, through his 
criticism of British colonial literature, that hybridity disrupts the hegemony-
13 “... uma mistura de duas linguagens sociais no interior de um único enunciado, é o reencontro na 
arena deste enunciado de duas consciências lingüísticas, separadas por uma época, por uma 
diferença social (ou por ambas) …”  
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subalternity relationship between the coloniser and the colonised by producing 
ambivalence on both sides. 
To support their assertion that cultures and cultural identities are inevitably open, 
post-colonial authors also draw on Derrida’s deconstructionism. For the French 
scholar, meaning in a given language (or text) is never fixed and derived from an 
independent objective world, but generated by means of relations among signifiers 
(ultimately, words can only refer to other words). Such relations normally take the 
form of binary oppositions in which one term is taken as fundamental and the other 
as derivative: the meaning of “woman”, for example, is generated by binary 
opposition to “man” (woman equals not man). To deconstruct is to dismantle such 
oppositions by showing that neither term is fundamental, that is, by showing that 
the opposition is a construction. 
For Derrida (1982, para. 25), “there can be arbitrariness only because the system of 
signs is constituted solely by the differences in terms, and not by their plenitude. 
The elements of signification function due not to the compact force of their nuclei, 
but rather to the network of oppositions that distinguishes them, and then relates 
them one to another”. Derrida’s différance, then, refers to “the movement 
according to which language, or any code, any system of referral in general is 
constituted ‘historically’ as a weave of differences” (para. 29), the word movement 
in this definition implying the impossibility of fixing the meaning of a sign 
permanently or attaching it to any “true” original meaning.  
Post-colonial theorists such as Bhabha (1994) and Hall (2003) take it that culture, 
like language, is constructed by différance, that is, culture is an open semiosis 
where hybridity rules. Hybridity thus corresponds to cultural translation, the word 
“translation” not referring to correspondences between two discrete systems, but to 
processes of dislocation, of bearing something across from one system to the other. 
Hybridity or cultural translation, in turn, takes place in what Bhabha (1994: 37) 
calls third spaces, that is, “discursive sites or conditions that ensure that the 
meaning and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the 
same signs can be appropriated, translated, and rehistoricized anew”.  
It is easier to get the third space out of its invisibility when we look at diasporic 
communities such as the often-cited groups of immigrants from ex-colonies (and 
their descendants) living in France, Portugal or the United Kingdom, because the 
co-presence of subjects or elements previously separated by geographical and 
historical disjunctures is still very evident. But the term ultimately refers to the fact 
that meaning is always dependent on objectively and ideologically heterogeneous 
contexts, subject to socio-historical conditioning factors. Strictly speaking, the 
third space is the space between signifying and signified that every interpreter, in 
every community, needs to handle in order to make meaning, a locus that is always 
constituted by a whole array of conflicting ideological, linguistic and cultural 
elements.  
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The contact zone or the border crossing experience of diasporas, nomadism, or 
immersion in such discursive sites as the internet makes the third space more 
tangible because it disrupts the artificial, coercive mechanisms which allow for the 
illusion that there was ever an original homogeneity or a stable resolution for 
meaning. This is essentially why, in post-colonial theory, the third space, or 
hybridity itself, is subversive, destabilising, transgressive: once retrieved from its 
invisibility, it deconstructs, negotiates and transforms all binary divisions (global-
local, traditional-modern, ethnic-white, gay-straight, national-foreign, social-
technical, included-excluded, and so on).  
How does always already hybridity translate into digital inclusion? Well, it 
certainly does not translate into finding a better niche within static power structures 
or imposed cultural grids, nor establishing more authorised connections within 
power-regulated networks. In fact, it is contradictory to the idea of stasis, and 
therefore of status, or state, as it points to the various ways through which the 
construction of such instances relies on ethnocentric representations of the world. 
Consequently, if there is any point in talking about a political stance on inclusion 
from that perspective, it is probably only in the sense of questioning the very idea 
that for social justice to prevail, there needs to be fixed, categorised and localised 
identities attached to specific geographical and/or social spaces. As far-fetched as 
this may sound, the best that always already hybridity can do for the debate on 
inclusion is to disavow the concept itself in pretty much the same way that an ideal 
multiculturalism should make the term itself unnecessary. In other words, by 
fostering interpretations of identity and difference as open, contingent, temporary 
and fluid, always already hybridity can subsidise a definition of democracy as a 
genuinely heterogeneous space (Hall 2003) and promote a ceaseless confrontation 
of all forms of closure. 
6. Concluding remarks: more borders to cross  
The considerations presented in this paper aim to contribute to the construction of a 
theory of digital inclusion that avoids both the implausible postulations of 
technological determinism and the naivety of instrumental theories of technology, 
which fall short of recognising the cultural and ideological embeddedness of ICT. 
Motivated by the results of recent research in which access to ICT is considered in 
relation to the contexts that culturalise it, I ventured discussing some underlying 
assumptions of current political doctrines regarding heterogeneity in order to 
problematise digital inclusion as an intersection between access to ICT and social 
inclusion.  
First, I emphasised the paradoxical nature of liberal multiculturalism and its 
double-edgedness, especially with respect to the tension between the alleged waves 
of cultural homogenisation and of proliferation of difference that characterises 
globalisation. I then turned to hybridity, in its various modes, as a possible 
alternative to the rhetoric of multiculturalism, in quest of its implications for a 
theory of social (digital) inclusion. The contrast between assumptions underlying 
278 Marcelo El Khouri Buzato
 
those two visions of inclusion shows that conservative varieties of multiculturalism 
are political strategies that operate on a conception of culture that cultural theory 
itself disavows. On the other hand, hybridity, as theorised in contemporary cultural 
theory, is not always compatible with the very notion of inclusion.  
This incommensurability between cultural theory and the politics of cultural 
heterogeneity, however, opens the way for a complex set of new questions that 
those interested in the relations between ICT, society and culture need to answer: to 
what extent does the concept of inclusion as containment still hold when we begin 
to dream of, or be frightened by, the idea of the world as a digitally supported zone 
of contact where crossing symbolic borders is the rule? Does inclusion adequately 
translate our concerns in relation to the ways through which ICT access is 
supposed to improve people’s lives? If it does, then how can we work towards a 
notion of inclusion that goes beyond access and connection to account for 
heterogeneity and cosmopolitan citizenship? 
To that set of questions, we should add quite a few others that hybridity inspires. 
First, we need to know more about how hybridity underlies representation in ICT 
seen as a medium, that is, about how semiotic modalities, linguistic codes and 
artificial languages intertwine in the digital discourses that shape and are shaped by 
contemporary societies, so that we can uncover the ways through which the 
supposed homogeneity and discreteness of the cultural and the technical reinforce 
political forms of oppression or exclusion. Second, we need to probe further into 
technology as a contact zone between culture, science and politics, and into 
technological innovation as a process of translation – in that same sense the word 
acquires in post-colonial critique. How do ICT become black boxes (Latour 1987), 
how do they acquire closed, fixed meanings, and how can we dislocate them in 
order that they can be of better service to the inevitable openness of culture? Third, 
we need to find ways to deconstruct such binary oppositions as virtual and real and 
to find out how ICT are entangled in the hybrid cultural spaces, literacies and 
identities of late modernity. 
In pursuing answers to these questions we might very well end up discarding the 
words “inclusion” and “exclusion” which, notwithstanding, are still an important if 
inaccurate means of referring to the deepening of social injustice the world faces 
(or, maybe, has more difficulty ignoring) today. Nevertheless, if we do so, it will 
be for the sake of establishing a new, more powerful connection between what we 
think is ethically right and what we know is theoretically acceptable. To pursue this 
adequacy, on the other hand, digital inclusion theorists from various academic 
backgrounds will, paradoxically, have to deal with the same kind of border 
crossing, instability or hybridity that they wish to explain. That is pretty much what 
I have tried to do here. 
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